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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 enacted one of the most 
significant reforms seen in the United States healthcare landscape. The Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid (CMS) led transformation efforts in regulatory reform and coverage expansion 
across the U.S. population. Since 2010, care delivery systems have been shifting from episodic, 
decentralized and fee-for-service models to value-based population health models, like 
accountable care organizations (ACO). ACOs have been specifically primed for local response 
to improve the health of their communities. ACO research has traditionally focused on 
performance measures like mortality, readmissions, quality outcomes and savings. ACO 
organizational characteristics analyzed in the literature have focused on provider composition, 
health information technology, leadership structures and provider access. According to CMS, 
readmissions account for one of the greatest contributors in healthcare spend, and studies by 
The Commonwealth Fund detail the top percentile of the population as high need, high cost 
vi 
 
 
 
(HNHC) patients who further contribute to the majority of healthcare spend. Opportunity exists 
to explore the diversity among ACO structures, their relationship to local environments and 
influence on top contributors to healthcare spend, like readmissions and high need , high cost 
populations. 
The objectives of this study are to better understand existing ACO structures, explore 
relationships among ACO organizational structures, their local environment in which they 
operate and directional impact on performance, with emphasis on at risk patients like high need, 
high cost populations. Theoretically, this study applies Structural Contingency Theory (SCT) for 
its empirical analyses, specifically a multiple contingency approach. In the extant literature, SCT 
has not been commonly applied due to its longitudinal nature and limited public access to ACO 
organizational data. 
The study sample consists of 45 ACOs that entered into the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program under Track 1 for the entire term from 2015 to 2017. ACO performance is represented 
by total shared savings, change in rate of readmissions and change in rate of inpatient 
psychiatric admissions. Four contingency-structure relationships are analyzed from the National 
Survey of Accountable Care Organizations and CMS Public Use Files, 1) ACO governance 
structure and strategy alignment, 2) Interdependency from complex coordination and formalized 
provider agreement types, 3) interdependency from complex coordination and formalized 
relationships with mental and behavioral health specialists, and 4) complex coordination and 
health IT integration and interoperability. Regression analyses were used to analyzed potential 
misfit and directional impact on performance and the contingency-structure pairs. Results 
indicate that wide variety exists among ACO structures, that conventional investments in 
provider agreements and fully integrated health IT do not clearly present positive performance 
effect. Future research opportunities exist to further examine the impact ACO programs have on 
meeting community needs and populations. 
vii 
 
 
 
This study offers the theoretical application of a multiple contingency approach from 
Structural Contingency Theory and a practical exploration of ACO structure, its contextual 
operations and performance on high need, high cost populations. 
Keywords: Accountable care organizations, structural contingency theory, organizational 
design, organizational structure, high need high cost, readmissions, earned shared savings, 
NSACO, value based care
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the wake of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, many healthcare 
organizations and payers in the United States moved towards a value-based model for health 
services delivery and reimbursement (Kaufman et al., 2017). Historically, United States care 
delivery has been volume-driven and based on fee-for-service payment schemes according to 
episodes of care delivered in fragmented pieces with disparate provider incentives (Martin et al., 
2016). In comparison, value-based structures, such as the Accountable Care Organization 
(ACO), operate under an integrated population health delivery model that considers the total 
cost of services across the care continuum (Berenson et al., 2016).  
Organizations under a value-based model are incentivized to reduce unnecessary 
services and focus on preventable care (Cox et al., 2016). Furthermore, studies have shown 
that the greatest improvement opportunity to reduce healthcare expenditure is among the top 
10% of the patient population that consumes the largest quantity of services – identified as high 
need, high cost patients (HNHC) (McCarthy, Ryan, & Klein, 2015). These patients are usually 
indicated by Medicare and Medicaid dual eligible status, existing chronic conditions, behavioral 
issues, functional limitations and socioeconomic challenges (Dean & Grabowski, 2014; Guerard 
et al., 2019). Healthcare literature cites readmissions as being the greatest performance 
indicator for unnecessary spend due to breakdowns in care coordination, discharge planning, 
post-acute care transitions and timely access to ambulatory care services (Chukmaitov et al., 
2018; Hines et al., 2014; Mask & Adepoju, 2018). Therefore, significant reduction in 
 
 
2 
 
unnecessary health spend may be achieved by concentrating efforts on preventing unplanned 
hospital readmissions for HNHC patients. 
Existing research has yet to validate that ACOs have produced sustainable 
improvements and what ACO structures are optimal to reduce readmissions (Albright et al., 
2016; Comfort et al., 2018; Fisher et al., 2012). There is exploratory research being conducted 
to determine if  a value-based population management approach can effectively reduce national 
healthcare expenditure and improve quality outcomes (Albright et al., 2016; Duggal et al., 2018). 
This research will study the structural characteristics of value-based programs, specifically 
Accountable Care Organizations, and their performance in preventable readmissions and total 
savings earned in relation to HNHC patient populations.  
Background 
The US has operated mostly under a fee-for-service model of healthcare delivery; thus, 
health services consumption and utilization remains high as the United States population ages, 
catalyzing the need for regulatory and healthcare delivery reform. Currently, 17.9% of the US 
GDP is attributed to national health expenditures, with projections by the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid (CMS) to reach 19.4% by 2027, if spending continues at its current rate (CMS, 
2018). On a global scale, US health spending is highest among Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 2019). According to the Commonwealth Fund (Squires, 2015), consumption of 
health services in the United States is 50% greater than in other high-income nations, while 
producing less than comparable health benefits in relation to their cohort. Efforts to implement 
delivery reform are being addressed in both public and private sectors, with CMS being one of 
the largest public players to affect such reform efforts (Kaufman et al., 2017). 
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Population Health Key Indicators and Outcomes 
CMS has implemented critical changes to regulatory, quality and financial policies to 
align with population health care delivery. One major metric CMS has identif ied as part of 
healthcare reform is the rate in which patients are re-hospitalized or readmitted within 30 days 
of their hospital discharge (Kroch et al., 2015; Mask & Adepoju, 2018; Ryan et al., 2017). 
According to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), $41.3 billion in hospital 
costs were associated with 30 day all-cause readmissions, pointing to major potential for 
savings (Hines et al., 2014). Patients who were re-hospitalized within 30 days of their inpatient 
discharge were potentially admitted with “ambulatory care sensitive conditions [that suggested 
they] could have been avoided through high-quality outpatient care or that reflect conditions that 
could be less severe, if treated early and appropriately” (AHRQ, 2001). Readmissions serve as 
indicators for healthcare gaps and magnitude of waste in the delivery model.  
Causes for Readmissions  
Extant readmissions literature consists of diverse approaches and tools focused on 
readmissions reduction or prevention. For example, the Society of Hospital Medicine published 
a risk assessment tool with categories identifying high risk factors that attribute to patients who 
are more susceptible to being readmitted within 30 days of discharge if not addressed 
appropriately or in a timely manner.  This tool, called BOOST 8Ps, uses a methodology that 
addresses social and clinical determinants of health, such as problematic medications, 
polypharmacy needs, psychological care, primary diagnoses for chronic care management, 
patient support needs, prior hospitalizations, poor health literacy and palliative care needs 
(Hansen et al., 2013).  
Several studies have analyzed readmission root causes and effects on patient 
outcomes, such as provider coordination during transitions of care (Mileski et al., 2017; 
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Takahashi et al., 2016; Winblad et al., 2017). Winblad and colleagues identify one cause being 
communication breakdowns from inpatient discharge to post-acute settings, like a skilled 
nursing facility (SNF), that result in readmissions. The authors compared hospitals affiliated or 
not-affiliated with ACOs on targeting at-risk patients and communication platforms between 
facilities. The research showed that hospitals affiliated with ACOs had significantly better 
processes in identifying patients at-risk for readmissions, enhanced information sharing and 
greater communication between hospitals and SNFs. Such enhanced processes are dependent 
on the technological capabilities of health service providers and organizations to promote care 
continuity. This is especially important for patients with higher needs and complexity requiring 
intensive care coordination. Traditionally, models of  care and cost evaluations have been 
focused at the inpatient setting, but with the move towards value-based care, the scope of 
managing patients with high risks for readmissions expands to the ambulatory and post -acute 
setting (Berry et al., 2013) 
Populations at Greatest Risk for Readmissions.  A large concentration of 
readmissions is centered on a small population (top 10% of Medicare patients) with few chronic 
diagnoses, heart failure, septicemia and pneumonia, representing $4.3 billion in hospital costs 
(Hines et al., 2014; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2019). Often 
referenced as an inverse pyramid, 5% of the adult populations accessing health care in the 
United States are identif ied as patients with the highest need and producing the highest costs 
(Bélanger et al., 2019; Blumenthal, 2017). Opportunities, therefore, exist in developing a 
healthcare delivery model that bridges care gaps and focuses on chronic disease populations at 
highest risk for readmissions. 
Public Health Program Efforts that Address High Risk for Readmission Patients. 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act implemented several federal programs to begin 
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structural alignment with changes to healthcare regulatory reform. One such program that has 
gained significant momentum and attention is the accountable care organization (ACO)  model. 
ACOs were established in 2010 in order to build a patient-centered community among providers 
across all settings of care through population health management (Fisher & Shortell, 2010; Sen 
et al., 2018). Essentially, ACOs are groups of providers collectively held responsible for a 
defined population, (described as ACO beneficiaries) to control spending and improve quality of 
care, measured or benchmarked according to national healthcare outcomes metrics (Barnes et 
al., 2014; Berenson et al., 2016). In correlation with the high potential cost savings of 
readmissions, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act included a section in the new 
legislature called the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) and implemented a 
new incentive for readmissions reductions for participating Medicare organizations (McIlvennan 
et al., 2015). Healthcare organizations or physician groups that elected to become an ACO have 
grown exponentially from its inception in 2010 to current times, showing a dramatic shift in care 
delivery from fee-for-service to value-based care (Winblad et al., 2017). But due to the 
fragmented and convoluted system of healthcare delivery in the US, heterogeneous structures 
have developed across the ACO markets and performance has been variable (Kaufman et al., 
2017). Variability of ACO structures exist, differing by size, governance, span of control, risk 
sharing, networking and information systems maturity (Cryts, 2015).  
Accountable Care Organizations: What Structures Exist Today 
Initially, CMS established two main ACO financial models: the pioneer model and the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program model (MSSP). The pioneer model served as the ACO’s 
f irst generation model for 2-sided risk sharing, including upside rewards for shared savings and 
downside penalties for overspending or missed targets. Slight deviations to the 2-sided risk 
sharing model include advanced payment bundling or capitated payments for bundled care 
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programs (A. J. Barnes et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2018). MSSP models came online in subsequent 
generations, building an incremental bonus structure for upside rewards sharing and advancing 
to multiple options for 2-sided risk in later models.  
These financial models serve as incentives and change drivers to healthcare delivery. In 
risk sharing models, healthcare organizations are incentivized to improve care coordination, 
place greater emphasis on preventative care and reduce medically unnecessary services. 
Operational and environmental challenges exist along the care continuum, representing multiple 
issues individual organizations must address. Additionally, current ACO models may operate 
under different forms of governance, such as a hospital-led versus physician group-led ACO. 
The difference in governance informs where risk will be taken. For example, hospital-led ACOs 
would have greater capability for risk management and be inclined to integrate services along 
the care continuum in the effort to have greater control of services to ease transition from 
inpatient discharge to the ambulatory setting. On the contrary, physician group-led ACOs would 
be more focused on controlling referral and admission patterns to manage their risk as patients 
navigate the system in the outpatient setting (Comfort et al., 2018; D’Aunno et al., 2018; Wu et 
al., 2016). For those with higher risks and higher potential for rewards, organizations are thus 
motivated to decrease risk where they are weakest in operations. This may translate to 
organizational integration in the effort to improve service coordination or new partnerships to 
expand coverage and services (Fisher et al., 2012; McHugh et al., 2018; Winblad et al., 2017).  
Research Opportunities 
CMS outlined preliminary structures for ACO management but allowed individual ACOs 
flexibility to customize their programs to their local environments. Therefore, many structural 
forms have been trialed, and healthcare organizations continue to seek the best form to deliver 
care and optimize patient outcomes. Shortell and colleagues (2014) proposed a taxonomy for 
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ACOs, classified into three groups: 1) large integrated health systems with broad services, 2) 
physician group practices focused largely on primary care, and 3) joint physician-hospital 
initiatives with moderate service levels. The study precipitated further taxonomic ACO research 
by Bazzoli and colleagues (2017), who analyzed commonalities across ACO structures using 
the American Hospital Association’s ACO competencies, utilizing key data to categorize ACOs 
along a spectrum of ambulatory services, provider network access and health information 
technology (IT) capabilities. The study categorizes organizational structures as having either: 1) 
highly functioning IT capabilities and expansive access to ambulatory services; 2) highly 
functioning IT capabilities but low levels of access to ambulatory services; 3) low functioning IT 
capabilities; 4) highly functioning IT capabilities, expansive access to ambulatory services, and 
tight alignment between hospitals and providers regarding value-based care incentives; or, 5) 
some IT capabilities and a loose alignment among providers with hospitals on the value-based 
model. Bazzoli and colleagues expanded their taxonomy from Shortell and colleagues’ seminal 
work by including ACO technology capabilities for evaluation. At the time of Shortell and 
colleagues’ research, ACO development was at its nascent form, including any national-level 
and standardized data consortium available for ACO research. As ACOs grew in volume and 
sophistication, data capture and management also improved for research and study, which 
helped Bazzoli and colleagues’ updated ACO taxonomy analysis. This research will utilize 
Bazzoli and colleagues’ taxonomic groups and adapt according to data available by the National 
Survey of Accountable Care Organizations (NSACO) related to in-depth organizational 
categories relevant to current environmental trends in health services research. 
Existing literature has focused on the impact that MSSP and Pioneer ACOs have had on 
health services consumption and clinical outcomes, such as mortality and re-hospitalizations 
from a SNF (Colla, Lewis, Tierney, et al., 2016; Conway et al., 2018; Pham et al., 2014) . Further 
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opportunities for more in-depth analyses of populations with the greatest impact to readmissions 
exist. Studies involving ACOs have not drilled down on specific populations that contribute to 
high service consumption, such as patients with multiple chronic conditions and socioeconomic 
needs. Comparatively, there is a plethora of literature on the topic of readmissions and high -risk 
populations with chronic conditions and complex needs (Bergethon et al., 2016; Bisiani & 
Jurgens, 2015; Chukmaitov et al., 2018; Hayes et al., 2016; McCarthy et al., 2015; Ryan et al., 
2017; Shah et al., 2016). Opportunity exists to bridge the two areas of study and further explore 
population health models that address readmissions for high risk patient populations. 
Structural Contingency Theory and ACO Model Research 
On a national scale, CMS has implemented regulatory and reimbursement policy 
changes that effected constant disruption across the healthcare industry. On an organizational 
level, diverse ACO models exist in the healthcare market, producing varied results. One of the 
top contributors to healthcare spending has been identified as readmissions by at-risk 
populations. Conceptually, opportunity exists to explore ACO organizational structures, their 
associated environmental contingencies and the effect on performance, such as readmissions 
and total shared savings related to high risk populations. Bazzoli and colleagues (2017) 
described five categories of structures among hospital-affiliated ACOs, highlighting variation in 
their range of IT capabilities, ambulatory services, and provider alignment. Among the 
readmissions literature, studies have identif ied significant factors in addressing high risk 
populations that may prevent readmissions, such as communications among providers, 
coordination of services, transitions management during changes in levels of care and care 
continuity as the patient navigates the system.  
This research will bridge the gap in ACO and readmissions literature by analyzing which 
ACO structures have the greatest impact on readmission rates and total earned shared savings 
 
 
9 
 
for high risk populations through the lens of Structural Contingency Theory (SCT). SCT is most 
apt as a theoretical framework for this study because SCT focuses on how performance is 
impacted by fit between organizational structure and the contingencies in which organizations 
operate. Contingencies, like environmental uncertainty and task interdependence, are identified 
in the literature as moderating variables that influence changes to structure and impact on 
performance. In SCT literature, Donaldson (2001) highlights the core concepts of the theoretical 
framework that this study will apply: 1) there is an association between structure and 
contingency, 2) when contingencies change, fit can be disrupted and structural adaptation 
occurs to regain fit, and 3) fit between structure and contingencies affects performance. A 
foundational concept in SCT is that there is no one best fit; instead, fit is tailored to that specific 
organization’s structure and its contingencies. Performance is thus determined by the most 
optimal fit between an organization’s structure and contingencies. Applying Bazzoli and 
colleagues’ (2017) taxonomic categories, this study will analyze the relationship that exists 
between hospital structures among ACOs, the level of differentiation and integration among its 
services and the impact on performance for high need, high cost populations.  
Upcoming Chapters 
In chapter two, this paper will present extant literature on ACOs, specifically what 
research exists comparing various ACO program structures, qualitative and quantitative models 
of research conducted on ACOs and the different applications such research have had on 
operationalizing ACOs. Also, this literature review chapter will include the theoretical models 
applied in analyzing ACOs in the past and what statistical models have been utilized.  
Chapter three will describe the theoretical framework of Structural Contingency Theory 
and the working hypotheses this study will attempt to analyze. Specifically, this study will 
analyze the following relationships to determine their probable impact on readmission rates for 
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high risk populations: 1) the association between ACO size and formalization of partnerships 
within the ACO, 2) the moderating effect of ACO size on fit between formalized structure and 
performance, 3) the association between task uncertainty and organizational integration, and 
lastly, 4) the moderating effect of uncertainty on fit between integration and performance.   
Chapter four will describe the methodological approach to be used to analyze the 
relationships between the ACO models, their contingencies and performance. This study will 
derive its contingency variables from reported data and defined based on SCT literature. For 
example, ACO size will be defined by hospital bed size and number of physicians employed; 
task uncertainty will be defined by level of IT functionality of an ACO, such as the presence of a 
system ACO-wide EMR. This study will use Bazzoli and colleagues’ taxonomy to identify 
formalized structures and ACO program integration. Formalization is interpreted under an SCT 
lens as formal hospital/health system and physician alignment. ACO program integration may 
be interpreted as contracted access among health services in the ACO network. To analyze the 
relationships between contingency variables and organizational structure, this study will use a 
correlation to determine the strength of association and direction between the variables. A 
regression will be used to analyze moderating effect of contingency variables on the relationship 
between ACO structural variables and their performance.  
Chapter five will present the results of the statistical analyses, in reference to 
hypotheses discussed. Lastly, chapter six will highlight discussion points, practical implications 
to the results from the study’s analyses, the study’s limitations and future opportunities for 
continued research in this topic.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This study focuses its research on Accountable Care Organization structures and 
contingencies that effect their organizational performance. Emphasis is on savings and 
readmission rates for high need, high cost patient populations because of their scope of impact 
on overall healthcare spend. Thus, this chapter will synthesize extant literature on accountable 
care organizations, existing structures, their effectiveness on improving outcomes and reducing 
costs, related literature on readmissions and any linkages to high need, high cost populations.  
US healthcare spending has been on an upward trajectory with little improvement in 
care. As the baby boomer generation ages and enters retirement, the US anticipates increased 
utilization of health services and corresponding exponential growth in healthcare expenses. 
CMS projected growth in national health expenditure from 17.9% in 2017 to 19.7% in 2026, 
which prompted serious discussions around health delivery reform (CMS, 2018). Reform came 
in the execution of the Affordable Care Act, which incorporated multiple financial reform 
programs to assist in shifting the US’ historical fee-for-service reimbursement model towards a 
pay-for-performance value-based model (Gaynor et al., 2015; Walker et al., 2017). The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act emphasized a triple aim: improving the care of individuals, 
improving the health of populations and reducing healthcare spending by reducing unnecessary 
utilization of health services (Loeher et al., 2016). 
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Under the auspices of The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, accountable care 
organizations are a means for healthcare organizations to voluntarily participate in reform. ACO 
performance is categorized into four domains: Patient/Caregiver experience, care 
coordination/patient safety, clinical care for at-risk populations, and preventive health. Under 
each domain, CMS has identif ied quality metrics for ACO performance that are used to 
calculate savings and penalties (Peck et al., 2018). Key metrics that have been popular topics of 
discussion include risk-standardized, all condition readmissions under care coordination/patient 
safety and populations “at-risk” for preventable disease management or inappropriate health 
services utilization (O’Malley et al., 2019; Sen et al., 2018). Readmissions account for $41.3 
billion in hospital costs, making it one of the highest expenditures among healthcare costs 
(Hines et al., 2014). Among the highest spenders, 5% of patients account for 50% of annual 
healthcare spending. High need, high cost patients are often categorized in that top tier of 
population and are identif ied by characteristics that make them “at-risk”, such as, elderly 
patients with multiple chronic conditions, persistent behavioral health challenges and distinct 
lack of social support. This research will target the highest contributors to the nation’s 
healthcare spending and how such topics are associated together with the development of the 
ACO.     
ACO Models 
The ACO model drives alignment between payment incentives and provider practice to 
improve care in both public and private health services sectors (Fisher et al., 2009). Varied ACO 
models exist in the US, primarily ranging across government-sponsored ACOs versus managed 
care ACOs (Shortell et al., 2015). However, managed care ACOs do not have the necessary 
market share that a national payer, such as CMS, has on membership and performance for true 
impact on population health (A. J. Barnes et al., 2014; Shortell et al., 2015). Limited data 
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capture and comparative capabilities existed prior to the inception of the Medicare ACO. Thus, 
most studies have focused on analyzing Medicare-sponsored ACOs due to its large 
membership, potential policy impact and high variability (Bazzoli et al., 2019; Fisher et al., 2012; 
Fisher & Shortell, 2010).  
Amongst the literature, accountable care organizations are described as a network of 
healthcare providers that have entered into an agreement to take joint accountability for 
coordinating high quality, efficient and medically appropriate care for populations (Barnes et al., 
2014; CMS, 2018). Care under the ACO spans across the continuum for outpatient, inpatient 
and post-acute settings; provider networks under the ACO agree to take financial responsibility 
of a population’s health through an incentive payment system to keep costs down and improve 
care. Like a health maintenance organization (HMO), ACOs assign a primary care provider 
(PCP) to beneficiaries to coordinate care and manage costs through proactive case 
management. However, HMO beneficiaries are restricted to accessing care to in-network 
services. ACO beneficiaries are not restricted to the ACO’s network, but the ACO is still 
f inancially responsible for the healthcare outcomes of their beneficiaries regardless of where 
services are accessed (Berenson et al., 2016; Martin et al., 2016). This reimbursement model 
broadens ACO incentives to address community healthcare access and coordination, 
regardless of payer network (Rittenhouse et al., 2010).  
Medicare Shared Savings Program 
Accountable care organization models consist of several programs. The largest program 
is the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). In the MSSP, ACOs have the option of 
entering into different tracks for risk sharing, with the opportunity to earn bonuses when the 
ACOs surpass quality and outcome benchmarks. MSSPs consist of progressive tracks in which 
ACOs can mature and increase financial risks for the potential to earn greater bonuses. ACO 
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eligibility requirements include: 1) clearly defined ACO structures and operations capabilities for 
provider incentive payment, 2) sufficient access to providers relative to number of beneficiaries 
to be serviced, 3) application of patient-centered primary care practice, 4) robust care 
management to identify beneficiaries, Track and monitor key performance metrics, report out 
quality data and support beneficiaries in their care, 5) timely exchange of information among 
providers for care transition management, 6) transparent communication of clinical performance 
and quality to patients, 7) measures and publicly reports performance and quality key ACO 
metrics, such as quality, patient experience and cost. Among the eligibility requirements, 
organizations are allowed limited autonomy to construct their governance and service delivery 
based on local resources (CMS, 2018; Barnes et al., 2014). Therefore, ACO variability is 
derived from the unique combination of  local environmental conditions and basic CMS program 
requirements. 
 Essentially, ACOs are financially reimbursed through a pay-for-performance basis, 
where financial penalties and rewards are determined by how ACOs perform on healthcare 
outcomes compared to national benchmarks (CMS, 2017). The MSSP is organized by different 
tracks for ACO participation and allows for a 6-year participation period. Key elements, such as 
financial structure, population management, and permitted waivers to CMS rules, differentiate 
the tracks. Financial incentives progress as tracks advance; ACOs are benchmarked at rates 
corresponding to the amount of risk the ACO takes. For example, MSSP Track 1 is an entry 
level track that includes one-sided risk for participating ACOs. ACOs under MSSP Track 1 
receive revenues from shared savings if they perform better than comparable organizations in 
quality, patient experience and cost. There are no penalties or downside risk for Track 1 ACOs. 
Revenue can be up to 50% of savings, once the ACO meets a minimum savings rate (2.0 – 
3.9%) better than benchmark (Pyenson et al., 2011). As ACOs progress in the MSSP to 
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advanced tracks (such as, Tracks 1+, 2, 3 and next generation model), ACOs shift from one-
sided risk to a two-sided risk arrangement, including ACO downside risk. In advanced tracks, 
ACOs are not to exceed a minimum loss rate (0.5 – 2.0%) worse than benchmark and are liable 
to pay back an “x”% of every dollar beyond that rate. ACOs in advanced tracks have the option 
to choose symmetrical savings and loss rates, so that the minimum percentage would be the 
same for savings above and losses below the benchmark. There is a corresponding increase for 
potential revenue as advanced track ACOs take on greater downside risk. As mentioned earlier, 
advanced tracks permit ACOs to waive certain CMS rules to enhance operational flexibility for 
care coordination. For example, in Track 1, ACOs are required to still apply the 3-day skilled 
nursing facility (SNF) rule or 2-midnight rule, where hospitals will not be reimbursed for patients 
transferred from an emergency room visit to a SNF until that patient has been admitted as an 
inpatient for 2 midnights. In advanced tracks, such as 1+ and 3, ACOs are permitted to waive 
the 3-day SNF rule. Another example is allowing an ACO to bill an after-discharge home care 
visit to improve care coordination and preventative measures for readmissions. This waiver is 
permitted only for next generation models. Table 1 presents a simplif ied comparison of the 
different MSSP Tracks. 
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Table 1 
Medicare Shared Savings Program Track Comparisons 
MSSP Elements Track 1 Track 1+ Track 2 Track 3 Next Gen 
Minimum Savings 
Rate (MSR) / 
Minimum Loss Rate 
(MLR) 
2.0 – 3.9% 
Options: 
• 0.0 – 0.0% 
• 0.5 – 2.0% 
• Varies based 
on number of 
beneficiaries 
0.5 – 2.0% 0.5 – 2.0% 
None; dollar 
savings/losses when 
spending below/above 
benchmark 
Shared Savings Up to 50% Up to 50% Up to 60% Up to 75% 
Options: 
• Incremental increase 
up to 85% w/in 5 years 
• Up to 100% 
Shared Losses N/A 30% 40 – 60% 40 – 75% 
First dollar losses for 
spending above 
benchmark 
Prospective 
Beneficiary 
Assignment 
Not 
Permitted 
Permitted Permitted Permitted Permitted 
MACRA Waivers 
Not 
Permitted 
Skilled nursing 
facility (SNF) 3-
day 
Not 
Permitted 
• SNF 3-day 
• Telehealth 
• SNF 3-day 
• Telehealth 
• Claims for home visits 
• Primary care co-pay 
waiver 
 
Alternative ACO Programs  
In parallel to the MSSP, CMS launched a secondary ACO program intended for more 
developed and mature health systems already actively engaged in population health 
management, called the Pioneer Program. In this experimental version of the ACO, mature 
organizations have the option to enter a track with greater financial risk for the opportunity of 
greater rewards. Most organizations that started with the Pioneer Program had either dropped 
out or shifted to a 2-sided risk sharing MSSP model. Fewer than 20 ACOs participated in the 
Pioneer Program at its inception year (2012) and less than a tenth of Pioneer Program ACOs 
had opted to stay in the program due to the heavy financial penalties. The central concept of 
greater risk and reward was later incorporated into newer MSSP Tracks, after ACOs have had 
 
 
17 
 
the chance to build up their programs (McWilliams, 2016; Pham et al., 2014). As a result, the 
Pioneer Program was discontinued in 2015. 
In 2013, CMS established an advanced payment model to assist rural health systems 
and small provider practices develop health information technology (HIT) capabilities for data 
tracking, information sharing and reporting (Wu et al., 2017). The advanced payment model 
evolved into the ACO Investment Model (AIM) in 2015, acting as a capital development 
assistance program that provided ACOs access to funds based off of anticipated shared 
savings. In addition to AIM, MSSP Track 1+ was established in 2018 to offer a moderate option 
for savings and minimal downside risk, with some waivers to CMS rules. Both AIM and Track 1+ 
target and encourage rural areas to participate in the ACO program. These models highlight 
regional consideration to ACO structure and reiterates the inherent variability among ACOs 
(Chen et al., 2016). Figure 1 presents a timeline of the formation and discontinuation of different 
Medicare ACO programs. The Henry J. Kaiser Foundation published a map of United States 
ACO programs and locations. The map shows that 82% of ACOs are under Track 1, as of 2018, 
and there is a dense concentration of ACOs in the Midwest and East Coast regions. 
Figure 1 
Medicare ACO Program / Track Activation Timeline 
 
 
2012
•Medicare 
Shared Savings 
Program (MSSP) 
Track 1 & 2
•Pioneer 
Program
2013
•Advanced 
Payment  ACO 
Model (for rural 
systems)
2015
•Discontinue 
Pioneer 
Program and 
Advanced 
Payment ACO 
model
2016
•Next Generation 
ACO Model
•ACO Investment 
Model (AIM) 
(complementary to 
Advanced 
Payment)
•MSSP Track 3
2018
•MSSP Track 1+ 
(aimed at small 
practices and 
rural health 
systems)
2019
•Discontinue 
MSSPs
•Pathways to 
Success ACO 
Model begins
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ACO Structures 
CMS’ ACO models provide high level structures for population health management to 
healthcare organizations, while allowing for adaptability to their environment.  Structural 
variability exists among healthcare organizations, depending on the environment in which they 
operate, such as existing physician groups, accessibility of health services, geographical region, 
socioeconomic conditions and populations served (Comfort et al., 2018). Due to the high 
variability, research and analysis of inter- and intra-organizational relationships have been 
diff icult; thus, researchers have sought to classify structures by their derivative forms and in 
discrete categories (Rich, 1992).  
Systematic approaches to organizational classification include: Common sense, a priori 
and a posteriori. Common sense is defined as a conceptualization of organizational structure 
that has been intuitively determined without data or theory. A priori is a theoretically driven 
heuristic approach where organizational structures are classified and sorted based on a 
theoretical framework. A posteriori is an empirically driven approach that classifies 
organizational structures by statistically analyzing similarities or variance to then sort into 
themes. The a posteriori method is considered by researchers to be a taxonomic approach that 
allows for data-driven classification of hierarchies spanning across individual characteristics to 
broader categories for populations (Rich, 1992). Therefore, taxonomies provide a robust means 
of classification, especially important for such complex multidimensional constructs like 
healthcare organizations.  
ACO Taxonomy 
Bazzoli, and colleagues (1999) analyzed organizational structures and strategies across 
hospital-led health networks and systems according to three main structural characteristics: 
differentiation, integration and centralization. Using these three main constructs as points of 
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classification, the authors developed a widely recognized taxonomy of health networks and 
systems, reliably defining organizational trends in health system changes and network 
evolution.  
Similarly, Shortell, Wu, Lewis, Colla and Fisher (2014) proposed an ACO taxonomy that 
was grounded in two different organizational theories: resource dependence and institutional 
theory. Shortell and colleagues (2014) posited ACO structures were clustered into three 
categories: large integrated health systems with broad services, physician group practices 
focused largely on primary care, and joint physician-hospital initiatives with moderate service 
levels. The authors were able to conduct an a posteriori approach using ACO entry year (2012) 
data from CMS to identify the three clusters.  
In a recent publication, Bazzoli, Harless and Chukmaitov (2017) presented an updated 
taxonomy of hospitals participating in Medicare ACOs that was based on transaction cost 
economics (TCE) theory. They examined how ACOs structured their programs to best interact 
with the market and conduct healthcare transactions. The authors conducted a hierarchical 
cluster analysis of MSSP and Pioneer ACOs to empirically identify themes and variations across 
the two programs for the period of 2012-2013. As part of this study’s taxonomic development, 
the authors measured key ACO competencies derived from the American Hospital Association 
(AHA) and the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS) related to 1) 
physician association, 2) ambulatory services access and 3) health information technology (HIT) 
infrastructure. Like Shortell and colleagues’ 2014 taxonomy, Bazzoli and colleagues included 
physician associations and health services in their taxonomy. Physician association was 
described as physician (MD) alignment with the ACO organization through formal agreements 
and contracts. Ambulatory services demonstrated access to preventive care and timely follow 
up care post-hospitalization. In contrast to Shortell and colleagues’ 2014 taxonomy, Bazzoli and 
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colleagues included a crucial competency that Shortell and colleagues did not: health 
information technology. The importance of an ACO’s HIT infrastructure is outlined by Bazzoli 
and colleagues as: a) an ACO’s ability to conduct timely communication among providers, b) 
coordinate across beneficiaries’ care continuum through ready access of information across 
care settings, and c) capture data for analyzing trends and reporting purposes.  
Bazzoli and colleagues’ research showed fundamental structural characteristics 
clustered in five groups for each program, summarized in Table 2. Pioneer programs showed 
slightly greater scope of ambulatory services than MSSPs in cluster 1 and cluster 4 of the 
taxonomy. It is important to note that both Pioneer programs and MSSPs have highly developed 
health IT infrastructures, but that competency alone is not an indicator of an ACO’s care 
coordination capabilities. Further extrapolating from the data, MSSPs with high health IT but low 
numbers of ambulatory services in their network may indicate less robust capabilities to 
coordinate across beneficiaries’ care continuum once discharged from the hospital.   
 Shortell and colleagues identif ied primary care and joint physician initiatives as critical 
factors for physician engagemen. In comparison, Bazzoli and colleagues included access to 
ambulatory and specialty services.  
Table 2  
Summary of Bazzoli, Harless & Chukmaitov’s Five Cluster Taxonomy 
  Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
Pioneer 
Ambulatory 
services 
high low  high  
Health IT high high low high high 
MD alignment    tight loose 
MSSP 
Ambulatory 
services 
low     
Health IT high high low high high 
MD alignment    tight loose 
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Associations Explored Among ACO Models and Their Performance.  
Invariably, researchers question whether ACOs provide true value or significant structure 
to current healthcare systems. Key ACO performance metrics were established by CMS to 
improve healthcare quality and decrease costs in four major domains of healthcare delivery: 
Patient/Caregiver Experience, Care Coordination/Patient Safety, Preventive Health and At-Risk 
Populations (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Shared Savings Program, 
2017). For 2018-2019 reporting years, thirty-one quality measures were identified for ACO 
performance across the four domains. Several research studies have explored how ACO 
models impacted performance and identified future research opportunities. 
McWilliams and colleagues analyzed ACO performance under the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program and focused on measures under the domain of Preventive Health, such as 
hospitalizations for patients with ambulatory-care sensitive conditions (e.g., Diabetes, 
Congestive Heart Failure and Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease) and all cause 30-day 
readmissions (McWilliams et al., 2016). McWilliams and colleagues (2016) applied a common 
sense approach to categorizing ACOs by Medicare spending at or above the median pre- and 
post-ACO entry, which produced the following categories: ACO structure, baseline spending at 
entry, and ACO contracting with commercial insurers. The study differentiated ACOs as 
vertically integrating with either hospitals, multispecialty physician groups or independent 
primary care practices. McWilliams et al concluded that ACOs integrated with independent 
primary care practices saw significantly greater savings than other structures, resulting in 
reduced inpatient and outpatient services. Furthermore, savings were greatest among earlier 
cohorts where baseline spending was above benchmark. As ACOs matured, savings diminished 
and became harder to achieve. The authors identif ied some key limitations to be considered for 
future research: 1) probable self-selection bias and identif ied savings were due to organizations 
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already primed for spending reduction 2) estimated savings excluded costs from improvement 
efforts 3) the statistical model utilized did not adjust for ACO subgroups. McWilliams and 
colleagues’ study identif ies important points for future ACO research, such as incorporating in 
the statistical model how best to account performance and appropriately categorize ACO 
models for a true comparison of savings. 
Recently, Winblad, Mor, Mchugh and Rahman (2017) examined ACO quality data for the 
anticipated effect ACOs were intended to have on care coordination, specifically around 
rehospitalizations. Rehospitalizations, or readmissions, were identified as one of the highest 
contributors to Medicare spend, and 20% of those rehospitalizations were attributed to post-
acute care transitions to skilled nursing facilities (SNFs). The authors thus concentrated this 
study on a subset population most likely to be transferred to a SNF post-discharge and most at-
risk for rehospitalization. They identified ACOs with the highest concentration of 
rehospitalizations from post-acute care settings. The population with the highest rate of 
rehospitalization were elderly patients with multiple comorbidities and were being treated for 
multiple chronic illnesses. First, the authors analyzed general rehospitalization performance 
across different ACO models. The authors organized the ACOs by 1) physician-led ACOs 
(without a hospital formally affiliate to the ACO), 2) hospital-led ACOs, 3) ACOs with joint 
ventures between hospital and physician groups and 4) ACOs under standalone limited liability 
companies. The study analyzed hospitals participating in an MSSP and non-ACOs. The results 
of the study displayed ACOs affiliated with hospitals utilized post-acute care services, like SNFs, 
more frequently than ACOs without hospital affiliations.  Furthermore, among ACO-affiliated 
hospitals, MSSP hospitals showed the greatest reduction in readmissions, followed by Pioneer 
hospitals and then non-ACO affiliated hospitals. The authors postulate that ACO-affiliated 
hospitals and Pioneer hospitals may be employing concentrated resources to readmission 
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efforts due to incentive programs outside of the ACO, such as the Medicare Hospital 
Readmissions Reduction Program implemented in 2013. Winblad and colleagues highlight 
significant opportunities for future research to examine readmissions performance within the 
considerable variations among ACOs and how provider networks are utilized among the 
different models. 
Chukmaitov and colleagues (2015) analyzed organizational characteristics associated 
with ACO competencies and performance, such as improved patient outcomes and cost 
reduction. They cited intensive interdependence among services in the ACO and further 
described the need for alignment starting with ACO governance. The authors contributed to the 
literature by aggregating and systematizing ACO competencies from multiple sources such as 
the American Hospital Association’s (AHA) annual survey, Bazzoli and colleagues’ health 
system governance study (1999) and Healthcare Information and Management Systems 
Society’s (HIMSS) metrics. Chukmaitov and colleagues (2015) laid out the following 
competencies for future research frameworks: leadership and management, linkages among 
health care providers, health information technology infrastructure, ability to manage financial 
risk, and infrastructure for monitoring and reporting quality. The study aimed to demonstrate that 
performance improvement would be higher among ACOs with greater centralization, fully 
integrated physician groups, highly integrated medical services along the care continuum, and 
advanced health information technology (HIT) infrastructure. The dependent variables were 30-
day all-cause mortality and inpatient hospital costs. The results of the study showed significant 
reduction in mortality for hospitals and health systems with centralized structures in comparison 
to freestanding hospitals. Key to centralized structures is governance and leadership in the ACO 
to help with aligning the inherently fragmented system towards a similar goal (Chumaitov et al, 
2015). This may indicate better care coordination and communication for centralized systems 
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than hospitals not associated with a health system. Integrated physician groups were defined as 
alignment of incentives, reporting, governance and affiliation. Here, the study did not show 
improvement in care for highly integrated physician groups. Instead, mortality was slightly higher 
than less integrated physician groups, which suggest that formal physician to hospital structures 
are not as impactful to patient outcomes and require greater research. Results proved 
inconclusive of significant association between advanced HIT infrastructure and cost savings or 
improved patient outcomes. Instead, the authors recommended greater time is needed for 
ACOs to mature in their HIT infrastructures before true outcomes will be present.  Chukamitov 
and colleagues’ approach to analyzing ACO competencies, structure and outcomes is a good 
example of an analytic approach for future ACO research.     
In Albright, Lewis, Ross and Colla’s (2016) study, the authors conducted a cross-
sectional analysis for associations between ACO performance and organizational 
characteristics correlated to preventive measures. This study is significant in that it focuses on 
preventive care, such as vaccines and screenings, and how it may impact ACO performance.  
Albright and colleagues utilized the National Survey of ACOs (NSACO) to analyze 
organizational characteristics across ACOs, analyzed trends among preventive care quality 
performance data and identif ied composite measures among preventive quality metrics. The 
characteristics included provider composition, beneficiary composition, governance, health 
services access, electronic health record capabilities, quality management capabilities and 
finance performance. Among ACO preventive quality metrics, two subgroups had significant 
associations with ACO characteristics: disease prevention (vaccines and cancer screening) and 
wellness screening (annual checkups). The subgroups correlated with ACO characteristics, 
such as provider composition and upfront ACO investment. The study supported the authors’ 
position that provider composition allows for better care continuum and easier access to 
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specialist visits, while upfront ACO investment indicates better technology, such as being on an 
electronic health record, in detection, patient eligibility and administration of more complex 
services for ACO beneficiaries. The statistical methodology Albright and colleagues applied to 
this study offer a potential approach for future analyses between ACO characteristics and 
composite measures. 
In Accountable Care Organizations: The National Landscape , Shortell, Colla, Lewis, 
Fisher, Kessell and Ramsay (2015) analyzed ACOs to determine organizational characteristics 
that showed highest performance. The study’s scope included ACOs in California due to the 
high concentration of ACOs within the state in comparison to the rest of the U.S., with a plethora 
of different structures to analyze for performance. The authors applied a three-cluster taxonomic 
approach to categorize the different ACO structures, specifically researching types of contracts, 
governance, scope of services, care management capabilities and patient experience.  The 
taxonomy Shortell et al utilized was from A Taxonomy of Accountable Care Organizations for 
Policy and Practice (2014), which was an empirically-based taxonomy developed to examine 
performance and ACO effectiveness. Shortell and colleagues applied resource dependence 
theory as a conceptual framework to analyze the resources necessary for implementation of the 
ACO care model. The ACOs were split between Medicare or private payer contracts, essentially 
similar in risk, performance and quality metrics. The composition of California ACOs included 
51% physician-led ACOs and 33% jointly led by physicians and hospitals. Among the California 
ACOs, 84% were under a shared savings contract with either downside risks built into the 
agreement or a quality-based performance bonus. The taxonomy categorized the following key 
program characteristics: number of full time equivalent (FTE) clinicians in the ACO, variety and 
number of provider services across the care continuum, level of integrated delivery system 
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using HIT, institutional leadership structure and historical experience with payment reform 
activities.  
California has been a long time innovator in healthcare delivery reform and expenditure 
control; therefore, Shortell et al (2015) concentrated their study on the additional value ACO 
participation may bring to healthcare providers in the area of patient experience, care 
coordination and cost savings. Results showed that ACO participants generally scored higher, 
albeit small percentage points, than non-ACO participants in the measures of access to care, 
coordination of care, promotional health, doctor-patient interactions, office staff helpfulness and 
overall rating of care. In contrast, quality scores related to heart, cancer, diabetes, pediatric, 
asthma and chlamydia screenings were comparable among ACO and non-ACO participants. 
Statistically significant results were seen when Kaiser Permanente was excluded from results. 
Screenings are indicative of preventive care coordination capabilities within the ACO. Such  
capabilities are contingent on appropriate identification of patients requiring screening and 
preventive care.  
In the 2015 study by Shortell and colleagues, results showed that most significant cost 
savings and patient experience scores were around ACOs with greatest prior experience in risk -
based agreements, strong electronic health record infrastructure and functionality, the 
establishment of high risk complex care management programs, strong physician leadership 
structure and mature quality improvement programs. Shortell and colleagues highlighted the 
importance of high risk complex care management and the integration of strong clinical care 
teams. In Accountable Care Organization: The National Landscape, the authors effectively 
present a practical outlook in the value ACO participation brings to organizations experienced in 
risk-bearing contracts, historical experience with cost savings and intensive high r isk patient 
population health management. Results show that, overall, certain ACO structural 
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characteristics provide statistical impact to performance, primarily in health information 
technology and physician-led organizations. 
ACO participation has grown exponentially from 220 to 561 organizations entering into 
Medicare Shared Savings Program ACO contracts in 2018 and covering 10.5 million 
beneficiaries (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018a). Building upon previous 
ACO studies, Bazzoli, Harless and Chukmaitov proposed a new taxonomic approach to the 
study of ACO structures in A Taxonomy of Hospitals Participating in Medicare Accountable Care 
Organizations (2017). Earlier in this chapter, this research study mentioned Bazzoli et al’s 
taxonomy as an updated approach from Shortell and colleagues’ proposal on ACO taxonomy 
(2014). Shortell et al’s taxonomy concentrated on integrated systems that included post-acute 
care facilities, extensive primary care network and physician performance and joint leadership 
structures between hospitals and physicians. In comparison, Bazzoli et al’s taxonomy drills 
deeper into ACO capabilities that allow for integration and accountability among physician 
practice, such as health information technology capabilities that can link services across the 
broad spectrum of healthcare delivery. With the onset of meaningful use and as healthcare 
organizations continue to mature, it is important to specify how HIT influences structure , and this 
makes Bazzoli’s taxonomy most appropriate for this research study.  
ACO and Readmissions Literature 
Among extant ACO literature, researchers studied variability among ACO structures and 
their impact on performance, such as readmissions (Hayes et al., 2016; Loeher et al., 2016). 
Readmissions represent one of the highest costs in healthcare, reported in 2011 by the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality as approximately $41.3 billion in national healthcare 
expenditure. Historically, 20% of Medicare discharges were reported to have a 30-day 
readmission (McIlvennan et al., 2015). Medicare and Medicaid patients have been most 
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susceptible to being readmitted for ambulatory sensitive conditions like congestive heart failure, 
septicemia and pneumonia. Because of the high costs associated with readmissions and their 
prevalence, CMS directed key reform efforts to reduce readmissions through the Affordable 
Care Act. The reform established the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) in 
2012, which penalized hospitals for 30-day readmission rates higher than benchmark for acute 
myocardial infarction, heart failure and pneumonia. The HRRP complemented pay-for-
performance programs, like ACOs, and strategically possessed overlapping requirements to 
incentivize healthcare organizations and providers to adopt best practices for care coordination 
and preventative health management. In McIlvennan et al’s Hospital Readmissions Reduction 
Program, the authors describe how the HRRP has seen preliminary reductions in readmissions 
but there is still debate in relation to the program’s penalties spanning all cause readmissions 
versus disease specific preventions. Additionally, the authors note hospitals invest in transitions 
of care by implementing interventional tools or dedicating key clinical resources to oversee high 
risk patients. 
In extant readmissions literature, Hansen, Young, Hinami, Leung and Williams (2011) 
conducted a systematic review of published interventions that aimed to prevent readmissions. 
Hansen and colleagues identif ied twelve distinct interventions that appeared to be effective in 
reducing readmissions. Those twelve interventions included three domains: Pre-discharge, 
post-discharge and transitions of care interventions. Pre-discharge interventions included: 
patient education, medication reconciliation, discharge planning, and scheduling of a follow-up 
appointment before discharge. Post-discharge interventions included follow-up telephone calls, 
patient-activated hotlines, timely communication with ambulatory providers, timely ambulatory 
provider follow-up, and post-discharge home visits. Transitions of care interventions included: 
transition coaches, physician continuity across the inpatient and outpatient setting, and patient -
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centered discharge instruction. At a high level, such interventions could be categorized as 
complex care coordination, post-acute care services, timely access to health services and an 
expansive primary care network. The authors highlight transitions in care as requiring significant 
intervention for readmissions reduction due to the handoffs that must occur from one care 
setting to another. The interventions mentioned in the systematic review are similar to ACO 
structural characteristics analyzed in ACO literature and may be key structural characteristics to 
analyzing readmissions performance in comparison among ACO models. 
Researchers (Ma et al., 2017) published another systematic review of extant 
readmissions literature in The Prevalence, Reasons, and Risk Factors for Hospital 
Readmissions Among Home Health Care Patients. The article identified gaps in literature 
related to readmissions and patients who received home health care services. In their review, 
the authors noted that readmission rates were highest among patients with heart failure. 
Reasons stated among the literature included patients being admitted due to a worsening  
condition of their primary diagnosis of heart failure, cardiac-related diagnoses or respiratory 
conditions. Risk factors for readmissions were identified as being 1) patient demographics: 
elderly, male and race, 2) high severity of primary medical condition, presence of multiple 
comorbidities and lower functional status, 3) lower patient socioeconomic status, 4) lack of 
interpersonal support, and 5) low intensity of post-discharge home health services. Key 
takeaways from this systematic review for this research is that certain patient populations are 
more susceptible to readmissions and key risk factors exist in identifying which types of patients 
may be higher risk for readmissions. 
In Falling Through the Cracks: Challenges and Opportunities for Improving Transitional 
Care for Persons with Continuous Complex Care Needs, Coleman (2003) highlights the 
importance of technology for information transfer across care settings. The article summarizes 
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key components necessary for effective care transitions: strong communication between 
providers, a common care plan for the patient being treated, reconciliation of medications, follow 
up plans and explicit summary of plans, symptoms and signs for which the patient should be 
cautious. The component with greatest influence to successful transitions is communication and 
the flow of information. It can be extrapolated from this study that information technology, such 
as an electronic health record, and timely information exchange across care settings would be 
highly contingent on technology and integration of health services. 
In ACO literature, readmissions has had cursory exploration due to complex data 
capture and ACO identif ication. As data capture and systems Tracking mechanisms advance, 
greater opportunities exist to analyze ACO structural characteristics and readmissions 
performance. In ACO-Affiliated Hospitals Reduced Rehospitalizations from Skilled Nursing 
Facilities Faster than Other Hospitals, Winblad et al (2017) explored ACO impact on 
readmissions for an elderly population with complex chronic and multiple comorbidity conditions. 
The authors discuss how ACOs are more likely to have more advanced health IT tools to 
capture data, identify probable readmissions from patient medical histories and Track patients 
with high risk for rehospitalization from skilled nursing facilities. This would imply that ACOs that 
have high integrative services and strong IT infrastructures for care continuum would have the 
greatest impact on readmissions from post-acute facilities. 
In Colla, Lewis, Tierney and Muhlestein’s (2016) article, Hospitals Participating in ACOs 
Tend to be Large and Urban, Allowing Access to Capital and Data, the authors analyze the 
general structure of ACO participants and performance. General findings included large health 
systems with a wide range of health services available for primary care, specialist access and 
post-acute care facilities. Originally, the authors hypothesized that outcomes management, such 
as readmissions, began at the hospital setting, prior to discharge and heavily managed via care 
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coordination. Thus, ACOs associated with hospitals would be expected to have better outcomes 
than ACOs not associated with hospitals. But according to their f indings, the authors did not find 
great variation between quality or readmissions performance for ACO participants associated 
with hospitals and those not associated with hospitals. ACO entry requirements for Track 1 
include a minimum 50% of providers participating in the ACO to meet Meaningful Use 
requirements for certified electronic health record utilization. This is an especially large financial 
investment for providers in rural areas with widely dispersed populations. Rural health 
organizations were not inclined to join ACOs due to the incredible capital and human resources 
necessary to meet requirements. Early results showed that in general, spending in outpatient 
settings increased as inpatient spending significantly decreased as ACOs focused on preventive 
measures. This study shows that access to capital for HIT infrastructure tends to be available 
for hospitals large in structure and residing in urban environments, but that these specific 
structural characteristics do not show significant effect on reducing readmissions.  
In readmissions literature, physician incentive alignment is critical. Cox, Sadiraj, Schnier 
& Sweeney (2016) published Incentivizing Cost-Effective Reductions in Hospital Readmission 
Rates. The authors conducted an experiment on physician engagement under fee-for-service 
models versus value-based models like bonuses and bundled payments. The results of the 
experiment showed that physicians under bundled payment models had the greatest reductions 
in hospital lengths of stay and readmission rates. The implications to these findings are that 
when physician incentives and hospital goals are aligned through a value-based model, there is 
greater potential for performance improvement and better patient outcomes. 
In the study, Association Between Hospital Participation in Medicare Shared Savings 
Program Accountable Care Organizations and Readmissions Following Major Surgery , (Borza 
et al., 2019) the researchers conducted a retrospective cohort study comparing national 
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Medicare beneficiaries who completed a common major surgery and analyzed rate of 
readmissions for those part of an ACO or not between 2010 to 2014. The authors identified the 
following as most common major surgeries: Abdominal aortic aneurism repair, colectomy, 
cystectomy, prostatectomy, lung resection, total knee arthroplasty, and total hip arthroplasty.  
Results showed that risk-adjusted readmission rates decreased significantly among hospitals 
affiliated with MSSP ACOs in comparison to non-ACO hospitals. This study narrowed its 
research from general population to a subset population, but the authors did not study in detail 
the different ACO structural characteristics that may have contributed to the readmissions 
reduction. 
In The American Journal of Accountable Care, authors Gross, Eason, Przezdecki, 
Menacker, Gold, Chauhan, Hart, Sawczuk, Garrett and Glenning published The Ingredients of 
Success in a Medicare Accountable Care Organization (2016). The authors conducted a case 
study analyzing the Hackensack Alliance Accountable Care Organization because the ACO 
achieved cost savings while maintaining quality for two consecutive years. The result of the 
authors’ analysis were that they had enrolled their physician practices were required to be 
certif ied as a patient centered medical home and that they assigned dedicated nursing 
coordinators to follow patients high risk for readmissions. Key elements of the patient centered 
medical home that are translatable to the ACO are its emphases on primary care, care 
coordination and timely communication of information. Another component mentioned was a 
dedicated nurse care coordinator. The nurse care coordinator was responsible for identifying 
high risk patients and partnering with the PCP to reduce hospitalizations and manage 
ambulatory sensitive conditions like heart failure. 
In looking at the broader readmissions literature, readmission interventions are targeted 
oftentimes at the patient population that contributes to the greatest percentage of readmissions . 
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For Medicare patients, congestive heart failure, septicemia and pneumonia accounted for $4.3 
billion in readmission costs. The greatest contributors to readmissions among Medicaid patients 
were mood disorders, schizophrenia and diabetes, which accounted for $839 million in 
readmissions. Similarly, for privately insured patients, mood disorders, chemotherapy 
maintenance and complications to surgeries accounted for $785 million in readmissions (Hines 
et al., 2014) 
Many studies have focused on targeted patient populations, like heart failure or the 
elderly, to better scope efforts for greatest impact on readmissions (Coleman, 2003; Donze et 
al., 2013; Hansen et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2017). Other studies have focused heavily on care 
coordination interventions among health networks (Burke et al., 2013; Feigenbaum et al., 2012; 
McIlvennan et al., 2015; Takahashi et al., 2016), post-discharge follow up interventions (Misky 
et al., 2010; Tung et al., 2017) and correct predictive modeling algorithms for identifying patients 
high risk for readmissions (Kansagara et al., 2011). 
In Risk Prediction Models for Hospital Readmissions, Kansagara and colleagues 
conducted a systematic review to identify studies that have analyzed and proposed different risk 
models for readmission predictions at varying stages of patient care. Essentially, the authors 
posit that patient functional status, severity of illness and social determinants of health variables 
improved the predictive quality of identifying patients who were high risk for readmission. 
Amarasingham, Moore, Tabak, Drazner, Clark, Zhang, Reed, Swanson, Ma & Halm published 
results of their predictive model in An Automated Model to Identify Heart Failure Patients at Risk 
for 30-Day Readmission or Death Using Electronic Medical Record Data (2010). The authors 
highlighted the variables and methodology for identifying and scoring risk values for heart failure 
patients likely to be readmitted. They concluded that accuracy of the predictive model depended 
heavily on both clinical and social factors. This is a common thread across the different 
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predictive models that clinical factors alone are not enough to identify high risk patients . 
Furthermore, patients who are most likely to be readmitted have risk factors that indicate an 
inability to function or be compliant to treatment, have socioeconomic factors hindering their 
ability to access preventive health services or are among vulnerable demographic populations 
like the elderly. 
ACOs are a value-based pay-for-performance model with readmissions interventions 
inherently built into its Medicare program at large. Although implemented close to the same 
timeframe as the HRRP, there is scant research that analyzes readmissions and ACO 
structures. The research that does exist has concentrated on 1) ACO performance for general 
30-day all cause readmissions, 2) ACO performance on patient populations similar to HRRP 
requirements, such as myocardial infarction, heart failure and pneumonia, 3) ACO readmission 
rates from SNFs and 4) ACO readmission rates after a major common surgery. This highlights 
the opportunity for this study to fill in a research gap to analyze ACO structural characteristics 
associated with readmissions reduction. Specific ACO structural characteristics that have not 
been analyzed in relation to readmissions are IT capabilities and vertical integration of services. 
Consistently across readmissions literature, timely communication and information sharing 
across transitional care settings have been highlighted as critical to preventing readmissions. 
Thus, this research has the opportunity to analyze associations between readmissions and ACO 
structures related to transitions of care, like HIT, scope of PCP network and timely access to 
post-acute services. 
High Need, High Cost Patient Populations 
Among readmissions literature, researchers have recommended focusing intervention 
efforts on targeted populations with highest risks. In addition, predictive model studies have 
stated key differentiating factors that improve accuracy of identifying patients high risk for 
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readmissions as being patient functional status and social determinants of health  (Blumenthal et 
al., 2016). A similarly defined population exists in high need, high cost patients, whom are 
identif ied by the Commonwealth Fund as patients with 3+ chronic conditions, high risk of health 
services utilization, high severity of illness, functional limitations, high social needs and are 
elderly (Blumenthal, 2017; Blumenthal & Abrams, 2016; Hayes et al., 2016) . The National 
Academy of Medicine (NAM) published a patient taxonomy on HNHC (Long et al., 2017) with an 
additional layer of behavioral health and social risk factors. The taxonomy demonstrates a team 
approach to improving the care for HNHC patient populations. HNHC patients are primarily low 
income and are insured through Medicaid. 5% of Medicaid patients are responsible for 57% of 
healthcare expenditure, and the top 1% of Medicaid patients account for 25% of spending.  
Furthermore, the Commonwealth Fund has posited that behavioral health issues are key 
indicators for future high cost among patients with ambulatory sensitive diagnoses, like chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, congestive heart failure, coronary heart disease, diabetes and 
hypertension (Blumenthal, 2017). 
HNHC patients have a significant impact on overall national healthcare spending due to 
lack of support and proper maintenance of their health needs, which leads to preventable 
readmissions, hospitalizations and emergency room visits (Hayes et al., 2016; McCarthy et al., 
2015; Trendwatch Chartbook 2016 Trends Affecting Hospitals and Health Systems, 2016, pgs. 
71-79). Interventions to address HNHC patient management are similar to interventions for 
readmissions reductions: “[targeted populations for greatest benefit; comprehensive 
assessments of patients’ risks and needs; evidence-based care plans] and patient monitoring; 
promoting patient and family engagement in self -care; coordinating care and communication 
among patients and providers; facilitating transitions from the hospital and referrals to 
community resources; and providing appropriate care in accordance with patients’ preferences” 
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(McCarthy et al, 2015). Furthermore, intensive integration of services and access to ambulatory 
care is highlighted for the most vulnerable of populations in the US to address inequity within 
the healthcare system (Martin et al., 2016). 
In a related study to vulnerable or disadvantaged patient populations, Coleman (2003) 
describes the challenges and opportunities for managing patients with complex care needs. In 
his article, he focuses on transitions between care settings for patients with chronic conditions 
who need intensive management and care coordination. Coleman highlights the difficulties in 
coordinating and navigating the US’ inherently fragmented system. It is important to note that 
this article was published before the advent of The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
but that the key issues regarding care coordination for complex patient populations have been 
an ongoing challenge. The author outlines that system breakdowns exist in medications 
management, information transfer between care settings, disparate and disjointed clinical 
oversight of patient care and patient advocacy. Coleman posits that healthcare policy reform, 
information technology advancement and alignment of healthcare professional accountability 
would help address improved management of complex patient population management. 
The Commonwealth Fund has been forefront in addressing HNHC patient research and 
management. Blumenthal (2017) proposed a patient-centered care model to address HNHC 
patients and develop a support structure for such patients that address macro and micro 
environmental challenges, such as integration of services, payment reform, correct identification 
of high risk patients, strong care coordination services. A key component of HNHC patient care 
is to address behavioral health needs. Behavioral health screening was not included in ACO 
assessments prior to 2016. The opportunity to integrate behavioral health assessments into 
ACOs recently began with the inclusion of a depression screening measure for reporting of 
quality performance (Gordon, 2016). At a recent Institute for Healthcare Improvement forum 
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(2017), Goldman, Figueroa, Waller & Vogeli presented a “playbook” for identifying high need, 
high cost populations. The “playbook” consisted of a five-association sponsorship among The 
Commonwealth Fund, The John A. Hartford Foundation, the Peterson Center on Healthcare, 
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and The SCAN Foundation. The vision of the “playbook” 
sponsors is to have 30% of ACOs and Medicare Advantage plans adopt proven interventions to 
manage HNHC patients by 2020. There is immense interest in integrating and aligning ACO 
programs with HNHC patient interventions.  
 In reviewing HNHC literature, there are diverse perspectives on whether ACOs would be 
appropriate for reducing high spend from HNHC patients. Some studies have advocated that 
ACOs should target interventions on high risk and high spend patients through dual Medicare 
and Medicaid eligibility and disabled beneficiaries (Bynum et al., 2017; Guerard et al., 2019; 
Zainulbhai et al., 2014). For example, one study analyzed ACO performance with high dual 
eligible and disabled beneficiary populations. Results showed slightly lower quality scores but 
with higher earned savings than ACOs with lower dual eligible and disabled populations (Sen et 
al., 2018). In contrast, other studies from the New England Journal of Medicine (McWilliams et 
al., 2016; McWilliams & Schwartz, 2017) have opined that targeting specific patient populations 
is part of a fee-for-service health delivery model and not a value-based model like the 
accountable care organization. The authors point out that in order to best manage HNHC 
patients, like readmissions, accurate prediction of patients to target are highly susceptible to 
error, citing recent statistics from Medicare that patients scored high for risk accounted for only 
42% of Medicare spending and may represent lost opportunities for reducing waste in other 
areas. Earlier in ACO development, a study was conducted on ACOs and their lack of 
innovative models to integrate mental illness and substance abuse into their care programs 
(Lewis et al., 2014). In an indirect way, this relates to models for HNHC patient management, as 
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mental health and substance abuse are additional factors to be considered in identifying HNHC 
patients. 
 In a recent publication, Performance in the Medicare Shared Saving Program by 
accountable care organizations disproportionately serving dual and disabled populations  by 
Sen, Chen, Samson, Epstein and Maddox (2018), the authors analyze in a retrospective cohort 
study if MSSPs serving dually enrolled (aka Medicare and Medicaid populations) and disabled 
beneficiaries show improved shared savings from their inception over the time period 2014 
through 2016. Sen and colleagues saw equal or better outcome savings per beneficiaries than 
MSSPs that did not serve as many dually enrolled or disabled populations. This study shows the 
increasing interest that ACO researchers have on disadvantaged patient populations. Sen et al 
were interested on a broader perspective of ACO-level outcomes and did not incorporate 
structural characteristics in their study. The authors recognize opportunity for future research to 
analyze optimal ACO program design and necessary infrastructure for ongoing monitoring and 
Tracking of outcomes for disadvantaged populations. 
There continues to be questions related to ACO effectiveness and their ability to improve 
quality and financial outcomes. Little research has been published even on ACOs and 
specifically readmissions performance, considering interventions necessary for reducing 
readmissions. Furthermore, there is an even more distinct gap in substantive, empirical 
research on HNHC patient readmissions among ACOs. Regardless, common themes do exist 
across ACO, readmissions and HNHC literature (see Table 3 for common themes). This 
research study aims to fill this gap and contribute to further knowledge of the impact ACOs have 
on healthcare expenditure and future ACO models.  
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Table 3 
Common Themes Across the Literature 
 Coordination 
across care 
continuum 
Patients with 
multiple 
chronic 
conditions 
Population 
management 
Ambulatory 
care access 
Integrated 
information 
systems 
Provider 
alignment 
across care 
system 
ACO 
      
Readmissions 
  
 
   
HNHC 
  
 
  
 
 
Literature Review Chapter Summary 
In this literature review chapter, extant research on ACOs demonstrates a diverse field 
of study that has been a gradual evolution reflective of the ACOs themselves. As the ACO 
model matured, researchers have had the chance to better identify, categorize, and analyze 
ACO organizational structures, the local context in which they operate, and the domains in 
which performance is Tracked and monitored. Most research has been exploratory. 
Furthermore, previous studies have not explored a key subset population that has garnered 
much attention in recent years: high need, high cost patients. Instead, the literature review 
revealed most studies included either a broad scope in general, specific populations with 
ambulatory care sensitive conditions, or at-risk populations that utilized skilled nursing facilities. 
Performance has primarily focused on mortality and costs. Few studies concerned 
readmissions, and the few that had analyzed readmissions provide a strong foundation for 
which this study will build its analytical framework.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
Organizational theory serves as the overarching umbrella for research in the life cycle, 
management, structure and performance of organizations — organizations defined as an 
organized division of labor where people work together in sub-systems that ultimately transform 
services to reach an end goal (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a; Shafritz et al., 2011). In this study, 
Accountable Care Organizations are organizations that span across several divisions of labor 
and sub-systems that transform healthcare services to improve the quality of care in which 
health services are delivered, while decreasing costs overall. Several subsets of organizational 
theory exist that address how organizations operate, the factors that influence them, and the 
impact of such influences. One subset is organizational structure, which is described as a 
fundamental characteristic that frames how an organization formalizes its authority and 
coordinates work based on its environment and its goals (Jones, 2012). 
Structural Contingency Theory 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) focused ACO incentives on value metrics 
to drive performance improvement. ACOs were allowed operational flexibility to customize their 
structures to local environments for optimal performance. Structural Contingency Theory 
provides a theoretical framework that describes how organizations perform best when structural 
characteristics align in relation to the situation in which organizations operate. Opportunity exists 
to analyze ACOs under the lens of Structural Contingency Theory (SCT) to identify structural 
characteristics that have the greatest impact on ACO performance. High need, high cost
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 patients are highlighted in the literature as top contributors to healthcare expenditure, and 
readmissions are identif ied as one of the highest costs (Hayes et al., 2016; Hines et al., 2014; 
Kroch et al., 2015; Zuckerman et al., 2016). Common themes across ACO, readmissions, and 
HNHC literature include complex coordination across the patient care continuum and goal 
alignment among providers as key to improving quality and performance. 
Structural Contingency Theory (SCT) is a research paradigm composed of three core 
elements: 1) there is a relationship between organizational contingency and organizational 
structure, 2) a change in the contingency determines a change in structure, and 3) organizations 
seek alignment or “fit” between structure and contingency, which results in positive 
organizational performance (Donaldson, 2001b). Contingencies are defined as the contextual 
variables that influence the environment or work in which organizations operate. SCT focuses 
on factors that contribute to performance variability and is based on the premise that 
organizations change structure to adapt to environment or contingency. As contingencies 
change, the organization shifts from fit to misfit as they adapt and seek new fit. Therefore, there 
is no universal fit for organizations due to the specific environment in which they subsist. The 
concept of no “one size fits all” is integral in both SCT and ACO design.  
The majority of ACO literature has applied transaction cost economics and strategic 
management theories to analyze the decision of producing services in-house and organizational 
strategies that vertically integrate services (Bazzoli et al., 2017; Diana, Walker, Mora, & Zhang, 
2015; Shay & Mick, 2016). transaction cost economics provides a framework for researchers to 
examine how ACOs manage and access resources to conduct business (Shortell, 2016), such 
as the costs and benefits for ACOs to contract third party vendors versus developing internal 
capacity to produce resources themselves. However, neither transaction cost economics or 
strategic management theory concentrate on organizational structure and performance 
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variability. As seen in the literature review chapter previously, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act’s goal for executing ACO MSSPs was to establish an overarching 
accountability across care settings and improve coordination among fragmented health 
services. SCT addresses the structural characteristics that allow for accountability and 
coordination. 
SCT is particularly apt to identify structural characteristics per individual environments 
for organizations to reach optimal performance. An example of SCT in ACO research is 
Chukmaitov, Harless, Bazzoli, Caretta & Siangphoe’s (2015) publication, “Delivery system 
characteristics and their association with quality and costs of care: Implications for accountable 
care organizations.” The authors analyzed ACO competencies, hospital characteristics, and 
market characteristics on their impact on 30-day all-cause mortality and hospital inpatient costs. 
Specifically, the authors hypothesized that 1) more centralized health systems had greater 
improvement in mortality and inpatient costs, 2) hospitals with more physicians in a tightly 
integrated physician organization agreement performed better than hospitals without physician 
organization agreements, 3) hospitals with greater vertical integration of services along the care 
continuum realized better performance, and 4) higher levels of health information technology 
competencies were related to improved performance. The authors hypothesized that task 
interdependence was a key contingency to study for ACO success based on the US’ 
fragmented healthcare delivery system. Chukmaitov and colleagues’ research highlights 
existing opportunities in ACO literature. 
Overall, few studies have leveraged SCT as a theoretical framework because of the 
longitudinal nature of SCT research and the limited data available when ACOs were first 
implemented. In addition, ACO data collection and ACO identif ication were intensively manual 
at the program’s inception in 2012. As ACOs matured, data collection methodologies and 
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research have also matured, allowing researchers to better analyze ACO programs and their 
structural characteristics.  
Structural Contingencies  
Organizations exist to systematically transform services, products, or goods from one 
form to another (Andrew H Van de Ven & Drazin, 1985). The actions that exist to transform 
services are the activities or tasks that drive the organization's work. SCT is rich with numerous 
contingency analyses ranging in level of detail encompassing macro-economic conditions, 
organizational-wide factors, and unit level task activities that influence structure and 
performance (Pugh et al., 1969). The unique aspect of SCT is the concept of how contingencies 
influence structure, and organizational performance will vary depending on the way in which an 
organization’s structure fits or fails to fit the contingencies in its environment. Examples of 
contingencies are uncertainty (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b), technology 
(Donaldson, 2001b; Thompson, 1967), task interdependence (Aiken & Hage, 1968; Thompson, 
1967), environmental change, strategy and diversification (Child, 1972) and size (Blau, 1970). 
Among the listed contingencies, this study will f ocus on interdependence and strategy. 
Uncertainty as a Contingency  
In SCT literature, a variety of contingencies have been proposed throughout research, 
such as task interdependence, technology, size and strategy. Researchers have measured 
uncertainty by the extent that processes are automated or the frequency that rules and 
expectations change (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Child, 1972; Donaldson, 2001b).  Donaldson 
(2001) postulated that one of the most prolific contingencies examined in SCT literature was 
“uncertainty,” derived from Burns and Stalker (Donaldson, 2001, p. 37) as the rate of unknown 
in the context of the environment or an organizational task. According to Burns and Stalker 
(1961), two types of environments exist: mechanistic and organic. In a mechanistic 
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environment, activities in the environment are prescribed, formalized into documentation and 
information is quickly available for decision making at the top levels of management.  Uncertainty 
is low in a mechanistic environment. Contrarily, organic environments subsist in constant 
change, where activities are not prescribed, and information is in constant flux. Decision making 
requires local knowledge due to the frequency and pace of activities occurring in the specific 
environment. Thus, the frequency of change is high, and the amount of uncertainty is high in 
organic environments (Donaldson, 2001, p. 38).  
Burns and Stalker’s concept of mechanistic and organic environments is applicable to 
ACOs because of the fundamental cost saving nature of the program. Drivers to cost savings 
are decreasing unnecessary utilization of medical services through heavy emphasis on 
preventive care measures, such as cancer screenings, disease prevention and wellness 
screenings (Albright et al., 2016). In order to decrease cost and unnecessary utilization of 
services, ACOs focus on effectively targeting patients high risk of spending, such as patients 
with characteristics like multiple chronic conditions, elderly, disabled and advanced illness (Long 
et al., 2017). ACOs have focused efforts on unplanned readmissions and placed greater 
emphasis on care coordination across transitions of care. This shift towards preventive care 
management and intensive care coordination may be construed as a programmatic approach to 
decrease uncertainty of HNHC patients and how they access care. 
Interdependence as a Form of Uncertainty.  In organizational theory, interdependence 
is defined as the “intensity of connections” between tasks and task uncertainty among 
organizational departments. This can be described as direction of workflow, information flow, 
expected frequency of interaction among organizational departments and integration of work 
(Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a; Thompson, 1967; A.H. Van de Ven, 1976) . 
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In the SCT literature, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, 1967b) examined several 
organizations with highly differentiated structures. In their study, they found that the degree of 
differentiation and the type of work among the departments influenced performance. If an 
organization was composed of highly differentiated departments with individual goals operating 
under a very mechanistic environment, such departments would have few tasks interdependent 
between each other, and uncertainty between departments would be low since they operate 
independently of each other. If an organization was composed of departments that were more 
functional in nature and were aligned towards a common overarching organizational goal, the 
departments would be more likely to be interdependent with each other to accomplish their 
work. In addition, due to the increased interdependence between departments, there is a 
greater level of uncertainty in the operations. The authors further extrapolated f rom their f indings 
that when an organization’s department was more innovative in nature, the environment would 
be organic, and thus less formal and requiring greater autonomy in their work. In summation to 
Lawrence and Lorsch’s 1967 publications, the authors noted that organizational departments 
with increasing interdependent tasks among each other required a corresponding level of 
integration to mediate task uncertainty. 
Complementary to Lawrence and Lorsch’s studies (1967a, 1967b), Chandler (1962) 
recorded in his historical documents that a trend related to interdependence and integration was 
noted in organizations with diverse business portfolios and multinational structures. When 
businesses change their strategies to diversify their portfolios, their structures also become 
highly differentiated and decentralized. Under their portfolio are independent products that can 
operate autonomously with essential functions set up within their independent organization—like 
a differentiated division within the larger organizational structure. As an organization becomes 
more diversified, interdependence decreases among the differentiated divisions because of their 
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autonomy. The contrary is also true in this case, that if an organization’s strategy is focused on 
a single product, their structure is not differentiated or decentralized. Instead, they are expected 
to be very functional and interdependent on each other since every department is contributing to 
the development of the single product. 
In the SCT literature, Thompson (1967) associated interdependence with technology as 
an integration or coordination mechanism. He categorized interdependence into three types, in 
increasing order of uncertainty and intensity of interaction between organizational departments: 
pooled, sequential, and reciprocal.  
Pooled interdependence. Pooled interdependence is described as a loosely formed 
unit composed of disparate functions that may operate distinctly from each other (Johannes M 
Pennings, 1975) such as a centralized or shared service that is heavily standardized by rules. 
Pooled interdependence has the least uncertainty in its interactions among departments of an 
organization due to its independent nature. In SCT literature, pooled interdependence is 
associated with decentralized structures and organic systems (Donaldson, 2001). Such 
organizations are more likely to have diversified strategies, and thus operate autonomously from 
other departments. 
Sequential interdependence. Sequential interdependence is defined as tasks or 
activities between organizational departments highly reliant on a distinct direction to workflow 
(Thompson, 1967). Each department is responsible for some sort of output that is necessary for 
the next unit’s production. This type is highly interdependent and requires intensive coordination 
but generally runs off a prescribed workflow. Sequential interdependence is higher in 
uncertainty than pooled interdependence because task production is directly dependent on 
another department’s output. Contrary to pooled interdependence, sequential interdependence 
is expected to be in centralized structures and more mechanistic systems (Donaldson, 2001) 
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Reciprocal interdependence. Reciprocal interdependence is described as a mutual 
adjustment of workflow that occurs based on a feedback loop between departments to 
accomplish tasks (Thompson, 1976; Aiken & Hage, 1968; Van de Ven, 1976). Reciprocal is 
highest in uncertainty relative to the previous two interdependent types because tasks and 
actions change according to a collaborative partnership between the two departments to 
determine the next course of action. As uncertainty increases between organizational 
departments, the level of coordination required increases to effectively perform and the level of 
interdependence between departments is more intensive. Both reciprocal interdependence and 
sequential interdependence require intensive coordination between departments. Thus, both 
types of interdependence are more likely to operate in centralized structures that support the 
organization. See Figure 2 below for a display of how uncertainty and coordination increases 
with Thompson’s categories of  interdependence. 
Figure 2 
Relationship Between Uncertainty and Interdependence 
 
 
 
 
Task interdependence is a significant contingency when examining ACO structure, their 
environments and performance. ACOs provide multidisciplinary and complex care coordination 
for beneficiaries across the care continuum (A. J. Barnes et al., 2014). The US health system is 
historically fragmented, which can be a compounded issue for effectively managing HNHC 
patient populations (McCarthy et al., 2015). For ACOs to perform most effectively, ACOs would 
need to connect across the fragmented pieces of the US health system to coordinate care. 
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Thus, task interdependence would be expected to be high among providers in ACOs with high 
performance. 
Strategy as a Contingency  
An important contingency that influences organizational structure is strategy. This 
contingency is depicted in SCT literature as an organization’s future direction of its business, 
which spans across product development, geographical distribution, targeted customer group, 
or scope of services (Chandler Jr., 1962; Child & Francis, 1977). Common strategies cited in 
organization theory literature include volume expansion, geographical dispersion, vertical 
integration and diversification. Volume expansion is an increase in market share or customer 
base. Geographical dispersion is the development of local presence in different geographies. 
Vertical integration is the expansion of new functions that form multi-departmental structures 
with aligned objectives for a service or product line. Diversification is defined as expansion of 
new products or services offered, and essentially, separate targeted customer bases, objectives 
and operations for each product leading to a multidivisional structure (Chandler  Jr., 1962, p. 15-
16). Extant literature expounds that strategy is set by a governing body, most often a corporate 
governance or board of directors that oversee long term planning, resource allocation and 
overall strategy execution. Rezaee (2009, P. 7-9) describes corporate governance as an 
overseeing body for regulations, policies, business practices, ethics management, legislation, 
marketing and financial health of an organization. Depending on external and internal factors, 
the role of corporate governance can shift to accommodate the needs of the organization; these 
roles consist of auditing, supervising, coaching and steering. When conditions are less stable, 
more uncertain and internally ineffective, boards take on more active execution roles. During 
times of market transition, governance roles are required to shift towards a broad and diverse 
composition to better represent expertise required for the conditions in which the organization is 
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now operating (Ghofar & Islam, 2015). Likewise, governance roles can also be described as 
financially driven or performance driven (Young, 2003). Previous studies apply contingency 
theory to corporate governance by analyzing the moderating effect strategy has on governance 
structures as they shift along with market conditions. According to Child & Francis (1977), 
change in strategy leads to change in structure for decision making, environmental changes, 
governance, resource allocation and integration across organizational departments.  
Chandler describes multiple levels of vertical and horizontal alignment to execution of 
strategies set by the governing body of a corporation (Chandler, 1962, p.10). As organizations 
become more diversified, their structures shift from functional and centralized to divisional and 
decentralized. Thompson (1967) posits that strategy is inherently linked to interdependency 
because as organizations become more divisional, departments are reliant on a pool of shared 
resources while operating independently from other departments. The less diverse an 
organization, the more functional and interdependent their work are to each other  (Child, 1997); 
therefore, departments are operating intensively because their tasks are highly dependent on 
another departments’ output (Smith et al., 1989). Figure 3 shows as organizational strategy 
diversifies, interdependence decreases, and structure becomes more decentralized. 
Figure 3 
Relationship Between Strategy, Interdependence and Centralization 
 
As indicated earlier, CMS focused on ACO performance rather than the local 
implementation of ACO operations. Essentially, ACOs are composed of groups of providers and 
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organizations voluntarily coming together to coordinate high quality care for populations 
(McCarthy et al., 2015). By voluntarily coming together to form an ACO, disparate groups of 
providers have aligned their business objectives and scope of services. According to the 
strategy contingency, prior to joining the ACO, these disparate provider groups did not share a 
common business direction nor were incentivized to coordinate care for even similar patient 
populations. This could be construed as separate and diverse products across the care 
continuum. But with the advent of the ACO, the ACO provides an umbrella for virtual, if not 
organizational, alignment towards the same objectives with an officially established governing 
body overseeing the members of the ACO and its performance (Chukmaitov et al., 2015).  
Organizational Structures 
Much of contemporary research on organizational structure is derived from seminal 
studies conducted by Burns and Stalker (1961) on the management of organizational systems. 
Burns and Stalker (1961) highlighted two opposing organizational structures: mechanistic and 
organic systems.  Both systems are contingent on the environments in which they operate. 
Mechanistic systems are most appropriate in routine and stable environments structured for 
control, whereas organic systems work best in unpredictable and non-routine environments 
structured for innovation and autonomy (Burns & Stalker, 1961). These two management 
systems frame the environment in which organizational structures are formed. The key 
distinction between mechanistic and organic systems is the degree of control that management 
enforces through its structures. The organizational environment that ACOs operate in can be 
unpredictable and require flexible structures to adapt to highly localized needs, mitigate risks 
within uncertain environments, and actively manage costs in the most effective manner possible 
without jeopardizing quality of care.  
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Formalization  
Aiken and Hage (1968) define formalization as the parameters in which an 
organization’s standard operating procedure is documented and the degree to which its 
employees are free to deviate from such procedures (1968). Formalization has been 
characterized as the documentation of roles, standard processes for information sharing, and 
reported performance (Pugh et al., 1968). In SCT literature, formalization has been associated 
with mechanistic systems where uncertainty is low and degree of control is built into an 
organization’s bureaucracy (Burns & Stalker, 1961).  
Interdependence and Formalization  
According to SCT literature, as task interdependence increases, formalization decreases 
because the organizational structure becomes more functional and centralized (Donaldson, 
2001, p. 43).  As mentioned earlier in this chapter, interdependence is categorized into three 
types with corresponding levels of uncertainty. Since formalization has been associated with 
decreasing levels of uncertainty in SCT literature (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967; Donaldson, 2001), it can be assumed that pooled interdependence would be most 
complementary to highly formalized structures, whereas sequential and reciprocal 
interdependence would be most appropriate in organizations with low formalization. Figure 4 
displays the inverse relationship between uncertainty and formalization. 
Figure 4  
Relationship Between Uncertainty, Interdependence and Formalization 
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Differentiation  
In SCT literature, differentiation has been described as two different constructs. First, 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a) describe differentiation as the organizational division of work by 
function and specialization. Divisions may operate independently, driven by division-specific 
goals or incentives. Comparatively, Thompson (1972) describes differentiation as a vertical and 
horizontal construct, identified by levels of hierarchy, number of divisions, and number of jobs.  
Vertical Differentiation. Vertical differentiation is the hierarchical ranking of 
organizational divisions, where span of control grows in layers of authority as the number of 
employees grow (Blau, 1970). Organizational structures may be vertically differentiated along 
managerial levels or subdivisions by branches and headquarters (George Ritzer, 1975). This is 
true until the organization is at a point to leverage economies of scale and centralize 
administrative duties across its organization. In healthcare, this construct has been translated 
into levels of care, tiered access and pricing hierarchies across the care continuum (Bardey et 
al., 2012; Gaynor et al., 2015; Mougeot & Naegelen, 2013). 
Horizontal Differentiation. Horizontal differentiation is the number of  functional 
divisions working across the organization that may operate as shared resources for the 
organization, such as human resources, finance, and information technology (Blau, 1970). In 
healthcare, horizontal differentiation can be seen in the increasing development of physician 
group practices and independent practice associations across specialist groups. Strategically, 
hospitals have contracted services, built health systems and virtual alliances across the care 
continuum to expand scope of services (Young, Parker, & Charns, 2001). When organizations 
grow to a certain size, tasks and responsibilities are grouped by function and specialization, 
which leads to increased interdependence among the different functions (Van de Ven, 1976).  
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Applied to ACO structures, differentiation could be described as how ACOs vary in their 
contracting or services, according to local resources available or beneficiaries enrolled.  
Decentralization. The concept of decentralization is linked to organizational size and 
span of control. Decentralization is the concept that the organization has divided its workforce 
into independent divisions managed by local forms of authority. The level of decentralization is 
usually associated with size (Moch & Morse, 1977). As an organization grows, the more likely it 
will be differentiated and authority or control from a hierarchy is also divided (Hollenbeck et al., 
2011). Authority is localized because the organization is practically too large for timely decision 
making to flow up a large chain of command (Hinings, Greenwood, & Ranson, 1975; 
Donaldson, 2001, p. 69).  
Also linked to decentralization is interdependence and strategy. If an organization 
changes its strategy to diversify its products, change direction or scope of services, the 
organization’s structure is expected to be more autonomous, less interdependent with functional 
departments, and more coordinated with centralized shared resources (Child & Francis, 1977). 
In comparison, if an organization moves more towards an undiversified product, greater 
centralization is expected through overarching governance, increased interdependence 
between functional departments, and increased coordination between functional departments 
(Donaldson, 2001). In healthcare, tiered services and levels of care within health systems are 
likely to operate under a decentralized structure where decision-making authority is localized 
and adaptable to local environments (Young et al, 2001; Hollenbeck et al, 2011). ACOs operate 
under a similar concept where CMS allows organizations at the local environment to establish 
the organizational structure that best meets their needs (A. J. Barnes et al., 2014). This can be 
described in terms of the scope of services, level of integration among the services that are 
within the ACO and the governance structure that directs ACO performance (Walker et al., 
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2017). For example, ACO governance structures range from hospital-led, physician-group-led, 
co-leadership between hospital and physician group, or a separate governance structure led by 
local government representatives (Shortell et al, 2014). ACO governance demonstrates 
potential alignment of provider incentives across the care continuum for effective population 
health management (Abernethy & Stoelwinder, 1995; Alexander, Lee & Bazzoli, 2003; Van de 
Ven, 2004; Charland, 2015; Burgers & Covin, 2016). 
Integration. Integration is often paired with the study of differentiation. Integration is 
described in SCT literature as the “effort among various subsystems” to coordinate work to 
reach an organization’s goals (Zeithaml, Varadarajan, & Zeithaml, 1988; Donaldson, 2001, 
p.41). In the ACO literature, integration is the most common of structural characteristics 
explored (Frech et al., 2015; Gordon, 2016; Lewis et al., 2017; Mick & Shay, 2016) , especially 
as care coordination is being evaluated in ACO performance, and this is highly dependent on 
timely access to health services (Bazzoli et al., 2019; Shortell et al., 2017; Walker et al., 2017; 
Winblad et al., 2017). Integration can occur both vertically and horizontally across an 
organization. 
Vertical Integration. In SCT, vertical integration is considered as integration across a 
continuum of services or functions (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a). This is usually seen in 
organizations or functional departments with undiversified portfolios or strategies; workflow is 
directional and intensively interdependent between functional departments. In SCT literature, 
organizations with undiversified strategies that perform well show high interdependent activity 
and high levels of coordination between functions (Donaldson, 2001, p. 43). Vertical integration 
may be construed as organizational devices to align behavior and performance towards a 
similar goal through contractual agreements, alliances, affiliations or levels of ownership 
(Burgers et al., 2009; Jansen et al., 2009; L.J. Bourgeois, 1980; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a; 
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Turkulainen & Ketokivi, 2013). For example, if an ACO is highly integrated throughout the care 
continuum, the ACO may have affiliations or contractual agreements with post-acute facilities or 
home care agencies (Lewis et al., 2017). Affiliations have been noted as strategic alliances 
among providers or multispecialty providers with hospitals for post-discharge follow up of high 
risk populations (Fryer et al., 2016; Hickam et al., 2013), virtual agreements across health 
services for timely access to preventive services like screenings and specialty care (Chukmaitov 
et al, 2015), or safe transitions to post-acute facilities (Kennedy et al., 2018; Mileski et al., 2017; 
Winblad et al., 2017).  
Horizontal Integration. In comparison, horizontal integration in SCT is considered the 
consolidation or mergers of similar services to expand access to the same type of service 
(Young Parker & Charns, 2001; Jansen et al, 2009; Teixeira, Koufteros & Peng, 2012), such as 
organizational mergers to alleviate interdependence among services (Pfeffer, 1972). For 
example, in an ACO that is highly horizontally integrated, the ACO may acquire several primary 
care practices or specialist groups to improve time to access care, reduce wait time, and 
potentially divert unnecessary admissions or emergency room utilization. 
Integration mechanisms. Thompson (1967) outlines integration mechanisms to 
coordinate work. SCT literature describes integration as taking the form of 1) planned work or 
rules, 2) centralized governance, and 3) the appointment of an independent body or individual to 
act as a bridge among functions to coordinate activities (Thompson, 1967; Jansen, Tempelaar, 
van den Bosch & Volberda, 2009). In SCT, intensive utilization and capability of information 
technology tools is indicative of planned work through automation of standard operating 
procedures and transforming logic into defined steps and rules (Child, 1973; Ouchi, 1977; 
Starkweather, 1970). In evaluating the different integration mechanisms in the context of ACOs, 
planned work or rules is described in the ACO literature as information systems used in the 
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organization for information transfer, communication among providers, coordination across care 
settings, and Tracking and monitoring of key performance indicators (Blumenthal, 2017; 
Blumenthal & Abrams, 2016; Chukmaitov et al., 2015; Diana et al., 2015; Stremikis et al., 2017) .  
As seen in the literature, ACOs oftentimes consider the needs and capabilities of their 
organizations to manage specialized services in-house versus outsourcing. Integration has 
been analyzed under the transaction cost economics (TCE) theoretical lens described as 
organizations’ decision to internally produce or outsource expertise , but there is a difference 
between a TCE perspective of integration versus a SCT perspective. Where TCE focuses on 
cost and efficacy of producing specialized services versus outsourcing, SCT focuses on the 
activities interdependent between subsystems to allow for greatest transmission of information 
and transformation of services (Aiken & Hage, 1968). Furthermore, a critical program 
component for ACOs is timely communication and access of services to effectively manage 
patients across the care continuum, such as post-discharge transitions to a skilled nursing 
facility.  
Structure in Relation to Contingencies  
Organizations adapt their structures to their environment to maintain positive 
performance (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings & Turner, 1968; Donaldson, 2001). The environment in 
which work is done serves as a contingency for an organization’s operations. Contingency 
factors, such as organizational size, interdependency of tasks, and uncertainty in routine, are 
organizational “contingencies”. When environmental contingencies change, organizations adapt 
their structure to meet contingency demands so that they can ultimately progress and survive —  
pursuing what is termed in SCT literature as “fit”. Fit is defined as the adaptation of an 
organization’s structure according to the context of its environment in order to remain viable 
(Donaldson, 2001). When an organization is in “fit”, the organization’s structural traits are in 
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alignment to meet the demands of the environment, and performance improves as a result. 
When an organization is in “misfit”, the organization’s structure may not be best suited to the 
contingencies it faces, and performance declines as a result (Donaldson, 2001; Klaas, 2004; 
Soylu, 2008; Van de Ven & Drazin, 1985). Figure 5 provides a visual representation of the “fit” 
and “misfit” concept.   
Figure 5  
Structural Contingency Theory | “Fit” versus “Misfit” 
 
Analyzing Fit: Structural Adaptation to Regain Fit (SARFIT) and Hetero-Performance  
Key to SCT research is the argument that organizations seek the most optimal fit 
between structure and contingencies (Donaldson, 2001, 2006). In the literature, fit has been 
analyzed in various ways to determine if there are alternative forms of understanding or 
applying fit. Examples of different approaches to fit include: 1) natural selection, where 
resources fall into place as best needed for the organization, 2) interactive pairs of contingency 
and structure, and 3) a systems approach where the summation of several internal 
contingencies and structural f its result in a holistic impact on performance (Van de Ven & 
Drazin, 1985). A more functional approach to fit is Donaldson’s (2001) Structural Adaptation to 
Regain Fit (SARFIT), described as the process in which a contingency in the organization 
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changes, and the organization experiences reductions in efficiency and effectiveness (misfit) 
until its structure changes to correspond with the contingency change. After the organization 
adapts its structure to the most appropriate form for the changed contingency, performance is 
positive again and the organization regains fit (Donaldson, 1987, 1999, 2001). Graphically, f it is 
considered the point where contingency and structure intersect along a graph that indicates 
optimal performance (see Figure 6. SARFIT). According to the concept of hetero-performance, 
fit can be at different intersections where performance may be higher or lower, depending on 
how well the organization adapts its structure (Donaldson, 2001, p. 263-268). Performance is 
not static nor pre-set for all organizations. Performance is dependent on the individual 
organization’s contingencies and associated structure. The more optimal the fit between 
contingency and structure, the higher the organization performs; in other words, the intersection 
of contingency and structure is higher up on the fit line (Gresov, 1989; Klaas, 2004; Van de Ven 
& Drazin, 1985; Xu, Cavusgil, & White, 2006). 
 Figure 6  
SARFIT 
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ACO Contingency Relationships 
ACO Governance and Centralization  
ACOs are examples of strategic alliances across healthcare providers to leverage 
economies of scale for population impact (Colla, Lewis, Tierney & Muhlestein, 2016). The US 
health system has historically functioned as a fragmented model. By participating in an ACO, 
organizations are making a strategic decision to coordinate care as a system towards a similar 
objective, but ACO literature has shown that shared accountability among providers is a 
ubiquitous challenge (Lewis, Tierney, Colla & Shortell, 2017). Without shared incentives, 
providers have had disparate goals that directed their activities, most especially among 
hospitals, provider practices, and post-acute facilities, like skilled nursing facilities (SNF). In the 
ACO literature, researchers have cited a potential solution to improve ACO performance when 
providers do not share incentives: Centralize authority through shared governance between 
providers and the hospital in the ACO (Kennedy et al., 2018). Centralized governance is 
depicted in SCT literature as an independent group composed of representatives from 
participating organizations that is positioned in an organization that oversees high level strategic 
direction, resource allocation, long term planning and capital investments (Chandler Jr., 1962). 
When looking at readmissions performance for HNHC patients, centralized governance through 
shared accountability among providers in the hospital and post-acute settings are especially 
important for chronic disease management and preventing unnecessary readmissions (Hayes et 
al, 2016).  
Historically, hospitals and providers operated under a diverse portfolio of objectives and 
goals prior to joining an ACO. From the viewpoint of SCT, when hospitals and providers join an 
ACO, they operate under a common goal with standardized objectives. In essence, ACOs 
represent a strategic alignment among participating providers and health service organizations. 
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The ACO can act as a vehicle to align structure, governance and performance across the care 
continuum. As a consequence, the less diversified an organization’s portfolio is, its structure 
becomes less decentralized and more functional. For example, prior to joining an ACO, 
providers and health service organizations may be directed by individual goals, such as 
hospitals under a case rate reimbursement model, post-acute skilled nursing facilities under a 
fee-for-service reimbursement model and independent practice associations under a capitated 
per-member-per-month model. After joining an ACO, each provider group, service organization 
and health facility participating in the ACO are strategically aligned by performance and risk-
based agreements under the ACO. Thus, under the concept of SCT, ACOs will have greatest 
impact on readmissions reductions for HNHC patients when governance is centralized at the 
ACO level, structured as shared accountability between the hospital and providers. This may be 
operationalized in ACOs by having the ACO’s governance co-led between hospital and provider 
leadership. The contingency relationship is depicted in Figure 7. 
Figure 7  
Contingency-Structure Relationship #1 
 
 
 
Further extrapolating from SCT literature on strategy and structure, this study infers that 
the strategic oversight or alignment would indicate that an ACO controls long term planning, 
resource allocation, objectives setting and funds flow at the highest level of the organization. 
Therefore, based on this relationship between strategy alignment and governance, ACOs are 
anticipated to exhibit better fit – as evidenced in earned total shared savings – when 
governance is centralized at the ACO level and structured as a co-leadership between hospital 
and physician leaders. 
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H1: ACOs with hospital and physician co-led governance structures are more likely to 
produce total earned shared savings than ACOs without co-led governance structures. 
 
Vertical integration within the ACO through physician alignment. According to 
HNHC literature, HNHC patients have been identif ied as being complex because they possess 
multiple chronic conditions, suffer from major chronic illnesses (such as congestive heart failure 
and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease), and may be elderly, disabled, and require 
behavioral health services and social support (Long et al., 2017). Because of their highly 
complex needs, HNHC patients require intensive coordination among services and timely 
access to care (Blumenthal & Abrams, 2016). ACOs with a high density of HNHC patient 
populations would be expected to manage a greater amount of complex coordination for HNHC 
patients than ACOs with lower HNHC patient populations. The higher the complexity in care 
coordination, the greater the need for timely access to specialty care providers and preventive 
care monitoring. HNHC patient populations are more susceptible to being readmitted due to 
their multiple chronic conditions, diverse health needs, and challenging social and behavioral 
situations (Hayes et al., 2016). This is especially important in terms of accessing provider 
services across the care continuum. ACOs thus provide a strategic alignment among providers 
and health service organizations to bridge the gap of complex care coordination for HNHC 
patients. The greater the coordination needs, the more interdependent between health services.  
Within the SCT literature, Donaldson (2001) synthesizes Thompson’s (1967) work on 
interdependence and deconstructs the contingency into two basic elements: intensity of 
interaction between groups and level of uncertainty. Intensity of interaction between groups is 
defined as the frequency of administrative effort or interactions required between different 
groups to accomplish work (Donaldson, 2001, p.172). For HNHC patient management, 
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increased volumes or greater density of HNHC populations connotes an increased complexity in 
care and thus increased uncertainty, which then requires more intensive interactions between 
functions to decrease uncertainty. The corresponding structure thus suggests greater fit when 
high interdependence is more centralized and an increasingly functional structure (Aiken & 
Hage, 1968; Andrews & Boyne, 2014; Ford, Slocum, & Jr., 1977). Due to the high 
interdependence needed for complex coordination of HNHC patients, this study expects high 
interdependence among providers and health service organizations. Therefore, ACOs would be 
less likely to have physician groups be decentralized from the service organization, like a 
hospital. This can be applied to the current study in that as complex coordination increases, the 
less likely physician group practices will be decentralized from the ACO. Thus, physician group 
practices would be expected to be in tight alignment with service organizations, like a hospital in 
the ACO (see Figure 8 for the second contingency relationship). 
Figure 8 
Contingency-Structure Relationship #2 
  
The management of HNHC patient populations requires complex coordination.  Based 
on this relationship between complex coordination and physician alignment, it is hypothesized 
that ACOs with higher volumes of HNHC patients among their beneficiaries are anticipated to 
exhibit better fit – as evidenced in better performance through ACO program shared savings – 
when physician group practices are more tightly aligned with the ACO rather than loosely 
aligned. Tight alignment can be interpreted by the type of integration mechanisms ACOs 
employ, such as contractual agreements, alliances, affiliations or levels of ownership (Lawrence 
& Lorsch, 1967; Bourgeois, 1980; Burgers, Jansen, Van den Bosch & Volberda, 2009; Jansen, 
Tempelaar, Van den Bosch & Volberda, 2009; Turkulainen & Ketokivi, 2013). The more legally 
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binding an alignment, such as mergers, affiliations or types of ownership, the tighter the 
alignment. The more virtual an agreement, the looser the alignment.  
H2: Under conditions where the ACO is assigned to higher risk populations, ACOs with 
tight physician and hospital alignment will outperform ACOs with loosely aligned 
physician and hospital associations. 
 
Interdependence between hospital and community behavioral health partners. 
According to the Academy of Medicine’s HNHC patient taxonomy, behavioral health was one of 
the fundamental factors of the HNHC patient profile that makes this population distinctly more 
vulnerable to receiving sufficient quality care (Blumenthal et al., 2016; Long et al., 2017). Mental 
illness or drug / alcohol problems have been cited as key predictors for high services utilization 
among the Medicaid population (Blumenthal, 2017). Therefore, incorporating behavioral health 
services into ACO networks should yield an impact on preventing readmissions following 
hospital discharges.  
In viewing this contingency relationship under the lens of SCT, there is high 
interdependence between hospitals and behavioral health experts in the community. As 
interdependence increases, the expectation is that the ACO becomes less decentralized and 
more functional in structure. This would result in partner development between hospitals and 
behavioral health expert groups, potentially in the form of post-discharge enrollment to 
behavioral health services (Thompson, 1967; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Figure 9 depicts the 
third contingency relationship for this study.  
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Figure 9  
Contingency-Structure Relationship #3 
 
Based on the contingency relationship between complex coordination and functional 
partnerships with behavioral health experts, it is anticipated that ACOs with high volumes of 
HNHC beneficiaries will exhibit better fit – as evidenced in better performance in reduced 
inpatient psychiatric admissions – when they involve some form of partnership between 
hospitals and behavioral health expert groups. This may be in the form of preferred networks, 
contractual agreements, memorandums of understanding, or physician privileges among post-
acute facilities. Examples of this may be where hospitals apply for a waiver to the two-midnight 
rule when a patient is admitted through an emergency department, and the hospital has an 
agreement with a skilled nursing facility to transfer patients with lower acuity to be managed at a 
lower level of care after a 23-hour observation stay. Another example is the assignment of a 
social worker or behavioral health specialist to HNHC patients at risk due to mental illness. 
H3: Under conditions where the ACO is assigned to higher risk populations, ACOs with 
greater access to behavioral and mental health services will outperform ACOs without 
such access. 
 
ACO health IT integration among hospital, ambulatory and post-acute services. 
Building on complex coordination of care for HNHC populations among ACO beneficiaries, 
HNHC patient literature has described intensive communication among providers to coordinate 
care. Coordinating care for HNHC patients requires intensive interaction that occurs for ongoing 
care management, outcomes monitoring, and intervention activities (Blumenthal et al, 2016). To 
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determine when interventions are necessary, many ACOs have developed transition care teams 
to actively oversee beneficiaries posing the highest risk for readmission (Lewis et al, 2017). 
Critical tools and information necessary for transition care teams to be successful are access to 
patient medical records and care team notes. Immediate access to patient medical information 
and updated communications between providers are one of the critical health IT factors 
identif ied in Bazzoli and colleagues’ (2017) ACO taxonomy.  
Under the lens of SCT, the intensive interaction described above may be labeled as 
reciprocal interdependence among functions of health service experts. The more complex care 
that is needed, higher levels of interdependence is expected. Thus, integration tools would be 
needed for successful coordination among groups or services coordinating care for HNHC 
patients in the ACO. Advanced levels of  health IT integration is thus expected connecting 
providers and service organizations in the ACO (Thompson, 1967). For reciprocally 
interdependent tasks, “intensive” technologies are expected to be utilized where two-way 
communication and feedback determines next steps in action and highlights the greatest level of 
uncertainty in tasks. In order to mitigate the reciprocal nature of the interdependence between 
functions for complex care coordination of HNHC patients in ACOs, a high level of health IT 
integration is expected. Figure 10 displays the contingency relationship. 
Figure 10 
Contingency-Structure Relationship #4 
 
 
Thus, a high level of health IT integration is expected for a best fit between complex 
coordination and health IT.  Based on the contingency relationship between complex 
coordination and health IT integration, it is anticipated that ACOs with high volumes of HNHC 
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beneficiaries will exhibit better fit – as evidenced in better performance in unplanned admissions 
for beneficiaries with Heart Failure, Diabetes or Multiple Chronic Conditions – when they exhibit 
high levels of health IT integration.  
H4: Under conditions where the ACO is assigned to higher risk populations, ACOs with 
higher health IT integration will outperform ACOs with lower health IT integration. 
 
 
Conceptual Model 
 The complex nature of readmissions among HNHC populations connotes that no one 
contingency may definitively depict a best fit with ACO structure and performance. Considering 
this complexity, this study will draw from Donaldson’s (2001) concept of multiple contingencies 
that uses an additive model to determine best fit of contingencies and structure. 
 Figure 11 shows a conceptual model of this study. The first part depicts each 
contingency relationship outlined previously in this chapter that will be analyzed for calculated 
degree of fit to ACO performance. Secondly, scores for each contingency relationship will be 
added in a composite model for overall calculated degree of fit for ACO performance.  Overall, 
the greater degree of fit between contingency and structure is expected to present a positively 
correlating relationship with ACO performance. ACO performance dependent variables include 
readmission rates and ACO shared savings. Control variables include ACO variables (such as, 
ACO size, ACO Track, ACO program entry year, ACOs that changed Tracks or programs and 
ACOs that have exited), market variables (such as, geographical areas, urban vs rural, 
physician density) and beneficiary variables (such as those marked as HNHC or not). HNHC 
patient populations will be identif ied as beneficiaries dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid, 
diagnosed with chronic conditions, identified with behavioral health needs, or are disabled. 
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 Figure 11 
Conceptual Model and Contingency-Structure Relationship #5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As depicted in the conceptual model and referred to in Donaldson’s (2001) proposal that 
multiple contingencies may be calculated by applying an additive approach, the final hypothesis 
is an aggregate of the previous four hypotheses. 
H5: ACOs with higher measures of fit between their structural characteristics and 
contingencies will exhibit better performance than ACOs with lower measures of fit.   
 
Chapter Summary 
 In accordance with SCT, this study hypothesizes that the relationships between an 
ACO’s structure and its contingencies affect its performance. This study attempted to determine 
what specific ACO characteristics are associated with strategy and task interdependence 
contingencies, utilizing descriptions from Bazzoli and colleagues’ (2017) taxonomy of ACOs and 
the Academy of Medicine’s (2017) HNHC patient taxonomy.  
 Four contingency relationships were outlined, and from the conceptual model, f ive 
hypotheses were derived. Based on these hypotheses, the next chapter will detail the multiple 
regression model to be used to statistically determine their significant relationships with ACO 
Contingencies 
-Strategy Alignment 
-Complex Coordination 
Structural Characteristics 
-Governance 
-Physician Alignment 
-Functional Partnership 
-Health IT Integration 
Fit / 
Congruence 
ACO Performance 
ACO 
Variables 
+ 
Benef iciary 
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performance. The next chapter will also describe data sources, biases, research approach, 
analytical mode, and variables (such as independent, control, moderating and dependent 
variables).
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Chapter 4: Methods 
The objectives of this chapter are to describe the research design, data sources, sample 
and population, variables, and analytic methodology applied to this study. This will include study 
assumptions and steps taken to mitigate threats to the internal and external validity of the study.  
Research Design 
 This study is an exploratory, non-experimental, post-test-only non-equivalent group 
design with multiple cross-sections to examine fit / congruence between contingencies and ACO 
structural variables to explain ACO performance. Descriptive statistics will be conducted to 
explore associations among independent variables. Regression analyses will be used to 
analyze statistical significance, direction of relationships and impact with the dependent 
variables. Finally, a two-step regression will be utilized to analyze for multiple contingency fit 
(Volberda et al., 2012) 
The study will consist of a three-year period, 2015 through 2017. Past organizational 
theory research (Child, 1974; Donaldson, 1987; Ellis et al., 2002; Stan & Puranam, 2017)  have 
posited that a time lag occurs between an organizational change and its effect on performance. 
Fit / congruence will be measured when organizational change occurred, for example, when 
changes in contingency effectuate changes in structure (Donaldson, 2001). Previous studies 
have applied one year or a moving average (time plus one) to account for any time lag when 
examining fit (Sine et al., 2006; Sousa & Voss, 2008; Zajac et al., 2000). The sample population 
will include ACOs participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) with a start 
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date of 2015 and participated in the National Survey of Accountable Care Organizations. 
Organizations that have elected to discontinue the ACO program or change their Track during 
the study period will be excluded. For example, if an ACO changes from Pioneer to MSSP Track 
1, that ACO would not be included in the analysis to maintain consistency and not threaten 
internal validity of the study. Likewise, if an ACO discontinues its participation in the program 
during the study period, that ACO will be excluded in the dataset to maintain consistency. 
Therefore, this study will calculate fit / congruence (X) for ACO structural changes in initial 
agreement period year 2015 and outcome measures (O1 – O2) in PY 2016 through 2017 to 
accommodate the anticipated time lag and the full agreement period of 3 years. MSSPs are 
allowed 2 agreement periods of 3 years each. See figure 12 for the research design. 
Figure 12  
Research Design  
X O1 O2 
Fit / Congruence 
measurement PY 2015 
Performance measurement     
PY 2016 – PY 2017 
 
Threats to internal and external validity. This study is a non-experimental and non-
equivalent groups design because it will not manipulate independent variables for the study nor 
randomly assign test subjects (Belli, 2009). Instead, this study leverages best practices in the 
design of social sciences research to analyze existing ACO data for contingency relationships to 
performance. Internal validity is related to the accuracy of a study and the extent the design was 
able to control the impact extraneous variables may have on the outcomes. External validity is 
the extent in which the study’s results may be generalizable in another context outside o f this 
study. Threats to internal and external validity limit this study’s ability to establish a causal 
relationship between contingencies, structure and performance. The threats include 
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instrumentation, regression, testing, maturation, history, selection, setting and the existence of 
multiple programs. Elimination or mitigation of each threat will be discussed in detail in the 
following sections and highlighted in Table 4. 
Instrumentation.  Threats to internal validity related to instrumentation include any 
changes to the mode of administration and data collection in a study (Trochim, 2007). This 
study will utilize secondary data from two main sources: The Dartmouth Institute for Health 
Policy and Clinical Practice and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS).  
The Dartmouth Institute partnered with the University of California, Berkeley and The 
Commonwealth Fund on a project to analyze ACOs across the United States. Part of the project 
consists of the implementation and management of the National Survey of Accountab le Care 
Organizations (NSACO), which is a longitudinal study implemented in 2012 that surveys ACO 
executives and senior leadership regarding ACO structure, program characteristics, provider 
partnerships, and health services across the ACO. The NSACO dataset has been utilized in 
several studies since its inception, and the survey tool was validated by Dartmouth’s Data 
Analytic Core department. The survey was designed specifically for longitudinal analyses at 
national levels capable of linking to CMS datasets. Thus, threats regarding instrumentation for 
the NSACO are eliminated by the instrument’s design.  
Publicly available data and ACO performance data sources maintained by CMS are the 
other data sources this study will use. ACO-level, beneficiary-level, and provider-level ACO data 
are maintained by CMS and made public for researchers through the CMS.gov website as well 
as a research data assistance center for purchase. The threat to internal validity related to this 
dataset is that there have been changes in formatting and terminology for key metrics each 
performance year that CMS has released ACO performance data. CMS had released ACO data 
in a static .pdf file as a “fact sheet” compared to a public use file that CMS releases and updates 
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nearly quarterly. In order to address this threat, this study will use only public use files released 
at the end of the calendar year. Key terminology changes among performance year datasets 
include “generated savings/generated losses,” “earned savings,” and the availability of 
“Medicare trust fund” calculations. This was identif ied by the National Association of ACOs in 
their September 2016 performance year review of Medicare Shared Savings Program 
performance years 1 – 3 (Litton, 2016). The report suggested workaround calculations for 
comparable analyses, which this study will apply to be able to analyze across performance 
years.  
Regression. The threat to regress towards the mean in a study exists when a pre-test is 
conducted, scores show extreme performance, and participants are selected based on the pre-
test scores (Trochim, 2007). This study did not conduct a pre-test, so the study design 
eliminates this threat. 
Testing. The threat of having participants possess knowledge prior to the 
program/survey conducted is significant when there is potential heterogeneity in performance 
based on participants’ prior knowledge (Trochim, 2007).  The CMS data are derived from 
required data submissions from all participating ACOs. Therefore, the threat is neutralized 
because all organizations participating in an ACO are required to complete a lengthy 
submission process before being accepted as an ACO. No prior knowledge based on a pre -test 
has thus been applied. Similarly, the NSACO did not conduct a pre-test, and the results of the 
survey do not provide any direct benefit to ACOs that submit data to the NSACO. 
Maturation and History. Potential threats to validity regarding maturation are defined as 
changes that occur within participants that have an effect on the dependent variables. 
Participant history can be construed as any external event from the study that may impact the 
results. To address maturation and history, this study’s sampling population will include only 
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ACOs participating in MSSP that entered the program in the same cohort year – 2015 – and 
remained in the ACO without changes to its Track program until the final year. ACOs 
participating in Track 1, which is the predominant group, are allowed to stay in Track 1 for a 
maximum of three years.  
CMS beneficiary assignment methodology was revised in 2016 and again in 2018. In 
order to maintain as much consistency within the study population as possible, this study will 
analyze performance years 2016 – 2017, which accounts for any changes in beneficiary 
assignment. Medicare fee-for-service beneficiary assignment includes: 1) beneficiaries must 
have had at least 1 primary care visit during an ACO assignment window with an ACO provider, 
2) beneficiaries designate an ACO provider as their primary care provider (not to be substitute 
by a specialty provider), and 3) beneficiaries designate an ACO professional to coordinate their 
overall care. Exclusion criteria are highlighted as: 1) beneficiaries who have not had at least 1 
primary care visit during an ACO assignment window with an ACO provider, 2) beneficiaries 
elect to designate a non-ACO provider as their primary care provider, 3) beneficiaries elect to 
designate a non-ACO provider or a specialist to oversee their overall care, 4) CMS will exclude 
any services beneficiaries have received from ACO providers who participate in more than one 
ACO (Medicare Shared Savings Program, 2017). 
Selection Bias. Selection bias is defined as the selection of participants or data that 
may have not been properly randomized to a degree that represents the study population 
(Creswell, 2009, p. 218-220). This is a threat to internal validity because this study will not 
randomly assign high need, high cost beneficiaries to ACOs or randomly assign providers to 
ACOs. This study will mitigate some of these threats by its statistical model that will include 
control variables for ACO market and program characteristics, such as geographical location, 
rural/urban setting, ACO beneficiary size and provider density.  
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Beneficiaries may self -select out of ACOs during the study period, which may affect the 
outcomes if the groups are not equivalent from the beginning. This threat is eliminated by CMS 
requirements that ACOs are benchmarked according to 3 years of data prior to the initial start 
year. ACO benchmark years determine prior expenditure of key ACO metrics and beneficiary 
composition. In addition, ACOs must have a minimum of 5,000 beneficiaries per performance 
year. This stipulates a threshold of minimum beneficiaries. In addition, CMS calculates a risk-
adjusted beneficiary score to determine if adjustment is needed for the ACO’s benchmarking 
scores. Therefore, ACO scores are readjusted and re-benchmarked accordingly if changes in 
structure or beneficiary population occur. 
Providers may potentially self -select into ACOs based on local knowledge of potential 
beneficiaries in the community. Additionally, providers may participate in several ACOs, 
whereas ACOs are not allowed to participate in more than one shared savings program during 
any single performance year. This poses as a threat for provider self-selection or cherry-picking 
of populations that have greatest opportunity for better outcomes. In  order to mitigate this threat, 
the study population includes only ACOs that remain within the program for the study period. 
Potential selection bias for HNHC beneficiary assignment to ACOs is mitigated by CMS’ 
assignment methodology, based on prospective assignment with retrospective reconciliation. 
CMS’ beneficiary assignment methodology excludes services by providers participating in more 
than one ACO, basing assignment on primary care services and the designation of an ACO 
primary care provider (Medicare Shared Savings Program, 2017). 
Multiple Programs. There is the potential threat that providers and organizations 
participating in ACOs could be under conflicting healthcare programs that may influence results 
of the survey (Creswell, 2009, pp. 217-223). CMS is the overarching national governing body 
that maintains and oversees all CMS programs in which providers and organizations may 
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participate. Rules exist for both providers and healthcare organizations that limit their 
participation and align their improvement initiatives, such as the Hospital Readmissions 
Reduction Program and Merit-based Incentive Payment System. Potential conflict exists in 
some healthcare organizations or service providers that operate and are incentivized on a fee-
for-service basis versus value-based care. One of this study’s aims is to analyze the strategic 
alignment of disparate services across the care continuum within ACOs. Thus, this speci fic 
conflict will be an independent variable to be analyzed. 
External Validity: Generalizability of the Study. Threats to external validity include 
study generalizability—specifically, application to the broader ACO population. Due to the 
study’s small sample size, the findings would not be comparable to the overall ACO population 
(J. Barnes et al., 1994). However, the study’s findings may be transferable for targeted and 
practical application to localized geographies and groups, utilizing data sources from the 
National Survey of Accountable Care Associations and CMS (Zumbo & Rupp, 2004, p. 73; 
Creswell, 2009, p. 217-223). In studies with limited generalizability, transferability is an 
opportunity for practice managers to adapt or incorporate the study’s findings that best supports 
their operations. In order to mitigate challenges with small sample sizes, this study will focus its 
analysis on variables directly related to the contingency-structure pairs and HNHC indicators, 
such as Medicare and Medicaid dual eligible and disabled ACO beneficiaries. In addition, 
nonparametric statistical tests for non-normal distributions will be utilized to further enhance the 
model’s statistical power. For researchers seeking to apply this study’s findings to a broader 
ACO population, due to the small sample size and exploratory nature of the study, transferability 
may be a more appropriate practical application that selectively uses key concepts of the 
findings for ACOs in their local environments.  
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Table 4 
Threats to Internal and External Validity: Overview 
Threats to Validity Mitigation of Threats 
Instrumentation 
• Utilize NSACO and CMS datasets, based on their data collection 
methodologies 
• Include the most updated datasets published  
• Utilize recommended data transformation methodology per National Survey of 
ACOs 
Regression N/A 
Testing N/A 
Maturation/History • Include only ACOs that remained in Track 1 for study period 
Selection Bias 
• Beneficiary selection bias mitigated by CMS beneficiary assignment 
methodology and CMS re-benchmarking when major adjustments occur in ACO 
structure and beneficiary population changes 
• Provider selection bias mitigated by CMS exclusion criteria of any services with 
providers participating in multiple ACOs 
Multiple Programs 
• Organizational threat mitigated by CMS exclusion criteria for ACOs to 
participate in one shared savings program per performance year 
• Provider threat mitigated by CMS exclusion criteria for services provider by 
providers participating in multiple ACOs  
Generalizability 
• Selective application of the study’s findings to matching local environments 
versus broad policy implications for the broad ACO population in general  
 
Data Sources 
 This study will utilize the National Survey of Accountable Care Associations (NSACO) to 
access data on ACO organizational characteristics, ACO partnerships, contract features, and 
clinical and technical capabilities.  
 This study will merge NSACO data with publicly available CMS data sources, such as 
the Shared Savings Program ACO Public Use File (PUF) for ACO financial and quality 
performance data, beneficiary demographics, and CMS program eligibility. 
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Study Population and Sampling Strategy 
 This study examines the population of accountable care organizations under Track 1 of 
the Medicare Shared Savings Programs (MSSP) that started in 2015 and remained in Track 1 
through 2017. For this study, an accountable care organization is defined as any organization 
that has submitted an application and been accepted to CMS’s MSSP program.  
Sampling Strategy  
This study will be using data from the National Survey of ACOs (NSACO) and CMS’ Medicare 
Shared Savings Program (MSSP) Public Use Files (PUF). The Dartmouth Institute for Health 
Policy and Clinical Practice is the organizational body overseeing the NSACO instrument, data 
management, research and analytics related to ACOs. This study’s student investigator 
submitted a data request to The Dartmouth Institute for access to the NSACO survey data 
pertaining to the hypotheses described in Chapter Three. Working with The Dartmouth Institute, 
NSACO data were linked with CMS data from the PUFs posted on the public website  for ACO 
performance information. The dataset being utilized is composed of organization-level de-
identif ied data on ACOs that responded to the NSACO. The following sections detail the specific 
questions derived from the NSACO dataset. 
The objective is to include as many organizations as possible that have submitted data 
to both the NSACO and MSSP PUF during the period of 2015 – 2017. As described in the 
review of SCT literature, researchers have stated a time lag is expected from time of 
intervention to impact on performance (Sine et al., 2006; Sousa & Voss, 2008; Zajac et al., 
2000). According to the January 2018 Medicare Shared Savings Program Fast Facts release, 
the majority of MSSPs are under ACO Track 1, a one-sided risk sharing model, representing 
82% of all ACOs, as of 2018 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018a). ACOs 
participating in Track 1 are allowed two agreement periods of three years each until they are 
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required to progress to a two-sided risk sharing model. Thus, in order to analyze ACO structures 
on cost savings and quality outcomes, consistent participation in Track 1 is an inclusion criteria 
for this study’s ACO dataset. This research will attempt to maximize the sampling size of the 
study population utilizing a nonprobability sampling approach because each ACO in the dataset 
does not have a definite probability of being selected for analysis.  
Overview of Study Population. First, this study looks at the total number of ACOs 
under Track 1 listed in the ACO Shared Savings Program Public Use Files (SSP PUF) from 
2015 – 2017 posted on CMS.gov (N = 89) and those that participated in the NSACO (N = 45). 
For those ACOs remaining in the dataset, this study included ACOs that remained in Track 1 for 
their entire three-year agreement period and this research’s study period, 2015 – 2017. 
Beneficiary size is evaluated and will include only those ACOs with a minimum of 5,000 
beneficiaries. There is a slight possibility for ACOs to lose beneficiaries in their second or third 
years, and CMS communicates to ACOs with less than 5,000 beneficiaries that they must meet 
this minimum requirement. The sample size of ACOs that fit the above criteria is small (N = 45), 
and thus this analysis is meant to be exploratory in nature. The results will set the foundation for 
future analyses using NSACO data as more organizations participate.  
Next, the number of ACOs from the ACO SSP PUFs will be matched to the National 
Survey of Accountable Care Organizations. The dataset will include ACOs that completed the 
NSACO survey for the study period, 2015 – 2017. Pertinent information from the NSACO 
includes ACO governance structure, organizational structure, provider agreement types, and 
health services agreements. If ACOs did not submit the above information to the NSACO during 
the study period, those ACOs will be excluded from the dataset. See Figure 13 for exclusion 
criteria and sampling sizes. This study will exclude Non-MSSP ACOs, ACOs in Tracks 1+, 2, 3, 
Pioneer, and ACOs that did not complete the NSACO survey in 2015. 
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Figure 13  
 
Sampling Criteria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measurement Variables 
 As presented in the conceptual model described in Chapter 3, this study will analyze fit / 
congruence between ACO organizational characteristics and contingency variables related to 
interdependence and strategy. A regression analysis will be conducted between fit / congruence 
and ACO performance. This section describes how the study will operationalize the conceptual 
model into analytical variables, such as the dependent, independent and control variables. 
Study limitations will also be discussed at the end of the section. 
Dependent Variables  
ACO performance is based on multiple factors identified by CMS, such as relative 
change in beneficiary readmissions, relative change in inpatient psychiatric admissions and total 
744 ACOs (all types: MSSP, 
Managed Care, Medicaid, etc.) 
392 MSSP ACOs  
(all start years) 
89 MSSP ACO Track 1  
(start year 2015) 
45 MSSP ACO Track 1 and 
participated in NSACO  
(start year 2015) 
 
 
80 
 
earned shared savings. This study uses three dependent variables in its analyses of fit / 
congruence, which are discussed in the following sections. 
All Cause 30 Day Readmission Rates. This dependent variable is derived from the 
ACO SSP PUF as assigned beneficiaries readmitted to a hospital within 30 days from the index 
admission per 1,000 discharges for all diagnoses. A lower rate indicates a greater quality score 
for the ACO. Because this study includes only ACOs with a 2015 start year, a relative change in 
readmission rate will be calculated from start year versus the end of the ACO’s first agreement 
period, performance year 2017. This accounts for the anticipated time lag for operational 
implementation of the ACO program. Relative change to readmissions will be analyzed using a 
generalized linear regression model to determine if change over time is associated with program 
structure or contingencies.  
Earned Shared Savings Payments. This dependent variable is count data derived from 
the ACO SSP PUF as total shared savings ACOs earn based on their quality performance score 
exceeding a minimum savings rate. This study will include only ACOs participating in Track 1 as 
part of their initial agreement period. This dependent variable is an indicator for the program’s 
overall quality performance in comparison to their benchmarked performance that was 
calculated by CMS using three years-worth of retrospective performance data. Earned shared 
savings for performance years 2016 – 2017 will be added to represent total shared savings. 
However, Track 1 MSSP ACOs operate under a one-sided risk model. The total shared savings 
distribution will be highly positively skewed because Track 1 MSSP ACOs cannot earn negative 
savings and there are no penalties under Track 1. Total shared savings will be analyzed using 
an inflated zero negative binomial regression model to account for the potentially high number 
of zeros in the distribution (Muoka, Ngesa & Waititu, 2016). 
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Inpatient Psychiatric Admissions. In the ACO SSP PUF for performance years 2016 – 
2017, ACOs reported on assigned beneficiaries discharged from an inpatient psychiatric facility 
per 1,000 discharges. As identif ied in the literature, behavioral health factors heavily contribute 
to functional challenges for HNHC patients, exacerbated by their multiple comorbidities and 
diseases (Blumenthal, 2010 & 2017). Access to behavioral health services in the ambulatory 
setting would theoretically prevent unplanned admissions. This study will analyze relative 
change for inpatient psychiatric admissions from start year 2015 and the end of the ACO’s 
agreement period in 2017 using a generalized linear regression model. 
Independent variables  
Per the conceptual model discussed in chapter 3, this study will calculate fit / 
congruence for structural and contingency variables based on a factorial design, using 2015 
data from the NSACO and SSP PUFs. The dataset will include ACOs that entered into a Track 
1 agreement starting in 2015. Based on the contingency relationships described earlier, each 
structural and contingency pair will be transformed into a dummy variable to analyze its 
significance on ACO performance. 
Structural Variables. The following subsections describe how this study will create 
binary variables for the following ACO structures: Governance, physician alignment, functional 
partnership, and health IT integration.   
Governance. This structural variable will be derived from the NSACO survey instrument 
from performance year 2015, based on the ACO’s self-identified leadership structure. This study 
draws from Chandler’s (1962) research on structure and strategy. He lists the different 
strategies as 1) growth by expansion of volume, 2) geographical dispersion, 3) expansion into 
new functional services and 4) diversification into new products. As company strategies require 
greater local presence, structures become more decentralized and greater coordination among 
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divisions are required. Increased coordination equals to increased administrative activities. 
Chandler highlights global companies that have created overarching decision-making offices 
that oversee their catalogue of diverse products and coordination of activities across 
widespread geographical presence. Long term planning and organizational decision-making 
authority is centralized at a general office responsible for policy development and resource 
allocation. In application to ACOs, this study will analyze the ACO leadership structure most 
representative of inpatient and outpatient healthcare delivery. The question from the NSACO 
survey instrument that will be used to analyze ACO leadership structure is presented below. 
NSACO Question #9: Which of the following best describes the leadership structure of 
your ACO? Please select one response. 
• Physician-led 
• Hospital-led 
• Jointly led by physicians and hospital 
• Coalition-led 
• State, region, or county-led 
A binary variable will be calculated by transforming survey responses from ACOs that indicated 
“Jointly led by physicians and hospital” as 1 (co-led) and all other responses as 0 (not co-led). 
 Physician Alignment. This structural variable will be derived from the NSACO, based 
on contract characteristics of any provider agreements constructed with the ACO, such as joint 
ventures, management service agreements or physician employment agreements for specialty 
providers. This variable on physician alignment indicates services integrated along the care 
continuum for an ACO’s assigned beneficiaries. Chandler (1962) describes organizational 
expansion of services as vertical integration. Both Chukmaitov et al (2015) and Bazzoli et al 
(2017) identify formal provider agreements as a critical ACO organizational characteristic for 
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health service delivery. The question from the NSACO survey instrument that will be used to 
calculate this structural variable is presented below. If an ACO marks that the “ACO provides 
directly” or “ACO contracts w/ non-ACO providers” for the service specified, the variable will be 
coded as 1, representing a tight physician alignment. If an ACO indicates that it is not 
contracted with any providers through a formal relationship, the variable will be coded as 0, 
representing a loose physician alignment. This variable is an indicator that ACO strategy is in 
alignment of its physician resources, thus providing beneficiaries greater access to health 
services in a timely manner. 
NSACO Question #19: Please indicate how the following services are provided. 
 
ACO provides 
directly 
ACO contracts 
w/ non-ACO 
providers 
ACO has no formal 
relationship with 
providers 
Don’t 
know 
A. Routine specialty care 
(e.g., orthopedics)  
    
B. Inpatient rehabilitation 
services 
    
C. Mental health services  
    
D. Addiction treatment  
    
E. Skilled nursing facility  
    
F. Palliative/hospice care 
    
G. Home health/visiting nurse 
    
H. Hospital diversion services 
(e.g., outpatient crisis 
management, peer 
support, etc.) 
    
 
If an ACO has a formal agreement, it is more likely that the ACO is placing serious investment in 
access to health services, which should hypothetically improve care coordination and quality 
performance scores. Each service will be treated as a dummy variable and analyzed 
individually. 
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 Functional Partnership. This structural variable will be derived from the NSACO, based 
on indicators that partnerships exist for behavioral health services. This may be construed as 
any ancillary services agreements, management service agreements, joint ventures, patient 
transfer agreements, or professional services agreements with post-acute / ambulatory facilities, 
such as skilled nursing facilities, long term acute care hospitals, acute rehab facilities, 
behavioral health services or social services. The NSACO question below will calculate dummy 
variables for each clinician type. This question is a multiple response question where ACOs may 
indicate multiple types of clinicians participating in the ACO providing mental health services to 
assigned beneficiaries. 
NSACO Question #38: Do the following types of clinicians deliver any mental health or 
addiction treatment as part of the organization(s) participating in the ACO contract? 
A. Psychiatrists  
B. Nurse practitioners or physician assistants  
C. Psychologists  
D. Social workers providing therapy  
E. Peer support specialists  
F. Addiction treatment counselors (e.g., licensed drug and alcohol counselor, licensed 
clinical supervisor)  
G. Addiction medicine specialists (i.e., psychiatrists or other physicians focused on 
addiction medicine) 
A dummy variable will be created for each clinician type where the ACO marked “yes” being 1 
and indicating a functional partnership exists; if the ACO marked “no”, it will be 0 and indicates 
that a functional partnership does not exist. Because this is a multiple response survey 
question, this study will analyze all combination of answers submitted to the NSACO for 
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variability of the mean for total shared savings. The existence of these agreements are 
indicators of intense sequential interdependence and care coordination that can decrease 
readmissions to the hospital. High need, high cost patients are identif ied as having both 
behavioral and social needs that further exacerbates the complexity of their care. This structural 
characteristic is an indicator for an ACO to better engage high need, high cost patients and 
expand the realm of control for ACOs to coordinate post-discharge care. ACOs can establish a 
support system through community resources by forming official agreements with behavioral 
health services or facilities to alleviate HNHC beneficiaries with little support once they return to 
their communities. 
 Health IT Integration. The presence of health IT for enhanced communication, 
coordination, and access to important beneficiary information through an electronic health 
record or electronic medical record is a key structural variable. In the NSACO, multiple 
questions are included in the survey regarding information exchange and access for efficient 
beneficiary care coordination. For high cost, high need patients, timely access to beneficiary 
health information is necessary for the complex care coordination required. Below highlights the 
NSACO questions that will be converted into dummy variables for each multiple choice answer. 
NSACO Question #21: To what extent are [data elements included in the electronic health 
record] standardized (done in the same way) across the participating organizations in 
your ACO? 
• Not standardized; varied across our ACO 
• Somewhat standardized across our ACO 
• Mostly standardized across our ACO 
• Fully standardized across our ACO 
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NSACO Question #68: How many electronic health record (EHR) systems do you have in 
place across your ACO? Please “X” one box. 
• A single EHR across all facilities 
• Multiple EHRs 
• A mixture of EHR and paper systems 
• No EHR capabilities at present 
Both questions above are categorical variables and ordinal; from lowest IT integration 
capabilities at “Not standardized; varies across our ACO” in question #21 and “No EHR 
capabilities at present” in question #68 to highest IT integration capabilities at “Fully 
standardized across our ACO” in questions #21 and “A single EHR across all facilities” in 
question #68, respectively. A dummy variable will be created for each multiple choice response 
to analyze ACO standardization. 
Contingency Variables. Binary variables for ACO contingencies will be created for: 
Strategy alignment and complex coordination. 
Strategy Alignment. This contingency variable indicates alignment of organizational 
objectives with ACO objectives; specifically, long-term planning pertaining to funds flow, 
strategic partnerships, resource allocation and capital technology investments (Conway et al., 
2018; Day & Matousek, 2018; DeMuro, 2011). Chandler (1962) describes organizational 
strategy as the long-term planning of enterprise level objectives for growth and sustainability. 
Chandler’s definition of strategy can be applied to ACO research and structural contingency 
theory. Strategy is a contingency that impacts organizational structure when changes occur, and 
an organization seeks to adapt its structure to match its contingency for positive performance 
(Donaldson, 2001, p. 284-283). ACO structures may consist of health systems, hospitals, 
physician groups or health service providers. This survey question from the NSACO provides 
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data as to what level in the ACO structure determines strategy and organizational long term 
direction. Below highlights the NSACO questions that will be converted into binary variables.  
NSACO Question 14: At what level are [strategic planning] activities conducted? Please 
select one response per row. 
• Practice or hospital level  
• Region or division level  
• Contracting organization (ACO) level 
A dummy variable will be created for an ACO that indicates whether they conduct their activities 
at the “Contracting organization (ACO) level” for strategic planning (1 for ACO-level strategic 
planning) or not (0 for strategic planning at lower levels, such as practice or hospital and region 
or division levels). 
NSACO Question #27: Please indicate how financial rewards (savings, bonuses, upfront 
payments) from ACO participation are distributed [Yes, No or Don’t Know]. 
A. Retained by the ACO to offset overhead and infrastructure investments in information 
technology, care redesign and related items  
B. Allocated across participating ACO member organizations  
C. Paid directly to physicians 
A dummy variable will be created where 1 indicates that an ACO retains and allocates financial 
rewards versus 0 indicates that the financial rewards are allocated across participating ACO 
member organizations or paid directly to physicians. If an ACO retains the financial rewards, this 
is considered as high alignment. This is a multiple response category, and this study will also 
analyze the multiple response combinations. 
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NSACO Question #28: Are any of the following used to determine primary care physician 
compensation in the ACO [Yes or No]? 
A. Productivity measures (e.g., RVUs)  
B. Base salary  
C. Clinical quality measures  
D. Patient satisfaction  
E. Cost reduction measures 
A dummy variable will be created for each potential metric the ACO may use to determine 
primary care physician compensation. This is a multiple response category, and this study will 
conduct a multiple response analysis to better understand the potential combinations or patterns 
that may exist among the responses. 
Complex Coordination. This contingency variable will derive from CMS’ Hierarchical 
Condition Categories (HCC) risk scores and is a continuous variable. HCCs are a prospective 
risk adjustment methodology used by CMS for estimation of assigned beneficiary future 
healthcare expenditure. The model is based on hierarchical grouping of disease state by patient  
complexity, resource utilization, severity of illness, and demographic and disability status 
information. Higher scores indicate higher risk and anticipated expenditure.  
CMS calculates risk scores using demographic data of assigned beneficiaries under four 
separate populations in the ACO: end stage renal disease, disabled, dual eligible, non-dual 
eligible.  The risks scores are applied to the ACO assigned beneficiaries of the relevant sub-
population to adjust for projected expenditure of the performance year. ACOs with a score of 0.5 
are expected to have costs 50% lower than the average beneficiary, a score of 1.0 is expected 
to be equal and a score of 2.0 is expected to be two times higher than the average  (Better 
Medicare Alliance, 2018). High need, high cost patients have been identified as needing 
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intensive post-discharge care coordination due to their many behavioral needs and social risk 
factors (Long et al., 2017). Some research studies have used HCC risk scores as a means to 
analyze complexity and high risk patients (Bélanger et al., 2019; Fryer et al., 2016; Sen et al., 
2018). The HCC risk scores for assigned beneficiaries with disability or dual eligible status will 
be used in this study as indicators for complexity and coordination. Dual eligible assigned 
beneficiaries are individuals dually eligible for Medicaid and Medicare over the age of 65. Per 
Better Medicare Alliance’s white paper on Medicare Advantage Risk Adjustment (2018), dual 
eligible beneficiaries are considered as one of the highest risk and highest cost populations 
requiring extensive “specialized care and management”. Thus, the higher the HCC risk scores, 
the higher complexity and risk of the beneficiary population. See Table 5 for variables. 
 Contingency-Structure Pairs. Due to the small sample size, the contingency-structure 
pairs will be analyzed in a stepwise approach for hypotheses 1 – 4, following Pennings’ (1987) 
deviation analysis approach, exploring each pair and categorical response ’s fit / congruence for 
optimal performance. First, this study will calculate residual values for each contingency-
structure pair, representing the distance from the fit line, as described by Van de Ven and 
Drazin (1984, pp. 9, 22). The residual value for each ACO will then be added into a total 
contingency score and used in a regression analysis to determine if  multiple contingency fit / 
congruence has statistically significant influence on ACO performance. This residual and 
additive approach was utilized by Volberda and colleagues (2012), which built from Donaldson’s 
multiple contingency approach (2001).  
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Table 5 
Study Variables 
Variable Measurement Data Type Data Source 
Dependent Variables 
Readmissions per 1,000 dc 
 
Earned shared savings 
 
Inpatient psych admissions 
per 1,000 dc  
 
 
Final – Index / Index (2015 to 2017) 
 
 
Sum of earned shared savings (2016 to 2017) 
 
 
Final – Index / Index (2015 to 2017) 
 
 
 
Ratio 
 
 
Count 
 
 
Ratio 
 
SSP PUF 
 
Calculated 
 
Calculated 
 
Calculated 
Independent Variables 
Individual measure of fit / 
congruence 
 
Aggregate measure of fit / 
congruence 
 
ACO Misfit 
 
 
Misfit (residual) scores of each contingency-
structure pair 
 
Sum of misfit scores (residuals) for each 
individual fit / congruence 
 
Aggregate residual scores less than (-1) and 
greater than (+1) SD from fit line considered as 
“misfit”  
Interval 
 
 
Interval 
 
 
Dichotomous 
Calculated 
 
 
Calculated 
 
 
Calculated 
Structural Variables 
ACO governance 
 
Provider contracts 
 
Mental health delivery 
 
Data definitions 
 
EHR 
 
ACO leadership structure 
 
ACO provider agreement types 
 
ACO mental health delivery by provider 
 
Data standardization 
 
EHR centralization 
 
Nominal 
 
Nominal 
 
Nominal 
 
Ordinal 
 
Ordinal 
 
 
NSACO 
 
Contingency Variables  
Strategic planning 
 
Hierarchical Condition 
Category (HCC) dual and 
disabled 
 
Level in ACO responsible for strategic planning 
 
HCC risk scores for dually eligible and disabled 
assigned beneficiaries 
 
Dichotomous 
Interval 
 
NSACO 
 
SSP PUF 
 
Offset Variable 
 
ACO size 
 
Dual Eligible 
 
Log of assigned beneficiary panels by ACO 
 
Dual eligible assigned beneficiaries / Total 
assigned beneficiaries 
 
Interval 
Ratio 
SSP PUF 
Calculated 
Calculated  
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Calculation of Fit / Congruence 
 This study will leverage a similar approach to calculating fit / congruence as published by 
Pennings (1987), Van de Ven and Drazin (1985) and previously applied by Swofford (2011) and 
Volberda et al (2012). Complementary to the fit / congruence concept, Burton & Obel (1998) 
and Burton, Lauridsen & Obel (2002) published research on the calculation of misfit and 
multicontingency models, analyzing the relationship between number of misfits and directional 
implications to organizational performance. The authors found that the number of misfits did not 
correlate with greater performance loss for individual metrics. However, overall performance 
showed a slight inverse relationship with misfits in general. In contrast, Donaldson (2001, pp. 
282-285) described misfit as a nonlinear relationship between performance and fit when 
considering multiple contingencies.  
According to the SARFIT concept, organizations seek to adjust their structure as 
contingencies change, and as a result, performance decreases during this adjustment period. 
As the organization adapts its former structure to fit with new contingencies, a new threshold for 
fit develops between contingency and structure. Donaldson (2001) describes organizational 
performance between the “old fit” line and “new fit” line as a moderate performance decrease 
from previous performance levels as the organization adjusts its structure to attain fit. Thus, it 
would be expected that many ACOs would be in misfit and experience performance decline as 
they transition between their “old fit” and “new fit” when CMS releases new policies or 
submission requirements. This study will leverage the concept of misfit, as described in SCT 
literature regarding interdependence (Aiken & Hage, 1968; Thompson, 1967) and technology 
(Donaldson, 2001). See Table 6 for the contingency-structure pairs, which include H1) strategy 
alignment and shared governance, H2) complex coordination and physician alignment, H3) 
post-discharge care coordination and functional partnerships, H4) complex coordination  and 
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health IT integration, and H5) the overall f it of all contingent-structure pairs. Each hypothesis 
also indicates a reference group that will be used for the analysis. 
Table 6  
Contingency-Structure Pairs and Expected Performance Direction 
Hypothesis Contingency Variablesa Structure Variablesb Expected Performance 
 
1 
 
Strategy Alignment 
(Aligned similar goals to ACO) 
 
• Strategic Planning: ACO level 
• Financial Rewards retained by ACO 
• Physician Compensation including 
Clinical Quality indicators 
 
Governance 
(Centralized Leadership) 
 
ACO leadership structure 
• Joint-Led Hospital/Physician 
 
 
(+) Total Earned 
Shared Savings 
(greater than $0) 
 
2 
 
Complex Coordination 
(High interdependence) 
 
Hierarchical Condition Category Risk 
Scores for Dual Eligible/Disabled 
 
Service Alignment 
(More formalized 
partnerships) 
 
Provider Agreement Types 
(ACO formalized contract or 
directly provided services) 
 
(+) Total Earned 
Shared Savings 
(greater than $0) 
 
( - ) Relative Change in 
Readmissions 
(reduction) 
 
3 
 
Complex Coordination 
(High interdependence) 
 
Hierarchical Condition Category Risk 
Scores for Dual Eligible/Disabled 
 
Functional Partnership 
(More formalized 
partnerships) 
 
Mental Health Delivery provided 
by ACO 
 
( - ) Relative Change in 
Inpatient Psychiatric 
Facility Admissions 
(reduction) 
 
4 
 
Complex Coordination 
(High interdependence) 
 
Hierarchical Condition Category Risk 
Scores for Dual Eligible/Disabled 
 
Health IT Integration 
(More formalized processes) 
 
Fully standardized data 
 
A single EHR across all facilities 
 
(+) Total Earned 
Shared Savings 
(greater than $0) 
 
( - ) Relative Change in 
Readmissions 
a: Represents subcategories in NSACO multiple choice options that were identified as contingency variables for strategy (H1) and 
interdependence (H2-H4) matched to structural variables that would be a “fit” and produce optimal ACO performance 
b: Represents subcategories in NSACO multiple choice options that were identified as structural variables for centralized 
organizational oversight through ACO governance (H1) and formalization (H2-H4) matched to contingency variables that would be a 
“fit” and produce optimal ACO performance  
  
Based on Pennings’ deviation analysis approach from the SCT literature , this study will 
calculate residual values to represent misfit in each contingency-structure pair. For hypotheses 
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with multiple independent variable subcategories, a composite residual score will be calculated 
for each hypothesis. Next, this study will apply Donaldson’s (2001) additive multicontingency 
model approach. This study will aggregate the average residual scores of all the hypotheses to 
determine a total misfit score for each ACO. Finally, this study will adapt from Swofford’s (2011) 
research on multicontingencies by categorizing ACO misfit based on a nominal threshold from 
the aggregate residuals to be used in a regression analysis. Donaldson (2001, pp. 210-212) 
further expounds on the relationship between misfit and performance, according to deviation 
analysis, as one unit of misfit to a corresponding unit of performance. This study will categorize 
ACOs with aggregate residuals one standard deviation from the fit line as being in “misfit” and 
ACOs with residual values between (+1) and (-1) standard deviation in “fit”, effectively creating a 
dichotomous variable for misfit from the residual scores.  
Analytic Methodology 
This study will f irst explore the relationship between ACO structure and contingency.  
Each categorical variable from the NSACO will be transformed into dummy variables, or 
“synthetic variables”, and analyzed in a stepwise approach for directional indicato rs of the 
contingency-structure pairs to its dependent variable (Donaldson, 2001). This will be done to 
increase robustness of the statistical model because of the small sample size. Residual values 
will be calculated for each contingency-structure pair to evaluate misfit. The residuals are the 
distance from the fit line, thus interpreted as “misfit” (Volberda et al, 2012). An additive approach 
will then be applied to analyze multicontingency fit by calculating the sum of the residuals of 
each contingency-structure pair as an independent variable to be included in a future regression 
analysis (Donaldson, 2001; Swofford, 2011; Volberda et al, 2012). 
Next, f it / congruence hypotheses will be tested between contingency-structure pairs 
matrix, and the hypothesis for each pair will be analyzed for ACO performance using a 
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regression analysis. The empirical formula of the multiple regression for readmissions and 
inpatient psychiatric admissions dependent variables are: 
Readmissions: Yi ∆2015,2017 = β0 + β1Xi 2015 + β2Ai 2015 + log(t) + εi. 
IP Psych Admissions: Yi ∆2015,2017 = β0 + β1Xi 2015 + β2Ai 2015 + log(t) + εi. 
Yi ∆2015,2017 is the relative change of the dependent variable for ACO readmissions and inpatient 
psychiatric admissions i in performance years 2015 and 2017. β0 is the intercept in which the 
contingency-structure pair intersect with Yi ∆2015,2017 on the regression plane.  Xi 2015 is the 
independent variable for contingencies in the contingency-structure pair being analyzed. Ai 2015 
is the independent variable for structure in the contingency-structure pair being analyzed. The 
log(t) is the offset variable for the log of ACO assigned number of beneficiaries during 2015. ε i  is 
the error term (or residuals) for the empirical formula.  
The empirical formula of the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model (Oppong 
et al., 2017) for total earned shared savings dependent variable is:  
𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 ) = {
𝜋𝑖 + (1 − 𝜋𝑖 )𝑔(𝑌𝑖 = 0), 𝑌𝑖 = 0
(1 −  𝜋𝑖 )𝑔(𝑌𝑖 ), 𝑌𝑖 > 0
 
Pr is the probability of Yi success, interpreted as an ACO earning shared savings greater than 
zero. 𝜋𝑖  is the logistic link function over time 2016 – 2017, where total earned shared savings 
equal zero; versus (1 − 𝜋𝑖 ) is when Yi greater than zero. 𝑔(𝑌𝑖 ) is the negative binomial 
distribution that takes into account the over-dispersed count data with excess zeros, including 
the independent variables, offset and intercept, similar to the regression above.  
 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter described the methodology in which this study will analyze data from two 
major national sources: The National Survey of ACOs and the Centers for Medicaid and 
Medicare. This includes definitions of variables, transformation of variables for fit / congruence 
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analysis, regression analysis of the hypotheses and the limitations of the study. The next 
chapter will describe the preliminary results of the analysis.
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Chapter 5: Results 
 This chapter discusses data preparation, statistical analyses and results. The first 
section describes how the dependent variables were calculated and their descriptive statistics. 
The second section reports descriptive statistics for the independent variables and any 
exploratory associations with the dependent variables. The third section reports the results of 
the regression analyses conducted by hypothesis. The fourth section includes supplementary 
analyses for the multiple response data used in the independent variables. The final section 
concludes with a chapter summary. 
Data Preparation and Calculation of Study Measures 
 This study created a dataset merging ACO level data from the National Survey of 
Accountable Care Organizations and the Shared Savings Program Public Use Files available on 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid’s Research, Statistics, Data and Systems website . ACO 
organizational data, such as the structure variables and some of the contingency variables 
(specifically, the ACO strategic planning data), were derived from the NSACO, pulled by ACO 
investigators from the Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice. Data were then 
matched to the SSP PUF on ACO demographics, such as ACO beneficiary size, HCC risk 
scores for the dual eligible and disabled beneficiary populations, earned shared savings, 
inpatient psychiatric admissions and 30-day all cause unplanned readmissions. ACO HCC risk 
scores and earned shared savings were calculated by CMS based on three years of 
retrospective ACO performance data. Inclusion criteria for the ACOs in this 
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study’s dataset are: Medicare Shared Savings Program ACOs under Track 1 that participated in 
the NSACO, ACOs that started in 2015, and ACOs that remained in Track 1 until 2017, which is 
the end of the first agreement period.  
 The dependent variables for the study were calculated for relative change in 
readmissions and inpatient psychiatric admissions by ACO from start year 2015 and end of 
agreement period 2017. The formula used for readmissions was: 2017 readmissions per 1,000 
discharges minus 2015 readmissions per 1,000 discharges, divided by 2015 readmissions per 
1,000 discharges. The formula used for inpatient psychiatric admissions was: 2017 inpatient 
psychiatric admissions per 1,000 discharges minus 2015 inpatient psychiatric admissions per 
1,000 discharges, divided by 2015 inpatient psychiatric admissions per 1,000 discharges. Total 
earned shared savings per ACO was calculated as the sum of 2016 and 2017 ACO earned 
shared savings. 2015 was not included because it was a start year and, as noted in Chapter 4, 
this study incorporated a one-year lag time from the first year of the ACO’s inception to account 
for program improvements. 
For the independent variables, NSACO survey answers obtained via the paper 
submission version of the survey were excluded from the analyses due to insufficient sample 
size. There were several NSACO survey questions that had multiple response options; thus, 
dummy variables were created to better analyze impact of individual responses and to improve 
robustness of the model by minimizing the degrees of freedom used. The multiple response 
questions from the NSACO that were re-coded into dichotomous variables for each response 
option include: Financial rewards, physician compensation, provider agreement types and 
mental health delivery by provider. Several NSACO survey questions were 1) aggregated 
multiple choice options and re-coded into dichotomous variables or 2) re-coded into 
dichotomous variables by response, in order to simplify the model and minimize degrees of 
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freedom used. These variables include strategic planning (at the ACO level: yes or no), ACO 
leadership structure (joint-led by hospital and physician or not), data standardization and EHR 
centralization.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variables  
The data for ACO earned shared savings, readmissions and inpatient psychiatric 
admissions were derived from CMS’ Shared Savings Program Public Use File. The dependent 
variable for total earned shared savings was calculated as a sum of 2016 – 2017 ACO savings 
at the organizational (ACO) level. Readmissions and inpatient psychiatric admissions were 
calculated as the relative change (∆) from 2015 to 2017. Table 8 presents descriptive statistics 
for the dependent variables and Appendix 1 provides histograms and Q-Q plots for further 
perusal. 
Total Earned Shared Savings. The sample size was relatively small (N = 45). This 
study’s dependent variable was composed of count data with a distribution that was non-normal 
(Shapiro-Wilk statistic = .671, sig. p = .000), heavily right skewed (skew = 1.387) and over-
dispersed (kurtosis = .633). ACOs earned on average $1.97M ± $3.18M in shared savings. A 
wide range existed (range = $10.3M), and the majority of ACOs in the sample (66%) earned 
zero savings. The Q-Q plot for total earned shared savings (see Appendix 1) highlighted 
outliers, and the non-zero values displayed unequal variances across the distribution. According 
to statistical count model literature, poisson distributions are identified by the population’s 
variance being equal to the mean, whereas the negative binomial distribution is more positive 
and severely right-skewed than the poisson (Rodriguez, 2013; UCLA: Statistical Consulting 
Group, 2019; Zamri & Zamzuri, 2017; Zhang, 2019). Based on the distribution characteristics 
described, total earned shared savings was identif ied as a negative binomial distribution. Thus, 
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this study will compare generalized negative binomial regression and a zero inflated negative 
binomial regression to determine which model would be most appropriate (Muoka et al., 2016) 
Relative Change in Readmissions. The mean readmission rates per 1,000 discharges 
in the ACO’s assigned beneficiary population showed a mean relative change in readmission 
rates of 5.23% ± 9.07%. A decline was observed in overall readmissions performance from 
2015 to 2017. The majority of ACOs (69%) saw increases in readmission rates, or decreased 
performance, as evidenced by the mean readmission rate increasing from 162.02 readmissions 
per 1,000 discharges in 2015 to 169.42 readmissions per 1,000 discharges in 2017 (see 
Appendix I for three-year trends for readmission rates). The distribution was normal (Shapiro-
Wilk statistic = .981, sig. p = .641) with slightly positive skew to the right (Skew = .210) and 
moderately thinner tails than expected in a normal distribution (Kurtosis = -.476). For the 
regression analysis, this study will use a generalized linear regression model for readmissions. 
Relative Change in Inpatient Psychiatric Admissions. ACO trends displayed slight 
improvement in overall inpatient psychiatric admissions with a mean value of -12.00% ± 33.80% 
relative change in psych admissions from 2015 – 2017. The distribution was slightly non-normal 
(Shapiro-Wilk statistic = .916, sig. p = .004) with moderately positive skew to the right (Skew = 
1.060) and highly kurtosed with long tails and high peak in its distribution (Kurtosis = 2.308), 
indicating potential outliers in the distribution. Similarly to readmissions, this study will use a 
generalized linear regression model for inpatient psychiatric admissions. See Table 7 for 
dependent variables’ descriptive statistics. 
Correlations Between Dependent Variables. Correlations analysis on total earned 
shared savings, relative change in readmissions and relative change in inpatient psychiatric 
admissions showed no statistically significant values and a relatively moderate negative 
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relationship (range Pearson correlation = -.025 to -.144) between the dependent variables (see 
Appendix 2 for Correlation Matrix: Dependent Variables). 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variables 
Name Total Earned Shared 
Savingsa 
∆ Readmissionsb 
∆ Inpatient Psychiatric 
Admissionsc 
N (ACO level) 45 45 44 (missing 1) 
Mean $1.97M 5.20% -1.22% 
Median $0.00M 5.00% -1.67% 
Standard Deviation $3.18M 9.07% 3.38% 
Variance $1.011E+13 8.22% 1.14% 
Skewness 1.387 .210 1.060  
Kurtosis .633 -.476 2.308 
Shapiro-Wilk Test for 
Normality 
Statistic = .671,  
sig. p = .000 
Statistic = .981,  
sig. p = .641 
Statistic = .916,  
sig. p = .004 
a. Calculated as the sum of ACO earned shared savings 2016 – 2017 
b. Calculated as the relative change in readmission rates per 1,000 discharges for all causes from 2015 start year and 2017  
c. Calculated as the relative change in rate of discharges from an inpatient psychiatric facility per 1,0 00 discharges from 2015 start 
year and 2017 
 
Independent Variables  
For this study’s independent variables, the frequency distribution showed that 28.9% (n 
= 13) of ACOs operated under a joint-led physician and hospital leadership structure, with a 
mean total shared savings of $1.27M ± $2.67M. Whereas, 53.3% (n = 24) of ACOs were 
physician-led, with a mean total shared savings of $3.01M ± $3.59M. An Independent T-Test for 
ACO Leadership Structure showed a mean difference of $0.90M between joint-led ACOs and 
other ACO leadership structures. Per Levene’s statistic (.sig value = .133), equal variances 
were assumed but joint-led structures were not statistically significantly different versus other 
ACO leadership structures (t(43) = .942, p = .351). 
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In terms of strategic planning, 60% of ACOs (n = 21) indicated strategic planning was 
done at the ACO level. Of those ACOs with strategic planning at the ACO level, the majority 
were physician-led. A comparison between the groups showed a mean difference of total 
earned shared savings at -$2.50M, where ACOs that conducted strategic planning at the ACO 
level have a mean $2.96M ± $3.70M versus ACOs conducting strategic planning at the hospital 
or regional level with a mean $0.50M ± $1.20M. Per Levene’s statistic, equal variances were not 
assumed (sig. value = .000) and there was a statistically significant difference between the 
groups (t(33) = .942, p = .003).  
ACOs appeared to operate under varying financial and service models. The majority of 
ACOs retained and reallocated across ACO members any financial rewards earned from shared 
savings. (76% and 78% of ACOs in the sample, respectively) The metrics ACOs primarily used 
to determine ACO physician compensation were clinical quality (80% of ACOs), patient 
satisfaction (64% of ACOs) and productivity (53% of ACOs), which reflected a shift towards 
value as more ACOs concentrated on quality and patient satisfaction.   
Numerous ACOs in the sample population (n = 45) directly provided routine specialty 
care (60%), inpatient rehabilitation (47%), mental health (33%) and home health services (31%). 
There was no clear standard model of contractual services that demonstrate significant savings 
or reduction in readmissions. For example, financial rewards distribution and physician 
compensation showed diverse combinations that were utilized by ACOs, but the ACOs still 
earned zero shared savings. See Table 8 for descriptive statistics of independent variables. 
ACOs appeared to operate under varying financial and service models. The majority of 
ACOs retained and reallocated across ACO members any f inancial rewards earned from shared 
savings. (76% and 78% of ACOs in the sample, respectively) The metrics ACOs primarily used 
to determine ACO physician compensation were clinical quality (80% of ACOs), patient  
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Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Variable Categories na (% total) Mean Savings (SD) Mean ∆Readm (SD) 
ACO 
Governance 
Physician-led 24 (53.3%) $3.01M (± $3.59M) 6.1% (± 8.9%) 
Hospital-led 4 (8.9%) $0 6.7% (± 4.5%) 
Jointly led by physicians and 
hospital 
13 (28.9%) $1.27M (± $2.67M) 5.3% (± 2.7%) 
Coalition-led 2 (4.4%) $0 -1.0% (± 2.8%) 
Other (State, region, or county-
led, other) 
2 (4.4%) $0 -1.5% (± 13.4%) 
Strategic 
Planning 
ACO level 27 (60%) $2.96M (± $3.70M) 4.1% (± 8.1%) 
Hospital / Practice level 14 (31%) $0.63M (± $1.30M) 5.6% (± 10.3%) 
Regional level 4 (8%) $0 12.0% (± 10.7%) 
Financial 
Rewards 
Distributionb 
Retained by ACO 34 (76%) $2.39Mc (± $3.45M) 6.0% (± 9.0%) 
Reallocated across members 35 (78%) $2.07Mc (± $3.25M) 1.2% (± 9.3%) 
Paid to physicians 24 (53%) $2.69Mc (± $3.55M) 3.7% (± 9.4%) 
Physician 
Compensationb 
Productivity 24 (53%) $1.28M (± $2.21M) 6.0% (± 9.4%) 
Base Salary 19 (42%) $0.89M (± $2.17M) 5.8% (± 8.7%) 
Clinical Quality 36 (80%) $1.74M (± $2.84M) 4.6% (± 9.0%) 
Patient Satisfaction 29 (64%) $1.60M (± $2.92M) 5.4% (± 9.6%) 
Cost Reduction 18 (40%) $1.67M (± $2.73M) 6.1% (± 9.6%) 
Data 
Definitionsd 
Fully standardized 5 (11%) $1.67M (± $3.73M) 8.8% (± 7.5%) 
Mostly standardized 15 (34%) $3.00M (± $3.32M) 6.7% (± 9.8%) 
Somewhat standardized 14 (32%) $1.97M (± $3.21M) 1.8% (± 9.1%) 
Not standardized 9 (20%) $0 5.3% (± 6.9%) 
EHRd 
Single system 8 (18%) $0.35M (± $0.86M) 7.6% (± 8.4%) 
Multiple EHRs 29 (66%) $2.05M (± $2.96M) 4.2% (± 9.5%) 
Mix EHR / paper 6 (14%) $2.29M (± $4.27M) 5.6% (± 6.7%) 
No EHR 0 $0 0 
a: total sample n = 45 
b: multiple response survey question; ACOs may select more than one category representative of a variety of financial approaches  
c: savings are overall ACO’s total earned shared savings; not specific amount of savings by distribution methodology 
d: sample missing 1 case; n = 44 
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satisfaction (64% of ACOs) and productivity (53% of ACOs), which reflected a shift towards 
value as more ACOs concentrated on quality and patient satisfaction. In terms of information 
technology, the majority of ACOs reported that they “mostly” (n = 15, 34%) or “somewhat” (n = 
14, 32%) standardized data elements for reporting and operations. Mean total earned shared 
savings were concentrated with ACOs reporting “mostly” standardized data elements ($3.00M ± 
$ 3.32M). Regarding electronic health records (EHR), the majority of ACOs reported to have a 
mix of EHR and paper (n = 6, 14%) or operating with multiple EHRs (n = 29, 66%), ranging 
between $2.05M - $2.29M in mean total earned shared savings. Readmission rates increased 
overall, showing a performance decline. The highest increase in readmission rates were ACOs 
with mostly standardized (6.7% ± 9.8%) and fully standardized data elements (8.8% ± 7.5%). 
Table 9 Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variable by Provider Type shows ACOs that 
delivered mental health services by type of provider. There is some discernible performance 
improvement that range between  -1.2% and -13.7% from 2015 to 2017. ACOs did not display 
any preferences for mental health service delivery; distribution was almost equal across 
psychiatrists, NP / PAs, psychologists and social workers. The greatest improvement in 
psychiatric admissions were seen with the use of NP / PAs and social workers. However, there 
were very high standard deviations (ranging from ±32.0% – 38.6%), due to the small number of 
ACOs and the relatively small number of inpatient psychiatric admissions. 
Table 9  
Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variable by Provider Typea  
Variable Categoriesb nc (%) Mean ∆IP Psych Adm (SD) 
Mental Health Delivery Psychiatrist 26 (59.0%) -11.3% (± 32.0%) 
 NP / PA 29 (66.0%) -13.5% (± 32.8%) 
 Psychologist 23 (52.3%) -1.2% (± 38.6%) 
 Social Worker 27 (61.4%) -13.7% (± 35.0%) 
a: multiple response survey question; ACOs may select more than one category 
b: excluded categories with less than 40 ACO responses 
c: sample missing 1 case; n = 44 
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Table 10 shows descriptive statistics for categorical variable by service type. No 
discernible outcome trends were found among ACOs that directly provided routine specialty 
care (60%), inpatient rehabilitation (47%), mental health (33%) and home health services (31%). 
For example, financial rewards distribution and physician compensation showed diverse 
combinations that were utilized by ACOs, but the ACOs still earned zero shared savings.  
Table 10  
Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variable by Service Typea  
  
Provides 
Directly 
Contracts No Contract Don’t Know 
Variable Categories n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
ACO Provider 
Contracts 
Routine specialty 
care 
27 (60%) 2 (4%) 15 (33%) 1 (2%) 
 IP rehab 21 (47%) 3 (7%) 18 (40%) 3 (7%) 
 Mental health 15 (33%) 3 (7%) 21 (47%) 5 (11%) 
 
Addiction 
treatment 
9 (20%) 2 (4%) 26 (58%) 7 (16%) 
 Skilled nursing 8 (18%) 8 (18%) 26 (58%) 3 (7%) 
 Palliative/hospice 11 (24%) 5 (11%) 26 (58%) 3 (7%) 
 Home health 14 (31%) 9 (20%) 19 (42%) 3 (7%) 
 Hospital diversion 12 (27%) 2 (4%) 23 (51%) 8 (18%) 
a: multiple response survey question; ACOs may select more than one service category across a variety of contracting approaches 
 
The continuous independent variables included hierarchical condition category risk 
scores for dual eligible and disabled assigned beneficiaries. ACO population risk scores were 
an average 1.04 (± .09) for dual eligible and 1.09 (± .09) for disabled assigned beneficiaries, 
which were very close to each other, indicating a similar or an overlapping population. Figure 14 
presents Hierarchical Condition Category risk scores by relative change in readmission rates 
and Figure 15 presents Hierarchical Condition Category risk scores by dual eligible 
beneficiaries. HCC scores above 1.00 indicated a patient population with higher risk and 
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anticipated cost expenditure, while below 1.00 were lower than average risk and expected costs 
for the specific condition evaluated.  
 Figure 14  
Change in Readmissions by HCC Risk Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 
 
Distribution of Dual Eligible by HCC Risk Scores 
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Table 11 shows HCC risk scores of dual eligible assigned beneficiaries were moderately right 
skewed (.422); whereas, HCC risk scores for disabled were highly skewed (.911) and kurtosed 
(2.65). 
Table 11 
Hierarchical Condition Category Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean (SD) Variance Skew Kurtosis 
HCC Dual 1.04 (± .09) .009 .422 -.071 
HCC Disabled 1.09 (± .09) .009 .911 2.65 
ACO Sizea 18.6K (± 20.7K) 4.32E+008 3.43 13.82 
Percent Dual Eligibleb 5.2% (± 3.4%) .001 1.39 1.63 
a: ACO assigned beneficiary panel start year 2015 
b: percent calculated by dividing the ACO’s number of dual eligible assigned beneficiaries by total assigned beneficiaries of 2015 
 
Based on the literature, high need, high cost patient profiles consisted of complex 
psychosocial healthcare needs, most likely over 65 years in age (i.e, Medicare), living at a lower 
socioeconomic status (i.e., Medicaid) and operating with functional disabilities (Blumenthal, 
2017). The average percentage of dual eligible patients to the total ACO assigned beneficiaries 
was 5.20% ± 3.40% with a .001 variance. below presented the distribution of dual eligible to 
non-dual eligible beneficiaries by ACO. The percentage of dual eligible assigned beneficiaries 
were not correlated with the overall size of an ACO’s beneficiary population. Offset variables in 
this study will be included as a log transformation of ACO assigned beneficiaries and dual 
eligible assigned beneficiaries. The average size of ACO assigned beneficiaries were 18.6K ± 
20.7K with a high variance (4.32E+008) across the spectrum. The highly variable small sample 
size will be diff icult for this study to accurately analyze impact on performance in a predictive 
fashion. Thus, a log transformation will be computed to transform assigned beneficiaries into an 
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offset variable for the regression models evaluating earned shared savings. Similarly, when 
evaluating mental health services and impact to inpatient psychiatric admissions performance, 
this study will employ dual eligible assigned beneficiaries as an offset.  
Figure 16  
Distribution Ratio of Dual Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries 
  
Multicollinearity 
 Under regression model assumptions, independent variables are not highly correlated 
with each other. Due to this study’s small sample size, multicollinearity, or highly correlated and 
exact linear relationships among independent variables, is a substantial challenge. In addition, 
the independent variables that are from multiple response questions have high associative 
relationships. This study conducted a Pearson’s correlation analysis and ran a linear regression 
to calculate variance inflation factors (VIF) to understand the extent variance may be inflated. 
See Appendix 2 for multicollinearity values. Finally, an ANOVA of the potential multiple 
response combinations was performed to determine if there were statistically significant 
variances among the multiple response groups in order to determine the final statistical model. 
The independent variables were analyzed for multicollinearity to identify any highly correlated 
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independent variables in preparation for the regression analyses ahead. Based on the VIF 
values and correlations, slight or moderate multicollinearity existed, which may lead to 
inaccurate regression coefficients and incorrect standard errors (Daoud, 2018). As discussed in 
earlier chapters, this study will mitigate multicollinearity by transforming independent variables 
into dichotomous variables for regression analyses. 
Multiple Response Analysis 
The contingency variables for strategy alignment and financial rewards, contracted 
services and mental health delivery were multiple response survey questions from the NSACO. 
The following tables show the multiple response distribution of applicable contingency and 
structural variables from NSACO: Table 12 for financial rewards distribution, Table 13 for mental 
health services, Table 14 for physician compensation and Table 15 for ACO provider contracts. 
Contrary to expectations, the distribution tables showed great variability across services and 
access. This study conducted ANOVAs for the combinations in the distribution to understand 
variance among the groups, but due to the small number of ACOs in the sample and the 
exploratory nature of this research, the ANOVAs did not show significant trends in the multiple 
responses. 
A correlation matrix was conducted (see Appendix 2) to determine if high correlations 
existed between independent variables for each of the statistical models. Statistically significant 
results were present for physician compensation categories “base salary” and “productivity” in 
the statistical model evaluating hypothesis 1, nearly all provider agreement type categories in 
hypothesis 2, nearly all mental health delivery clinician type categories in hypothesis 3, and 
most data standardization and EHR categories in hypothesis 4. To gain more insight as to the 
degree of correlation, correlation statistics were run to evaluate VIF values. Scores equal to 1 
are not correlated, scores between 1 and 5 are mildly correlated, and scores greater than 5 are 
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highly correlated. All independent variables exhibited mildly correlated VIF scores (see 
Appendix 2). In addition, ANOVAs were run for multiple response combinations to determine if 
any statistically significant variances existed between groups. 
Table 12  
Multiple Response Distribution for Financial Rewards Distribution 
Variable 
Multiple 
Response 
Combinations  
na (%)b 
Total  
Savingsc 
ACOs w/Zero 
Savingsd 
Total Assigned 
Beneficiariese 
Financial Rewards 
Distribution  
 
A. Retained by ACO 
B. Reallocated across 
members 
C. Paid to physicians 
A 3 (7%)  $0   3  50,983  
B 4 (9%)  $0  4  60,219  
C 0  $0  0  -    
AB 11 (24%)  $16,701,068  8  282,565  
AC 4 (9%)  $8,827,468  3  61,224  
BC 4 (9%)  $0 4  63,857  
ABC 16 (36%)  $55,701,220  7  235,273  
a: Possible combinations ACO mark “yes” for how they distribute financial rewards  
b: Count of ACOs indicating “yes” for how they distribute financial rewards 
c: Total Shared Savings gained by the ACOs that selected “yes” 
d: Count of ACOs that had zero ($0.00) total shared savings (potential contributor to excess zeros) 
e: Total of assigned beneficiaries for ACOs that marked “yes” 
Table 13 
Multiple Response Distribution for Mental Health Delivery by Clinician Type 
Variable 
Multiple Response 
Combinations 
Number of ACOs 
Total Assigned  
Beneficiaries 
Mental Health Delivery by  
Clinician Type 
 
A. Psychiatrist 
B. NP / PA 
C. Psychologist 
D. Social Worker 
None Selected 7 174,012 
A 2 30,812 
AB 1 12,349 
ABC 1 35,437 
ABCD 17 371,587 
ABD 2 18,888 
AC 1 12,131 
ACD 2 17,106 
B 4 75,470 
BD 4 45,849 
C 2 18,681 
D 2 23,708 
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Table 14 
Multiple Response Distribution for Physician Compensation 
Variable 
Multiple 
Response 
Combinations 
na (%)b 
Total  
Savingsc 
ACOs w/Zero 
Savingsd 
Total Assigned 
Beneficiariese 
Physician Compensation 
 
A. Productivity 
B. Base Salary 
C. Clinical Quality 
D. Patient Satisfaction 
E. Cost Reduction  
A 0  $0   0  -    
B 0  $0   0  -    
C 3 (7%)  $8,881,385  1  31,496  
D 0  $0   0  -    
E 0  $0   0  -    
AB 2 (4%)  $7,130,415  1  42,477  
AC 0  $0   0  -    
AD 0  $0   0  -    
AE 0  $0   0  -    
BC 0  $0   0  -    
BD 0  $0   0  -    
BE 0  $0   0  -    
CD 2 (4%)  $10,303,700  1  78,040  
CE 1 (2%)  $0   1  7,090  
DE 1 (2%)  $0   1  5,942  
ABC 4 (9%)  $5,375,365  3  80,009  
ABD 1 (2%)  $0   1  15,020  
ABE 0  $0   0  -    
ACD 3 (7%)  $3,916,671  2  50,592  
ACE 1 (2%)  $2,104,728  0  15,344  
ADE 0  $0   0  -    
BCD 0  $0   0  -    
BCE 0  $0   0  -    
BDE 0  $0   0  -    
CDE 7 (16%)  $20,059,690  4  77,616  
ABCD 7 (16%)  $4,453,320  6  153,324  
ABCE 0  $0   0  -    
ABDE 0  $0   0  -    
BCDE 2 (4%)  $0   2  13,900  
CDEA 7 (16%)  $20,059,690  4  77,616  
ABCDE 3 (7%)  $0   3  146,253  
a: Possible combinations ACO mark “yes” for how they distribute financial rewards  
b: Count of ACOs indicating “yes” for how they distribute financial rewards 
c: Total Shared Savings gained by the ACOs that selected “yes” 
d: Count of ACOs that had zero ($0.00) total shared savings (potential contributor to excess zeros) 
e: Total of assigned beneficiaries for ACOs that marked “yes” 
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Table 15 
Multiple Response Distribution for ACO Provider Contracts 
Variable 
Multiple Response 
Combinations 
ACO Provides Directly Contracts w/ Non-ACO Providers No Contract 
n Beneficiaries n Beneficiaries n Beneficiaries 
ACO Provider 
Contracts 
 
A. Routine specialty 
care 
B. IP rehab 
C. Mental health 
D. Addiction 
treatment 
E. Skilled nursing 
F. Palliative/hospice 
G. Home health 
H. Hospital diversion 
A 2 28,522 1 8,310 1 33,371 
AB 4 153,820     
ABC 1 30,346     
ABCDEFGH     8 63,828 
ABCDFG 1 6,057     
ABCDFGH     1 11,569 
ABCDFH 1 5,795   1 7,666 
ABCDGH 1 15,020     
ABCEFGH 1 19,839     
ABCFG 1 45,768     
ABCG 2 33,705     
ABCH 1 16,728     
ABDEFGH 1 8,327 1 12,005   
ABE 1 10,190     
ABEFG 1 35,437     
ABG 1 13,308     
ABH 1 42,603     
ACD 1 23,614     
ACDEF 1 12,131     
ACDEFH     1 12,349 
ACDFG     1 4,555 
ACDFGH 2 97,251     
ADF     1 7,090 
AF     1 11,311 
AFGH 1 11,551     
AGH 1 28,491     
AH 1 15,344     
B 1 12,349 1 80,178   
BCD     1 11,551 
BCDEF     1 28,491 
BCDEFG     1 15,344 
BCDEFGH 1 8,310   2 28,522 
BCDEGH   1 11,311   
BE 1 7,090   1 17,073 
BEFGH     1 23,614 
BGH     1 12,131 
C 1 12,005 1 8,327   
CDEFGH     2 17,757 
CDEFH     2 133,451 
CG   1 7,090   
DEF     1 30,346 
DEFG     1 16,728 
DEH     1 25,098 
DH     1 45,768 
E 1 11,569 2 57,319 1 80,178 
EF   1 15,020   
EFG   1 15,920   
EG   2 50,269 1 5,795 
EH     2 14,664 
F   2 33,705 1 42,603 
G   3 162,838   
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Evaluating Theoretical Hypotheses 
The five hypotheses for this study were evaluated using zero inflated negative binomial 
regression analysis for the financial dependent variable total earned shared savings. A 
generalized linear regression was used to evaluate dependent variables for clinical outcomes: 
readmission rates and inpatient psychiatric admissions. This study calculated relative change in 
rates for readmissions and inpatient psychiatric admissions to determine ACO performance 
from 2015 to 2017. The sample size is small and varied slightly for some of the models, notably 
for hypotheses 2 and 3, where some ACOs did not fully participate or answer all questions. In 
addition, multicollinearity exists among many of the independent variables, in particular the 
multiple response variables. In efforts to improve model robustness, offset variables were 
included to address variable ACO beneficiary size and dual eligible population size. To alleviate 
the multicollinearity of the independent variables, the final regression models evaluated the 
contingency structure pairs by each category as a dummy variable for multiple response 
variables in hypotheses 2 and 3.  
This study explores the direction and impact of relationships between contingency-
structure pairs using generalized linear regression and zero inflated regression because they 
are generally more flexible with fewer assumptions required than multiple linear regression 
(Zhang, 2019). Additionally, the independent and dependent variables were used for multiple 
analyses; there is an increasing likelihood of conducting a Type I error and interpreting the 
results as a false positive. To mitigate this, a Bonferroni type adjustment was applied to 
calculate altered p-values and lower the critical value to greater than .05. The formula used for 
the correction is: α/n, where n = number of hypotheses being tested and α is p-value .05 
(McDonald, 2014). The adjusted p-value is .01 (α/n = .05/5). This study will utilize the adjusted 
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p-value for its analyses and discussion of the findings. The result of each hypothesis is 
described, and the reference variable is indicated in each section. 
Hypothesis 1 Results 
This study ran two different statistical models for count data: a generalized linear model 
and a zero inflated model. According to the literature on statistical approaches to count data 
analysis, previous studies have used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values as a means 
to compare goodness of fit (Rodriguez, 2013). The lower the AIC values, the better the fit. In 
comparison between the two models, the generalized linear model shows higher AIC values 
(AIC values ranging from 1200 - 1600) than the zero inflated counts model (AIC values ranging 
500 - 550), indicating better model fit with the zero inflated counts model. Zero inflation models  
adjust for a high proportion of zeroes and carry forward the results in the model for the final 
count (Sharma & Landge, 2013).  
Based on descriptive statistics, the dependent variable’s mean ($1.97M) and variance 
($1.011E+13) are not equal and does not meet general assumptions for a Poisson distribution. 
Instead, the distribution shows extreme over-dispersion and strongly indicates a negative 
binomial distribution. Thus, the study ran a zero inflated negative binomial regression (ZINB) 
with a logit link function and the log of assigned beneficiaries as an offset variable. A stepwise 
approach was applied, starting with a baseline model that includes the structural variable (ACO 
Leadership Structure) and outcomes variable (ACO Total Earned Shared Savings). Contingency 
variables (Strategic Planning at the ACO level, Financial Rewards and Physician 
Compensation) were added sequentially. In addition, question 25 (ACO financial rewards 
distribution) and question 28 (ACO physician compensation) of the NSACO were analyzed 
separately to review impact to the overall model. According to Structural Contingency Theory 
literature, this study anticipated that ACO-level decision-making and governance, paired with 
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regional alignment of strategic objectives, would be associated with greater ACO performance, 
such as ACOs reporting greater total shared savings.  
The ZINB’s final count model results in Table 16 show that leadership is not statistically 
significant at the .01 level; however, the variables for strategy, financial rewards distribution in 
model 3a (ACO retains rewards), and physician compensation in model 3b (base salary and 
clinical quality) were statistically significant at or greater than the .01 level. As discussed earlier 
in the chapter, this study aims to explore the direction and impact of the contingency-structure 
relationship on total earned shared savings. Strategy displays a positive relationship between 
strategic planning at the ACO level and total shared savings in model 2 (p = .001, IRR = 2.340). 
The magnitude of the impact decreases slightly but remains positive as financial rewards 
distribution and physician compensation contingency variables are added to the model.  
In models 3a and 3b, strategic planning at the ACO level remains statistically significant (p = 
.004, p = .000, respectively) with an incident rate ratio (IRR) of 1.848 and 2.132, respectively. In 
model 3a, ACOs that retain financial rewards earned 3.827 times greater total earned shared 
savings than ACOs that distributed financial rewards to providers (p = .001). Although not 
statistically significant according to the adjusted p-value, ACOs that reallocate financial rewards 
across member organizations in the ACO showed a p-value of .05 and earned .635 times less 
total earned shared savings than ACOs that distributed financial rewards to providers. In model 
3b, results show statistically significant values for ACOs that include base salary (p = .001) and 
clinical quality (p = .001) as compensation metrics for their providers. ACOs using base salary 
and clinical quality as metrics earn .528 and .471 times less total shared savings than ACOs 
using productivity as a metric. Applying the adjusted p-values, patient satisfaction is not 
statistically significant at the .01 level (p = .021). However, the values are close to being 
statistically significant, and show ACOs with patient satisfaction as a compensation metric 
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earning 1.527 times greater total shared savings than ACOs using productivity as a metric. 
Interestingly, cost reductions do not display a statistically significant value. 
Table 16 
Regression Results for Hypothesis 1  
 
Zero Inflated Count Model 
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings 
Model Variable Estimate Std . Erro r z Value Sig. IRRb 
1 
Joint Hospital / Physician Leadership .693 .753 .921 .357 1.999 
(Ref) Physician, Hospital or Coalition 
Leadership  
0a - - - - 
2 
Joint Hospital / Physician Leadership .000 .885 .000 1.000 1.000 
Strategic Planning ACO-Level1.386 1.386 .840 -1.651 .099 3.999 
(Ref) Strategic Planning Hospital / 
Region-Level 
0a - - - - 
3a 
Joint Hospital / Physician Leadership .042 .914 .046 .963 1.043 
Strategic Planning ACO-Level -1.281 .869 -1.473 .141 .278 
Financial Rewards Retained by ACO -.853 .888 -.961 .337 .426 
Financial Rewards Allocated across ACO 
organizations 
.001 .835 .001 .999 1.001 
(Ref) Finance rewards Paid to Physicians 0a - - - - 
3b 
Joint-Led ACO Leadership Structure -.107 1.006 -.107 .915 .899 
Strategic Planning ACO-Level -1.418 .909 -1.559 .119 .242 
Base Salary 1.702 .867 1.963 .050 5.485 
Clinical quality measures -.715 1.074 -.665 .506 .489 
Patient satisfaction measures .756 .885 .853 .393 2.130 
Cost reduction measures .421 .917 .460 .646 1.523 
(Ref) Productivity 0 - - - - 
a: reference variable 
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate 
* statistically significant at the .01 level 
** statistically significant at the .001 level 
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Final Count Model 
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings 
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries 
 
Model Variable Estimate Std . Erro r z Value Sig. IRRb 
1 
Joint Hospital / Physician Leadership -.048 .325 -.147 .883 .953 
(Ref) Physician, Hospital or Coalition 
Leadership  
0a - - - - 
2 
Joint Hospital / Physician Leadership .080 .268 .298 .766 1.083 
Strategic Planning ACO-Level .850 .268 3.176 .0 01 * * 2.340 
(Ref) Strategic Planning Hospital / 
Region-Level 
0a - - - - 
3a 
Joint Hospital / Physician Leadership .211 .205 1.032 .302 1.235 
Strategic Planning ACO-Level .614 .216 2.842 .004* 1.848 
Financial Rewards Retained by ACO 1.342 .407 3.296 .0 01 * * 3.827 
Financial Rewards Allocated across ACO 
organizations 
-.635 .324 -1.958 .050 .530 
(Ref) Finance rewards Paid to Physicians 0a - - - - 
3b 
Joint-Led ACO Leadership Structure .380 .177 2.149 .032 1.462 
Strategic Planning ACO-Level .757 .194 3.908 .0 00 * * 2.132 
Base Salary -.639 .189 -3.380 .0 01 * * .528 
Clinical quality measures -.753 .233 -3.225 .0 01 * * .471 
Patient satisfaction measures .423 .184 2.299 .021 1.527 
Cost reduction measures -.289 .170 -1.699 .089 .749 
(Ref) Productivity 0 - - - - 
a: reference variable 
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate 
* statistically significant at the .01 level 
** statistically significant at the .001 level 
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Hypothesis 2 Results 
For hypothesis 2, this study evaluated data from the NSACO that specifies different 
types of service agreements used by ACOs. As presented in the descriptive statistics, ACOs 
had the option to select multiple responses on the survey, and the combination of  responses 
were widely distributed with no obvious bias towards any particular combination of provider 
types or services. The responses indicate the extent to which ACOs formalize health services 
delivery and integrate via contractual provider agreements. Extrapolating from Structural 
Contingency Theory literature, this study hypothesized that ACOs would see positive 
performance when engaged in vertical integration of health services along the patient care 
continuum. Positive performance is defined here as earning total shared savings and reducing 
rate of readmissions. In addition, the adjusted p-value of .01 will be used to report and interpret 
statistical significance in the results for Hypothesis 2. 
A zero inflated negative binomial regression (ZINB) was utilized to analyze the 
dependent variable of total earned shared savings, and a generalized linear regression (GLM) 
was utilized to analyze the dependent variable of change in readmission rates from 2015 – 
2017. Each model in the zero inflated negative binomial regression analyzed the structural 
variable for agreement type individually. In the generalized linear regression, all response 
variables were included with hospital diversion services as the reference variable. This was the 
linear regression model that produced the best fit, per the omnibus test. Hierarchical Condition 
Category for disabled and dual eligible assigned beneficiaries were used as contingency 
variables indicating complexity for the ACO’s population. As HCC scores increased, complexity 
of care and medical services coordination were expected to also increase.  
The ZINB final count model in Table 17 showed that most contingency and structural 
variables had non-significant results. However, the Hierarchical Condition Categorical risk 
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scores for dual eligible assigned beneficiaries showed a positive trend approximating towards 
statistical significance (considering adjusted p-value at .01 level) in relation to ACO 
performance. This trend could be seen in model 1 analyzing only HCC risk scores (p = .042, 
IRR = 2.799), model 5 with addiction treatment (p = .038, IRR = 2.889), model 6 with Skilled 
Nursing Facilities (SNF) (p = .042, IRR = 2.816), model 7 with palliative care services (p = .057, 
IRR = 2.616) and model 8 with home health services (p = .053, IRR = 2.732). Results displayed 
a trend where ACOs may earn 1.5 – 2.9 times more total shared savings when serving dual 
eligible populations with a higher HCC risk score.  
Under service provision and contracting, ACOs that directly provided and contracted 
non-ACO providers for routine specialty care and inpatient rehabilitation exhibited statistically 
significant results at .01 and .001 alpha levels. In model 2, ACOs with some formal arrangement 
to deliver routine specialty care showed a statistically significant (p = .004, IRR = .558) 
likelihood to earn .558 times less total shared savings than ACOs without any formal 
agreements. ACOs with some formal arrangement for inpatient rehabilitation earned .655 times 
less total shared savings than ACOs without any formal agreements.  
In the generalized linear regression, results showed a negative relationship between 
ACOs that had some formal agreement for routine specialty care and home health services. 
This study hypothesized that the more formalized the relationship between ACO providers, the 
better the performance. Better performance here was considered lower readmission rates from 
2015 – 2017. Findings showed that ACOs with a formal agreement to provide routine specialty 
care had .731 times less improvement in readmission rates from 2015 – 2017 than ACOs 
without any formal agreements. Similarly, ACOs with a formal agreement to deliver home health 
services showed .728 times less improvement in readmission rates from 2015 – 2017 than 
ACOs without any formal agreements.  
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Table 17 
Regression Results for Hypothesis 2 
Zero Inflated Count Model 
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings 
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries 
 
Model Variable Estimate Std. Erro r z Value Sig. IRRb 
1 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-15.105 6.941 -2.176 .030 2.7 54 E-07  
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
1.238 4.841 .256 .798 3.449 
2 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-36.252 14.706 -2.465 .014* 0.000 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-7.260 7.532 -.964 .335 0.001 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
routine specialty care 
3.876 1.664 2.330 .020 48.231 
(Ref) ACO no formal contracts with routine 
specialty care providers 
0a - - - - 
3 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-18.864 7.997 -2.359 .018 6.4 19 E-09  
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.098 4.988 -.020 .984 0.907 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
inpatient rehab 
1.633 .858 1.903 .057 5.119 
(Ref) ACO no formal contracts with inpatient 
rehab 
0a - - - - 
4 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-15.327 6.939 -2.209 .027 2.2 06 E-07  
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
1.063 4.866 .218 .827 2.895 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
mental health services 
.357 .740 .482 .630 1.429 
(Ref) ACO no formal contract with mental 
health services 
0a - - - - 
5 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-16.747 7.618 -2.199 .028 5.3 32 E-08  
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
.384 5.103 .075 .940 1.468 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
addiction treatment 
1.042 .902 1.156 .248 2.835 
(Ref) ACO no formal contracts addiction 
treatment 
0a - - - - 
 
 
119 
 
 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-15.109 6.952 -2.173 .030 2.7 43 E-07  
6 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
1.238 4.841 .256 .798 3.449 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
SNF 
-.007 .732 -.010 .992 0.993 
(Ref) ACO no formal contracts SNF 0a - - -  
7 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-15.786 7.243 -2.180 .029 1.3 94 E-07  
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
.924 4.931 .187 .851 2.519 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
palliative services 
.698 .788 .886 .376 2.010 
(Ref) ACO no formal contracts palliative 
services 
0a - - -  
8 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-15.770 7.087 -2.225 .026 1.4 16 E-07  
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
1.605 4.871 .330 .742 4.978 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
home health services 
.488 .727 .672 .502 1.629 
(Ref) ACO no formal contracts home health 
services 
0a - - - - 
9 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-15.576 7.022 -2.218 .027 1.7 20 E-07  
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
.982 4924 .199 .842 2.670 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
hospital diversion services 
-.887 .754 -1.176 .240 0.412 
(Ref) ACO no formal contracts for hospital 
diversion services 
0a - - - - 
a: reference variable 
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate 
* statistically significant at the .01 level 
** statistically significant at the .001 level 
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Final Count Model 
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings 
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries 
 
Model Variable Estimate Std. Erro r z Value Sig. IRRb 
1 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.064 1.308 -.049 .961 9.380E-01 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
2.799 1.377 2.033 .042 16.428 
2 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
.227 1.043 .217 .828 1.25 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
1.548 1.189 1.302 .193 4.702 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
routine specialty care 
-.584 .201 -2.903 .004* .558 
(Ref) ACO no formal contracts with routine 
specialty care providers 
0a - - - - 
3 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
.492 1.200 .410 .682 1.64 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
2.413 1.281 1.884 .060 11.167 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
inpatient rehab 
-.423 .217 -1.948 .051 .655 
(Ref) ACO no formal contracts with inpatient 
rehab 
0a - - - - 
4 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
.185 1.242 .149 .882 1.203 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
2.437 1.381 1.765 .077 11.439 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
mental health services 
-.289 .229 -1.259 .208 .749 
(Ref) ACO no formal contract with mental health 
services 
0a - - - - 
5 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.183 1.326 -.138 .890 .833 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
2.889 1.389 2.080 .038 17.975 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
addiction treatment 
-.149 .289 -.513 .608 .862 
(Ref) ACO no formal contracts addiction 
treatment 
0a - - - - 
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6 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.036 1.322 -.027 .978 .965 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
2.816 1.382 2.037 .042 16.710 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
SNF 
.031 .249 .125 .900 1.031 
(Ref) ACO no formal contracts SNF 0a - - - - 
7 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.270 1.330 -.203 .839 .763 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
2.616 1.373 1.906 .057 13.681 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
palliative services 
-.198 .271 -.731 .465 .820 
(Ref) ACO no formal contracts palliative 
services 
0a - - - - 
8 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.029 1.315 -.022 .982 .971 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
2.732 1.415 1.931 .053 15.364 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
home health services 
-.049 .235 -.210 .834 .952 
(Ref) ACO no formal contracts home health 
services 
0a - - - - 
9 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.502 1.330 -.378 .706 .605 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
2.411 1.363 1.769 .077 11.145 
ACO formal contract with or directly providing 
hospital diversion services 
-.300 .249 -1.206 .228 .741 
(Ref) ACO no formal contracts for hospital 
diversion services 
0a - - - - 
a: reference variable 
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate 
* statistically significant at the .01 level 
** statistically significant at the .001 level 
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Generalized Linear Regression Model 
Dependent variable: Relative Change in Readmission Rates 2015 – 2017 
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries 
 
     CI for Exp(B) 
Variables B 
Std 
Error 
Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Hierarchical Condition Category 
Disabled Assigned Beneficiaries 
.238 .6336 .707 1.269 .367 4.394 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual 
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.176 .5067 .728 .838 .311 2.263 
ACO formal contract with or directly 
providing routine specialty care 
-.313 .0908 .001** .731 .612 .874 
ACO formal contract with or directly 
providing inpatient rehab 
.078 .0758 .306 1.081 .931 1.254 
ACO formal contract with or directly 
providing mental health services 
-.023 .1348 .864 .977 .750 1.273 
ACO formal contract with or directly 
providing addiction treatment 
.071 .1406 .615 1.073 .815 1.414 
ACO formal contract with or directly 
providing SNF 
.090 .1060 .396 1.094 .889 1.347 
ACO formal contract with or directly 
providing palliative services 
.132 .1285 .303 1.141 .887 1.468 
ACO formal contract with or directly 
providing home health services 
-.318 .0964 .001** .728 .603 .879 
(Ref) ACO formal contract with or 
directly providing hospital diversion 
services 
0a - - - - - 
a: reference variable 
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate 
* statistically significant at the .01 level 
** statistically significant at the .001 level 
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Hypothesis 3 Results 
For hypothesis 3, behavioral and mental health services are evaluated by analyzing 
contingency-structure pairs related to inpatient psychiatric admissions. According to Structural 
Contingency literature, this study anticipated that as ACOs provide timely access to relevant 
behavioral and mental health services, ACO performance should improve by reducing the 
number of inpatient psychiatric admissions that occur. The dependent variable is the relative 
change in discharges from an inpatient psychiatric facility from 2015 to 2017. This study 
calculated a ratio for dual eligible assigned beneficiaries to total population as an offset and 
explanatory variable. The offset accounts for the added complexity when the population has a 
higher ratio of dual eligible assigned beneficiaries (AB). The calculated ratio for dual eligible ABs 
acts as an explanatory variable to analyze if higher populations of dual eligible ABs correlate 
with higher inpatient psychiatric admissions. Due to multicollinearity among the multiple 
response answers and the many combinations of responses ACOs submitted, each response is 
evaluated in an individual model with the HCC risk scores and dual eligible ratio.  The adjusted 
p-value of .01 will be used to report and interpret statistical significance. 
Per the regression results in Table 18, the dual eligible explanatory variable is 
statistically significant in each of the models, displaying an inverse trend with inpatient 
psychiatric admissions improvement. This may indicate that every unit of increase in the dual 
eligible population, the rate of improvement decreases for inpatient psychiatric admissions. In 
model 1, ACOs see a statistically significant (p = .001) performance decline for the use of 
psychiatrists to deliver behavioral and mental health services; these ACOs are more likely to 
see .731 times less improvement in inpatient psychiatric admissions than ACOs using other 
clinician types. Model 3 presents psychologists as approximately significant effect in 
performance improvement. ACOs that provide behavioral and mental health services using a 
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psychologist see an improvement near statistical significance (p = .042). ACOs using 
psychologists see 1.235 times improvement in inpatient psychiatric admissions from 2015 – 
2017 in comparison to ACOs using other clinician types. 
Table 18 
Regression Results for Hypothesis 3 
Generalized Linear Regression Model 
Dependent variable: Relative Change in Inpatient Psychiatric Admissions Rates 2015 – 2017 
Offset variable: log of dual eligible assigned beneficiaries  
 
      CI for Exp(B) 
Model Variables B 
Std 
Error 
Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
1 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
.171 .514 .707 1.269 .367 4.394 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual 
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.324 .705 .728 .838 .311 2.263 
Dual Eligible -5.709 1.821 .002* .003 9.345E-5 .118 
ACO behavioral health delivered by 
psychiatrist 
-.006 .111 .001** .731 .612 .874 
(Ref) ACO behavioral health delivered by 
clinicians other than psychiatrist 
0a - - - - - 
 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
.125 .488 .799 1.133 .435 2.950 
2 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual 
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.443 .727 .542 .642 .155 2.668 
 Dual Eligible -5.431 1.815 .003* .004 .000 .153 
 ACO behavioral health delivered by NP/PA -.111 .126 .379 .895 .698 1.146 
 
(Ref) ACO behavioral health delivered by 
clinicians other than NP/PA 
0a - - - - - 
3 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.089 .531 .867 .915 .323 2.590 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual 
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.111 .677 .869 .895 .238 3.369 
Dual Eligible -6.020 1.759 .001** .002 7.739E-5 .076 
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ACO behavioral health delivered by 
psychologist 
.211 .104 .042 1.235 1.008 1.513 
(Ref) ACO behavioral health delivered by 
clinicians other than psychologist 
0a - - - - - 
4 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
.202 .501 .687 1.224 .459 3.265 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual 
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.400 .713 .575 .671 .166 2.714 
Dual Eligible -5.673 1.902 .003* .003 8.261E-5 .143 
ACO behavioral health delivered by social 
worker 
-.066 .112 .554 .936 .751 1.166 
(Ref) ACO behavioral health delivered by 
clinicians other than social worker 
0a - - - - - 
a: reference variable 
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate 
* statistically significant at the .01 level 
** statistically significant at the .001 level 
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Hypothesis 4 Results  
 In hypothesis 4, this study analyzed the contingency-structure relationship between ACO 
information technology (IT) and interoperability as complexity increases. Specifically, this 
hypothesis evaluates ACO performance as IT definitions are standardized across care settings 
and electronic health records are centralized. According to Structural Contingency Theory, this 
study hypothesized that as ACOs increase integration of information technology and related 
interoperability capabilities, performance would improve. This hypothesis utilized the zero 
inflated negative binomial regression because it explores count data from the dependent 
variable total earned shared savings. As applied to the previous hypotheses, the findings for 
hypothesis 4 will continue to utilize the adjusted p-value of .01 as an indicator for statistical 
significance when reporting findings. 
Table 19 shows model 1 in the final count model, the structural variable evaluated is 
centralization of electronic health record (EHR) systems operating within an ACO. The 
reference variable is ACOs operating with a single unified EHR. ACOs operating with a mix of 
electronic health record and paper systems earn a statistically significant (p = .000) 4.773 times 
greater total shared savings than ACOs operating under a single EHR. ACOs operating with 
multiple EHRs earn a statistically significant (p = .018) 2.177 times greater total shared savings 
than ACOs operating under a single EHR. In model 2, ACOs that have standardized most of 
their data elements across their member organizations show that they earn a statistically 
significant (p = .008) .384 times less total shared savings than ACOs with fully standardized 
data elements across their organizations. 
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Table 19 
Regression Results for Hypothesis 4 
Zero Inflated Count Model 
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings 
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries 
 
Model Variable Estimate Std. Erro r z Value Sig. IRRb 
1 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-15.338 7.285 -2.105 .035 3.161 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual 
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.032 5.091 -.006 .995 5.078 
ACOs operating with a mix of EHRs and 
paper systems 
-1.056 1.465 -.721 .471 4.773 
ACOs operating with multiple EHRs -1.536 1.270 -1.209 .227 2.177 
(Ref) ACOs operating with a single EHR 0a - - - - 
2 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-12.732 6.788 -1.876 .061 .000 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual 
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries 
-3.404 5.503 -.619 .536 .033 
ACOs that standardized some data 
elements 
-1.730 1.168 -1.481 .139 .177 
ACOs that standardized most data 
elements 
-2.434 1.179 -2.064 .039 .088 
(Ref) ACOs that fully standardized data 
elements 
0a - - - - 
a: reference variable 
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate 
* statistically significant at the .01 level 
** statistically significant at the .001 level 
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Final Count Model 
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings 
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries 
 
Model Variable Estimate Std. Erro r z Value Sig. IRRb 
1 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
1.151 1.077 1.069 .285 3.161 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual 
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries 
1.625 .976 1.666 .096 5.078 
ACOs operating with a mix of EHRs and 
paper systems 
1.563 .374 4.185 .0 00 * * 4.773 
ACOs operating with multiple EHRs .778 .329 2.361 .018* 2.177 
(Ref) ACOs operating with a single EHR 0a - - - - 
2 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
.863 1.180 .731 .465 2.370 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual 
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries 
-.023 1.509 -.016 .988 .977 
ACOs that standardized some data 
elements 
-.489 .331 -1.480 .139 .613 
ACOs that standardized most data 
elements 
-.956 .362 -2.644 .008* .384 
(Ref) ACOs that fully standardized data 
elements 
0a - - - - 
a: reference variable 
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate 
* statistically significant at the .01 level 
** statistically significant at the .001 level 
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Hypothesis 5 Results 
Per Donaldson’s (2001) concept of multiple contingency fits, this model analyzed the 
level of multiple fits across the previous hypotheses 1 – 4. Empirically, according to the 
literature, this study anticipated overall greater misfit would result in slight performance decline. 
Furthermore, Donaldson (2001) provides contextual consideration in the form of his SARFIT 
model, hypothesizing that as contingencies change, organizations adapt their structures, 
leading to a transition from “fit” to “misfit” in the endeavor to find their new “fit”. Thus, a level of 
“misfit” would be expected if organizations are in a stage of adaptation. This study’s resu lts 
show that when misfit is analyzed by itself, greater ACO misfit is associated with greater total 
shared savings. Possible interpretation of these results is that a certain degree of misfit is 
expected as ACOs are continuously adapting their organizational structures in an effort to 
execute new CMS rules in a timely fashion. This is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
This study approached misfit calculation based on Pennings’ (1987) and Volberda and 
colleagues’ (2012) publications, which utilized residuals of each contingency-structure pair as 
the calculated deviation from fit. In hypothesis 5, the following steps provide details of the 
process in which misfit was calculated: 1) Pearson residuals were saved from each hypothesis’s 
f inal model above, 2) a composite score of the residuals was calculated for each ACO for each 
hypothesis, 3) an aggregate of the misfit scores were conducted for total misfit, 4) ACOs with an 
aggregate score less than a standard deviation (-1) / greater than a standard deviation (+1) from 
the fit line (Pearson residual value of zero) would be labeled as “misfit”, and 5) the misfit scores 
were used to analyze for multicollinearity and the directional relationship with total earned 
shared savings, using a zero inflated negative binomial regression. 
Descriptive statistics for “misfit” show 73.3% of ACOs in the study are not in “misfit” (n = 
33, ͞x = $1.036M total shared savings) and 26.7% of ACOs are in “misfit” (n = 12, x͞ = $4.544M 
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total shared savings). Within the subcategory of ACOs not in “misfit”, 78.8% (n = 26 of 33) show 
zero total shared savings. When looking at 2017 ACO savings rates for th is study’s sample (n = 
45 total ACOs), 21 ACOs produced negative savings, 15 ACOs met the minimum savings rates 
required by CMS to earn shared savings, and 9 ACOs produced positive savings but did not 
reach the minimum savings rates threshold to earn shared savings. Additionally, in the 
regression analysis, Cook’s distance and leverage values show two outliers with large residuals 
as potentially influencing the analysis. After filtering those two ACOs from the sample, little 
changes in statistical significance were observed. Therefore, in the effort to preserve as many 
degrees of freedom as possible for the regression, the two ACOs were not filtered out.  
Table 20 show two models analyzed: 1) misfit as a predictor variable by itself with the 
log of assigned beneficiaries as an offset variable to account for different ACO sizes, and 2) 
misfit, HCC for dual and disabled assigned beneficiaries as predictor variables with the log of 
assigned beneficiaries as an offset. In model one, the results display a statistically significant (p 
= .015) positive relationship: per the incident rate ratio (IRR), an ACO in “misfit” sees 1.725 
times greater total earned shared savings, or 72.5%, more than an ACO in “fit”. Positive 
correlation in model one may reflect the innovation being encouraged by CMS for ACOs to seek 
local solutions to improve the value of healthcare delivery in their communities (Pierce-Wrobel & 
Micklos, 2018). As mentioned above, another possibility is that ACOs are in constant misfit in 
order to react quickly to abrupt changes in CMS rules. Several changes are published to the 
ACO rules annually, and performance improvement calculations are based on each year’s 
results. This could mean future ACO analyses would need to capture pre / post -changes to 
CMS ACO final rules and organizational program changes in greater detail. In model two, when 
hierarchical conditions for disabled and dual eligible assigned beneficiaries are included as 
predictor variables, “misfit” retains a positive estimated value but is not statistically significant. 
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This result may indicate that the impact of high need, high cost assigned beneficiaries do not 
have statistically significant influence on ACO performance or that the distribution of high need, 
high cost assigned beneficiaries are evenly distributed to a point that their influence on ACO 
performance is comparable across organizations. 
Table 20 
Regression Results for Hypothesis 5 
Zero Inflated Count Model 
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings 
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries 
 
Model Variable Estimate Std. Erro r z Value Sig. IRRb 
1 ACO in Misfit -1.846 .751 -2.457 .014* 0.158 
 (Ref) ACO in Fit 0a - - - - 
2 
ACO Total Contingency Misfit -.1.555 .813 -1.912 .056 0.211 
(Ref) ACO in Fit 0a - - - - 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
-14.796 7.036 -2.103 .035 1.036 
 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual 
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries 
2.086 4.908 .425 .671 8.053 
a: reference variable 
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate 
* statistically significant at the .05 level 
** statistically significant at the .01 level 
*** statistically significant at the .001 level 
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Final Count Model 
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings 
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries 
 
Model Variable Estimate Std. Erro r z Value Sig. IRRb 
1 ACO in Misfit .545 .224 2.437 .015* 1.725 
 ACO in Fit 0a - - - - 
2 
ACO in Misfit .474 .273 1.736 .083 1.606 
ACO in Fit 0a - - - - 
Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled 
Assigned Beneficiaries 
.968 1.344 .720 .471 2.633 
 
Hierarchical Condition Category Dual 
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries 
1.021 1.570 .650 .516 2.776 
a: reference variable 
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate 
* statistically significant at the .05 level 
** statistically significant at the .01 level 
*** statistically significant at the .001 level 
 
Chapter Summary 
 This study undergoes an exploratory analysis utilizing organizational variables from the 
NSACO to analyze contingency-structure relationships on ACO total earned shared savings, 
changes in readmission and changes in inpatient psychiatric admissions. A key concept in 
Structural Contingency Theory is that better fit between contingency and structure results in 
improved performance. This is interpreted in this study as the residual from the best fit line in 
each contingency-structure relationship evaluated in the hypothesis through regression 
analyses.  
 This chapter describes the study variables, preparation of the data, calculation of 
individual misfit scores through residual generation of each hypothesis’s model and composite 
score computation for a total misfit score. The results of the regression analyses were reported 
on ACO performance and contingency-structure fit. 
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 Because this is an exploratory analysis, intensive descriptive statistics were conducted, 
and correlational analyses were reported in the appendices. The regression analyses that were 
used were primarily focused on directional impact of the explanatory variables. The results of 
the analyses were not as expected for every hypothesis. This can potentially be attributed to 
some correlational relationships among some of the independent variables and the small 
sample size, which indicates great future research opportunity. Expected and actual directional 
associations are depicted in Table 21 as a summary table of the findings for all hypotheses. 
Table 21 
Results Summary 
Directional Associations of Contingency-Structure Analyses 
 
 
Total Earned 
Shared Savings 
Change in 
Readmissions 
Change in IP 
Psych 
Admissions 
Variable Exp Act Exp Act Exp  Act 
H1: ACOs with hospital and physician co-led governance 
structures are more likely to produce total earned shared 
savings than ACOs without co-led governance 
structures. 
+ none     
H2: Under conditions where the ACO is assigned to 
higher risk populations, ACOs with tight physician and 
hospital alignment will outperform ACOs with loosely 
aligned physician and hospital associations. 
+ -* + -*   
H3: Under conditions where the ACO is assigned to 
higher risk populations, ACOs with greater access to 
behavioral and mental health services will outperform 
ACOs without such access. 
    + -* 
H4: Under conditions where the ACO is assigned to 
higher risk populations, ACOs with higher health IT 
integration will outperform ACOs with lower health IT 
integration. 
+ +* / -*     
H5: ACOs with higher measures of fit between their 
structural characteristics and contingencies will exhibit 
better performance than ACOs with lower measures of fit. 
- +
* 
/ 
nonea 
    
* statistically significant relationships for some of the independent variables analyzed 
a: H5 model including HCC disabled and dual eligible assigned beneficiaries showed no statistically significant relationships with 
ACO total shared savings 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the study’s findings and its application to the exploratory nature 
of the research. Discussion of managerial and policy implications are broadly discussed, future 
research opportunities are identified, and study limitations are presented.  
Discussion of the Study Findings 
This study used a two-step approach to analyze multiple contingency fit (Van de Ven & 
Drazin, 1976). The first step consists of analyzing four contingency-structure pairs. Regressions 
were used to better understand directional effect contingency-structure pairs had on ACO 
performance. From each regression, a Pearson correlation residual value was calculated. 
According to the deviation analysis approach in the SCT literature, residuals are one way to 
quantify organizational misfit by representing deviation from a fit line between contingency and 
structure. In this study, if a contingency-structure pair included subsegments, an average was 
calculated from the residuals of the subsegments. Second step in this study applied 
Donaldson’s additive fit approach to multiple contingencies. Each residual value was added to 
determine overall multiple contingency fit. Donaldson describes contingency fit as historically 
built on interaction terms (Donaldson, 2001, p. 210), but he cites previous contingency studies 
that have applied additive fit models as more practical and representative of complex multi-
contingent organizations. An additive approach allows for analytical models to empirically 
quantity misfit in a holistic manner, such as negative values for misfit can balance positive  
values for fit (Pennings, 1987; Volberda et al., 2012). The study results showed support for 
hypotheses related to strategy and some clinical service delivery, but further research with 
greater robustness in data collection is needed to improve analytical accuracy. Some of the 
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issues stem from the NSACO multiple response questions and the resultant combination of 
health services selected by ACOs.  
Multiple Response Survey Questions 
Approaches to multiple response analyses are diverse and nonconclusive, mainly 
focused on the descriptive and correlational aspects of the analytics (Stephen, 2016). The 
contingency and structural variables in hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are from multiple response survey 
questions from the NSACO. The tool is purposefully flexible to allow for detailed capture of ACO 
services. Conceptually, the combinations represent scope and diversity of services ACOs 
provide for their beneficiary populations. Theoretically, the greater number of services included 
in an ACO’s portfolio should represent greater community access to healthcare  (Kansagara et 
al., 2011; Misky et al., 2010). There is an opportunity to correlate the combination of services 
with individual beneficiary needs, identified via diagnoses by medical record number. 
Beneficiary-level data would provide more granularity on ACO performance and the effect from 
formalized agreements. Since this study utilized ACO-level data, little trends are identif iable 
among the ACOs due to the small sample size.  
Putting the Study Results in Context 
 This study analyzed individual contingency-structure pairs by hypothesis and then took 
an additive approach to calculating a composite contingency score for misfit. Misfit was then 
analyzed in a regression model, assuming an inverse relationship between ACO performance 
and misfit. This next section will discuss each hypothesis’s results and the overall misfit analysis 
in hypothesis five.  
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 examined the relationship between strategy and governance on ACO 
performance. Allocation of resources, financial rewards distribution and ACO physician 
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compensation were interpreted as the extent to which ACOs aligned their strategies—thus, 
indicating a single or centralized objective aligned across all provider care settings. In SCT 
literature, strategy is a contingency that affects structure. When an organization’s strategy is 
diverse, the organization is providing multiple services towards diverse objectives. This would 
be considered a diversified portfolio of services and expected to best fit with a decentralized 
structure operating in autonomous divisions of labor. In contrast, if an organization’s strategy is 
to primarily serve a single service or have a single objective across its functions, the structure 
that would best fit would be centralized and functional. Extrapolating from SCT literature, 
governance structures with representations for both ambulatory and inpatient settings would be 
optimal during times of transition in a market.  
Hypothesis 1 anticipated that ACOs with physician and hospital joint-led structures 
would perform better than other structures. In the ACO literature, conflicting results were found 
among different studies. In one study, correlations between leadership structure, organizational 
characteristics and performance reported that physician-led ACOs earned less shared savings 
and lower quality scores in comparison to hospital and joint-led ACOs (McWilliams, 2016; 
Ouayogodé, Colla & Lewis, 2017). However, in an Health Affairs article by Muhlestein and Hall 
(2014), the authors discuss how better quality results do not always equate to better financial 
results. In a subsequent study, researchers reported that physician-led ACOs saw higher 
savings than hospital-led ACOs in 2018 (LaPointe, 2019). Another publication in Health 
Services Research (Comfort et al., 2018), examined ACO governance structures and 
performance. The authors categorized governance in three ways: physician-led, integrated and 
hybrid. They found that quality and cost outcomes were comparable across different ACO 
governance structures. This study’s results indicated heterogeneous financial performance 
across ACOs; in addition, there were a disproportionately high number of ACOs earning zero 
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shared savings. The results show performance is not statistically significantly different for joint -
led ACOs in comparison to other structures. Previous studies have primarily focused on 
governance and performance. Specifically, physician-led and hospital-led structures. This study 
provides another perspective for ACO programs that examine governance structure, strategy 
and performance.  
Strategic planning at the ACO level shows statistically significant better performance 
than ACOs conducting strategic planning at the regional or hospital levels. This is in line with 
strategy and contingency literature; strategic planning is defined as long term planning and the 
reallocation of resources as determined by a governing board or centralized entity (Young, 
2003; Strebel, 2004; Bradshaw, 2009). This is further reiterated by the results for financial 
rewards distribution, which displays a statistically significant relationship where performance is 
higher for ACOs that retain financial rewards. For physician compensation, patient satisfaction 
was the only metric that showed an approximate statistically significant relationship to 
performance in comparison to productivity. Base salary and quality displayed lower earned 
shared savings than productivity. This is contrary to the concept of value-based care models; 
ACO programs are means to transition from volume-based care, such as productivity-driven 
incentives, to value-based care, such as quality and satisfaction (Muhlestein, Saunders, 
Richards & McClellan, 2018). The results show partial consistency with the literature. This could 
reflect the study’s limitations, such as the small sample size and scope. Nevertheless, the 
results indicate variability and that a clear relationship does not exist among patient satisfaction, 
quality and performance. Considerations to be taken into account when analyzing physician 
incentive models, capital investments and resource allocation. 
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Hypothesis 2 
According to SCT literature, formalization is associated with decreased uncertainty and 
increased interdependence (Donaldson, 2001, p. 56). In the ACO environment, 
interdependence is high as the aim of the program is to increase care coordination and improve 
access to preventive care services, especially in consideration of high need, high cost patients 
(O’Malley, Rich, Sarwar, Schultz, Warren, Shah & Abrams, 2019). In the context of Structural 
Contingency Theory, this hypothesis explored the relationship between formalization of services 
through contractual agreements and interdependence. High HCC risk scores indicated greater 
acuity in the patient population served, and thus, more complex coordination necessary to 
manage care across settings for patients with high needs. The more coordination needed, the 
greater the interdependence between tasks and provider groups would be expected. In order to 
reduce uncertainty among interdependent activities, providers would need to formalize their 
relationships on agreed upon terms so that their objectives would be aligned. However, in 
environments that are more organic or operate under constant change, SCT literature 
postulates that less formal structures allow for flexibility and innovation. Thus, organizations 
operating in increasingly uncertain environments may best fit with less formal structures. In 
practical terms, this study explores to what extent ACOs with formal structures thrive when 
operating in highly interdependent operations and uncertain environments.  
The study’s results indicate that there may be a relationship regarding access to 
healthcare services, albeit not statistically significant to the .01 level. that formalization of the 
services do not play a more significant role as long as ACO beneficiaries gain access to 
services in a timely fashion. Formal contractual agreements may even limit beneficiary access 
to services, if resources are not easily accessible to beneficiaries. Consistent with past 
research, there is wide inconsistency and variation in ACO performance related to structure and 
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performance, indicating comparable outcomes for diverse ACO structures (Ouayogodé, Colla & 
Lewis, 2017; Comfort, Shortell, Rodriguez & Colla, 2018). In addition, policy changes occur on 
an annual basis for ACO payment and performance, contributing to consistent uncertainty in the 
healthcare landscape.  
Findings from hypothesis 2 analyses show near statistically significant results (.01 ≤ p ≤ 
.05) when ACOs with higher HCC risk scores for dual eligible populations directly provide 
services or contract services for addiction, skilled nursing facilities, palliative care and home 
health. Interestingly, the direction on performance is an inverse relationship with HCC risk 
scores for dual eligible beneficiaries. These findings indicate high variability and wide 
confidence intervals in the data, which suggest future research would be beneficial to better 
understand the topic. Under the lens of SCT, these findings may imply that as HCC risk scores 
increase, uncertainty in the environment increases and less formal structures would be a better 
fit for ACOs. The variability further suggests that operations are so uncertain when ACOs 
service populations with high risk scores, that trends or patterns in the interaction among 
providers are too dynamic to document or standardize. This is supported by the many 
combinations of agreement types ACOs reported out, which further implies that ACOs are 
matching the services they are contracting or providing to their local environments, and high 
variability exists among ACOs because of their local needs. Therefore, formalizing agreements 
with post-acute services may not be the most effective tactic and a variety of tactics should be 
considered when managing high need, high cost patients. Additionally, a takeaway from these 
findings is that ACOs require greater flexibility to better perform, and any overregulation may 
have deleterious effects.  
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Hypothesis 3 
In ACO literature, some studies have presented statistically significant associations 
between quality care performance and ACO provider composition, specifically, primary care 
providers and specialists (Albright, Lewis, Ross & Colla, 2016; Ouayogodé, Colla & Lewis, 
2017). Extant literature posits that ACOs have two main options for mental and behavioral 
health services integration for their beneficiary populations: 1) to contract services with provider 
groups outside of the ACO’s network or 2) to build a network of mental and behavioral health 
specialists integrated into the ACO network (Kathol, Patel, Sacks, Sargent & Melek, 2015).  
Studies have suggested that building an integrated behavioral health network allows for 
greater access and alignment for coordination of care (Lewis, Colla, Tierney, Citters, Fisher & 
Meara, 2014). Other studies have reported ACOs seeing a reduction in spending for post-acute 
care services before and after joining a Medicare Shared Savings Program, including 
discharges from facilities (McWilliams, Gilstrap, Stevenson, Chernew, Huskamp & Grabowski, 
2017). Most ACOs provide behavioral health services through fragmented means and disparate 
f inancial models. This study’s results show a rich diversity in the types of specialists employed 
by ACOs to deliver behavioral health services. In addition, there is inconsistent performance 
seen across the types of specialists employed and ACO performance; psychiatrists and 
psychologists show statistically significant results. However, ACOs using psychologists to 
deliver behavioral and mental health services saw slight improvement for a decrease in inpatient 
psychiatric admissions, whereas ACOs using psychiatrists saw little to no improvement. Social 
workers and NPs/PAs did not show statistically significant relationships or performance 
improvement. A key variable is the ratio of dual eligible beneficiaries in a population; the results 
show that increases in dual eligible beneficiaries are associated with higher admissions.  
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When evaluating multiple response combinations, 17 of 44 ACOs reported that they use 
psychiatrists, NP/PAs, psychologists and social workers to deliver behavioral and mental health 
services to their beneficiary populations. Furthermore, drawing from hypothesis two’s 
descriptive statistics results, about 50% of ACOs reported that they directly provided mental 
health services (see Table10). This study’s hypothesis three results may reiterate the notion that 
type and variety of behavioral health services do not play significant factors in driving ACO 
outcomes improvement. There is no statistically significant difference across ACOs directly 
providing mental health services, contracting with non-ACOs or no formal contracts. This 
exploratory analysis into ACO contract types for behavioral and mental health services further 
iterates that there isn’t a standard model of behavioral health service delivery, and localized 
approaches may be most appropriate to produce optimal performance. ACOs also may not be 
adequately prepared for larger populations of dual eligible beneficiaries.  
Hypothesis 4  
In the ACO literature, electronic health record technology is cited as being a key tool for 
managing care transitions for patient populations (Wu, Rundall, Shortell & Bloom, 2016). In a 
study assessing health IT and care coordination in ACOs, researchers categorized care 
coordination and health IT exchange in three ascending levels of complexity: 1) information 
capture for standardization, 2) information provision for unidirectional activities, and 3) 
information exchange for bidirectional activities. The authors found that there was a statistically 
significant association between information exchange for bidirectional activities and care 
management processes, but results did not show statistically significant associations for 
standardization and unidirectional activities (Shortell, Rundall & Bloom, 2017).  
CMS had made recent attempts to simplify EHR rules for ACO physicians in an effort to 
decrease bureaucratic burden and physician burnout from heavy administrative requirements 
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(Arndt, 2018). In the ACO literature, some studies found that as ACOs grew in size, having an 
integrated EHR helped moderate decline in performance (Bao & Bardan, 2017). According to 
the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) report “Using Health IT for Care Coordination: Insights 
from Six Medicare Accountable Care Organizations,” findings stated that ACOs with single 
EHRs across their network were able to “share data in real time, enhancing providers’ ability to 
coordinate care” (Levinson, 2019, p. 3). However, the OIG report continues to note anecdotal 
feedback from providers that ACOs under a single EHR also placed heavy administrative 
burden on ACO providers. The workflows built into EHRs did not always capture operational 
workflows, and thus workarounds are put in place to accommodate (Levinson,  2019, pp. 3-5). 
In the SCT literature, as discussed in Chapter 3, technology as a contingency is discussed in 
relation to uncertainty and interdependence. Technology serves as a contingency that 
influences the environment in which organizations and personnel operate.  Technology 
influences the form in which information sharing occurs, the speed in which information is 
available for decision making and the vehicle for intra/inter-organizational communication 
through a shared language (Ford et al., 1977; Keller, 1994).  
A crucial component cited in ACO and SCT literature regarding to technology as a 
contingency is its effect on organizational interoperability (Chukmaitov et al., 2015; Samal et al., 
2016). According to the literature and the context in which this study applies SCT, technology 
integration encompasses technical capabilities, operations and information sharing (Alexander 
& Randolph, 1985; Luo & Donaldsen, 2013; Premkumar et al., 2005) . Based on the literature, 
this research study hypothesized that as ACOs grew their capabilities and became more 
integrated, performance would improve. In the context of EHRs, ACOs with a single EHR across 
their network would be considered as the most integrated. Conceptually, providers would not 
have to learn or keep up-to-date with multiple systems to manage their daily activities. On the 
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contrary, the study’s results showed that ACOs with multiple EHRs and a mixture of electronic 
and paper systems performed better than ACOs with single EHRs.  
Such results may imply that ACOs provide a high level structure for disparate healthcare 
providers, but that full operational and system integration continue to be opportunities for 
improvement. Prior to joining an ACO, healthcare providers may have practiced under different 
information systems and workflows. Significant operational changes may still be necessary to 
centralize EHRs, and providers may continue to operate with the same workflows prior to joining 
an ACO, regardless of the information system being used.  
This hypothesis looked at the level in which ACOs standardized data definitions; the 
level of standardization was interpreted as the extent to which providers communicated with a 
common understanding of the information shared, so they may make effective decisions for 
care coordination. Ideally, if information being shared was easily accessible and understood 
among providers, care coordination would be easier when managing high need, high cost 
patients and ACO performance would thus be positive. For example, providers managing 
patients with multiple diagnoses and comorbid conditions may be able to reduce unplanned 
readmissions related to timely access to specialty care or better contain costs of unnecessary 
testing when patients enter into an emergency department for care. In Shortell, Rundall and 
Bloom’s study (2017) on health IT and care coordination, standardization and unidirectional 
activities were statistically significant with care management processes. Their report does not 
directly support this study’s results. Conceptually, health IT standardization among ACO 
organizations would provide foundational aspects for improved care coordination, which should 
result in improved performance. In Lloyd’s (2018) report on Medicaid ACO’s data support 
needs, the author outlines benefits to supporting data capabilities and access to Medicaid ACOs 
to promote standardization of definitions, results, interpretation of results and better identify 
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improvement areas in targeted populations. This is in line with the results of this study and 
reiterates the importance of operationalizing standardized definitions for integrated care 
coordination. This essentially reduces uncertainty among providers and establishes a common 
language for action and interpretation. 
Hypothesis 5 
In previous contingency studies, Swofford (2015) analyzed health system access, 
geography and efficiency with hospital performance. He applied Donaldson’s (2001) multiple 
contingency theory and used an additive 2x2 approach for his research. In comparison, 
Volberda and colleagues (2012) published a slightly different approach that extrapolated similar 
concepts from Donaldson (2001) on multiple contingency analysis. The researchers analyzed 
deviation across contingency-structure regression analyses and calculated the sum of the 
deviations to equate to a total contingency score. In the same spirit of both Swofford (2011) and 
Volberda and colleagues (2012), this study calculated Pearson residuals across the 
contingency-structure pairs from the four hypotheses and calculated a composite score to 
produce an average misfit score. Therefore, the further the score from zero, the greater the 
misfit.  
According to Donaldson (2001), the concept of multiple fit is that organizational 
performance should decline as overall misfit across multiple contingencies increases. The 
study’s results did not empirically support this concept and showed an inverse relationship 
between the misfit score and ACO performance for total earned shared savings. However,  
Donaldson (2001) expounds on organizations’ structural adaptation to fit. He further describes 
there is an anticipated performance decline during the interim between an organization’s 
endeavors to find their new “fit” with new contingencies (Donaldson, 2001, pp. 210). 
Extrapolating from Donaldson (2001), this study may consider ACOs in a constant state of 
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“misfit” as ACO rules change annually, representing an organic environment in which ACOs 
must operate and adapt (Burns & Stalker, 1961). Furthermore, annual changes by CMS evinces 
a constant state of uncertainty for ACOs at a macroeconomic level. ACO literature has noted 
that successful ACOs have demonstrated a penchant for care delivery innovation and 
continuously seeking greater performance improvement opportunities (Curtis, 2015; McHugh et 
al., 2018; Pierce-Wrobel & Micklos, 2018).  
As CMS continues to gather feedback on drivers to ACO success, there is evidence of 
CMS simplifying rules and allowing for greater flexibility in ACO local operations so as to 
decrease bureaucracy. Potentially, a longer time period is needed to be evaluated; instead of a 
single three-year agreement period for Track 1 ACOs, it would be beneficial to include all tracks 
across two agreement periods and compare among different types of ACOs, such as 
commercial ACOs, evaluating the effect of misfit on ACO performance. This study’s results 
further reiterate the fact that this study is exploratory, with limited data and opportunities for 
refinement of the NSACO survey instrument for better data capture and ACO participation. 
Managerial Implications 
This study’s results include wide variation across ACOs. The implications for managers 
from hypotheses one and two are that a standardized best practice for formalizing partnerships 
or contractual agreements across healthcare services along the care continuum does not 
initially exhibit performance improvement. Formal or non-formal relationships were not 
statistically significant in driving ACO performance improvement to the extent of earning shared 
savings. This may imply that networks across the care continuum rely more on independence 
and flexibility than formalized networks.  
In relation to behavioral health services, managerial implications from hypothesis three 
are that the size of ACO beneficiary panels are important, and a deeper analysis of behavioral 
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health specialist to dual eligible beneficiary size ratio is needed. Instead of focusing on contracts 
and agreements, managers may focus more on official and unofficial access to services by the 
size and density of behavioral health needs patients. Furthermore, the results show that 
performance is not better with greater access and increased variety of clinician types delivering 
behavioral health. Instead, adequate access to the dual eligible population could potentially be 
beneficial. 
In hypothesis four, results suggest that ACOs that fully standardize data elements 
across member organizations are associated with higher shared savings in comparison to 
ACOs that standardize some but not all data elements. However, the number of EHRs utilized 
within an ACO showed an inverse relationship with performance. The more centralized ACOs 
are with their EHRs, such as operating under a single EHR, the less shared savings the ACO 
earned. Managerial implications for EHR centralization are to further evaluate and carefully 
assess organizational readiness for changes across the ACO. Findings suggest that fully 
integrating EHR workflows with post-acute care providers is not clearly indicative with positive 
ACO performance. Managers may consider integration in the context of interoperability between 
information systems and organizational workflows. Heavy capital investment and intensive 
change management would be necessary for successful implementation of a single EHR within 
an ACO across all member organizations.  
Theoretically, the more uncertain the environment, the greater the interdependence 
between groups, the less formal a structure should be to be in fit. Too much formalization 
makes an organization too rigid to react and adapt in a mercurial environment. However, the 
ACO should provide some virtual construct that helps reduce the uncertainty between 
interdependent provider groups along the care continuum.  
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One of the major benefits of an ACO has been that the ACO can access capital funding 
for infrastructure development that smaller independent practices or provider groups would not 
have been able to invest and maintain, such as an EHR. The results indicate it may be more 
important to be operating under a standard set of definitions than operating in a single EHR. 
Practically speaking, an organization’s priorities may need to first document standard operating 
procedures to reduce uncertainty or variability among different provider groups.  
Lastly, hypothesis five results indicate that ACOs may operate in a constant state of 
misfit, and this could be optimal for the dynamic healthcare environment instituted by CMS and 
the continued uncertainty surrounding the Affordable Care Act. This may indicate that 
organizations situated and structured to respond to the constant uncertainty and regulatory 
changes in the healthcare landscape are positioned to perform better. Therefore, managers 
may consider how to structure their ACO programs in a way that allows for innovation in health 
technologies and care coordination across multiple transition points along the patient journey. 
Another point to consider when developing or building out ACO provider networks is 
concentration or provider access dependent on high risk populations, such as dual eligible 
assigned beneficiaries. The use of advanced technologies or innovative means to access care 
is especially important for the dual eligible population and may require different strategies. Thus, 
contingency-structure pairs within an ACO may need to be categorized according to different 
levels of patient complexity and risk. Managers could target locations where high need, high 
cost beneficiaries with higher HCC risk scores reside and align health services access by 
greatest density of need (Colla, Lewis, Kao, et al., 2016; D’Aunno et al., 2018; Fryer et al., 2016; 
Jean-Baptiste et al., 2017). 
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Policy Implications 
This study represents preliminary findings and analyses for ACOs under the framework 
of contingency theory. Tentative policy implications can be initiated based on this exploratory 
research. Although the analyses presented diverse and varied outcomes due to the small 
sample size, the results are supported by other ACO research stating similar inconclusive or 
diverse results for most of the hypotheses analyzed. Based on the findings from this exploratory 
research, operational and regulatory flexibility may allow ACOs to service according to their 
assigned beneficiary populations and local communities. In addition, ACOs should continue to 
be incentivized to take risks and innovate population health solutions. This may require 
additional grants or payment schemes to be considered like previously executed advanced 
payment plans or grants for health IT investment incentives. 
ACOs are well-positioned to address access to preventive care services, complex 
patient needs, chronic illness management and transitional care services in their community 
(Peck et al., 2018; Schoen et al., 2009). Although ACOs possess a wide spectrum of 
infrastructure, their baseline infrastructure includes an electronic health record or medical 
information sharing mechanism across its care continuum for beneficiaries. There are 
opportunities for future private-public partnerships to enhance public safety during global 
pandemics, such as COVID-19, and apply population-based screening, establish extensive 
contact tracing programs and leverage innovative digital solutions, like telemedicine or remote 
patient monitoring (Bleser et al., 2020). Important policy implications for such partnerships is 
reimbursement and payment schemas by the government. This is a rapidly growing area of 
interest in the domain of telemedicine and its versatility when social distancing policies and 
executive stay-at-home orders are in place during pandemics. Recent changes to the ACO 
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program by CMS include greater regulatory flexibility and expanded benefit for the use of 
telehealth (Verma, 2018).  
 As mentioned earlier, ACOs have a complementary care model that may ideally address 
high need, high cost patients because of their complex care needs. Future regulatory 
reimbursement schemas may incentivize ACOs that service high risk sub-segments within their 
beneficiary populations. Other reimbursement models for consideration may be through grants 
or flexible reimbursement of telehealth services, especially for ACOs operating in rural areas or 
densely populated high-risk geographical regions. 
Comments on Contingency Theory 
This study’s methods utilized Donaldson’s (2001) and Volberda and colleagues’ (2012) 
approach to multiple contingency fit. Specifically, Donaldson (2001) and Volberda and 
colleagues (2012) describe organizational misfit as the measured distance from the fit line. 
Donaldson (2001) further expounds misfit as the residual from the regression l ine. In evaluating 
contingency and structure, Donaldson (2001) evaluates Drazin and Van de Ven’s (1985) 
argument regarding overall effect of multiple fits. He posits that Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) 
utilize the Euclidian distance formula to analyze systems fit for multiple contingency pairs. The 
Euclidian distance formula is, in essence, an additive model. This study applies the same 
concept of misfit as being the residuals calculated between contingency and structure pairs from 
the fit line in a regression analysis. Furthermore, for hypothesis five, each contingency-structure 
pair’s residual scores were aggregated, and a composite score was made to represent overall 
misfit for each ACO.  
This study utilized a multiple contingency approach to hypothesis five to analyze 
organizational misfit. However, in reviewing ACO structure and contingency, it becomes 
apparent that multiple structures exist within the ACO, along with multiple contingencies. This 
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especially true in the inherent construct of the ACO. ACOs are composed of disparate 
healthcare providers along the care continuum, with many possibilities that each provider are 
entering the ACO with existing operations or technologies. Thus, the extent in which providers 
operate or are structured deviate from the ACO’s structure or operations, may be another more 
appropriate way of analyzing ACO misfit. This approach may consist of multiple fits among 
contingency-structures within an organization. This approach would be applicable to any type of 
matrixed or large organization. Additionally, a multiple fits approach may be appropriate for  
intra-organizational analysis. At a macro-level, Structural Contingency Theory, alone, may not 
be appropriate to incorporate environmental variables into its analyses. Potentially,  a synthesis 
of SCT and another macro-level theory may be more appropriate. 
Donaldson (2001) also discusses confounding factors and constituents of fit, mostly in 
an organization’s prior years’ performance. Drawing from past SCT literature, Donaldson (2001 ) 
points out that correlations exist between performance and contingencies that may result in 
erroneous associations when calculating misfit. A way to counter this confounding factor is to 
include a lagging dependent variable. This study adapted this approach to ACOs by summing 
the last two years of total earned shared savings and excluding the first year’s performance to 
account for changes that organizations may have made to accommodate to first year 
participation. One difference related to ACO performance and prior year performance is that 
CMS bases benchmark and minimal savings rates on three years of an ACO’s retrospective 
performance data, so relative improvement would be considered for each ACO’s local 
environment. 
Contingency-structure pairs were identified by extrapolating upon Chandler’s (1962) 
descriptions on strategy and structure, Burton and Obel’s (1998) descriptions on differentiation, 
centralization and vertical integration, and Donaldson’s (2001) analysis of technology, 
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interdependencies, and coordination. Due to the small sample size, slight correlation among 
independent variables, and in an effort to minimize the degrees of freedom used in the statistical 
models to improve goodness of fit, multiple response variables were converted into 
dichotomous variables and analyzed individually instead of as multiple response groups. This 
approach highlights the exploratory nature of the research as well as the opportunity for more 
refined analysis with a larger sample size.  
Study Limitations 
 There are limitations to design and methods in this study, especially as it is a preliminary 
and exploratory study on ACO contingency-structure pairs. Potential limitations previously listed 
in the methods chapter are: 1) non-experimental design, 2) changing survey instrument and 
thus data capture by CMS and the NSACO, 3) small sample size, and 4) regional or market 
changes not captured by the survey instruments. 
 This study is a non-experimental design and thus susceptible to selection bias, and it is 
not meant for cause-and-effect research. The study utilizes a secondary dataset, and the 
researcher is unable to manipulate any of the predictor variables. Study part icipants include 
those who have successfully submitted data to CMS and participated in the NSACO 
consistently. NSACO participants may be susceptible to self -selection bias and represent only 
those ACOs with greater data capture or health information capabilities. NSACO submission 
options allow for ACOs to choose either a paper or electronic version of the survey, which 
contain slightly different questions or response options for some multiple-choice questions. Due 
to the variation, this reduced the viable sample size even further. Benchmark data or baseline 
data is incorporated into the ACO reporting methodology by CMS, but there is no benchmark or 
baseline data from the NSACO. Ideally, this would be a mixed-methods research design where 
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interviews were conducted with ACO leadership to have greater contextual data on ACO 
organizational structure.  
 The second study limitation for this research is data collection methodology. Survey 
participants included ACO leadership who may have changed throughout the study period, 
which may have affected ACO strategies or perspectives during the agreement period the 
NSACO was conducted. Several different people or teams may have been responsible for filling 
out the survey, and this may have resulted in different approaches or interpretations of the 
survey questions. However, the Dartmouth Institute mitigated this limitation by have robust 
review of all data submitted and comparing submissions with prior year submissions to assure 
for continuity. 
The third study limitation is the small sample size for this research due to the number of 
ACOs participating in both the NSACO and submitting complete data to CMS SSP. The sample 
size is small (N = 45), and thus the study is expected to contain wide confidence intervals and 
large standard errors, indicating less precision in the model estimates. However, the sample 
nevertheless provides an opportunity to better explore directional implications of the 
relationships between structure and contingency for ACO performance. For future data capture, 
consistent survey submission options across ACOs would be beneficial. For future research, 
evaluating among Medicaid, Medicare and Commercial ACOs would be an opportunity for 
greater program performance analysis.   
 Last, the fourth study limitation for this research is market or regional changes that may 
impact ACO fit that is not adequately captured through the ACO SSP PUF or the NSACO. 
Although the ACO beneficiary state of residence is controlled, there is still the potential that 
regional changes to an ACO’s environment may influence the ACO’s approach or participation.  
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CMS requirements and rules for quality and financial performance have changed on an annual 
basis. In an effort to account for natural disasters, promote “regulatory flexibility and free market 
principles,” CMS publishes final rules late into the year for the upcoming performance year 
(2017). Although changes to policies allow for ACOs to advocate for more appropriate 
submission requirements, changes simultaneously increase marketplace volatility that may not 
be accurately captured in the dataset. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 As indicated previously throughout this paper, there are suggestions for future research 
associated with the study’s limitations and gaps in the literature . First, opportunities exist to 
expand the scope of the study from Track 1 MSSP ACOs to all program types and 
subcategorize by Medicare, Medicaid and Commercial ACOs. This would require merging 
across several datasets and addressing different risk models being employed. However, this 
would be a beneficial analysis to see if significant performance differences related to 
contingency-structure pairs that may exist among different payers.  
Second, research opportunities exist to further explore vertical integration of behavioral 
and mental health services in the context of dual eligible populations with high density. This is 
an area of high need, high cost patient research that requires greater evaluation in the ACO 
literature. This study provides preliminary analysis evaluating the different combination of 
behavioral health providers available through ACOs and the statistical significance of dual 
eligible populations on an ACO’s ability to adequately provide services in a way that prevents 
admissions to an inpatient psychiatric facility.  
Third, building on this study’s preliminary analysis on ACO agreement types, healthcare 
administrators would especially benefit from further research about health services access, 
regardless of contractual agreements within the ACO network. A potential avenue for further 
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investigation is health services access by population density based on risk scores of 
Hierarchical Condition Category of ACO beneficiaries. Because ACO beneficiaries are not 
required to access services within a network, contractual agreements and referrals may not be 
as significant to timely services and preventative care. 
Fourth, there is opportunity to further explore ACO organizational readiness and health 
IT integration. Greater analyses would be beneficial to administrators to understand levels of 
standardization and integration needed for different types of providers, especially in the post -
acute setting. In addition to standardization, it would be valuable to understand if there is any 
association with formalized relationships and standardization required for health IT integration 
across different ACO members or providers. 
, as indicated by the findings throughout this study, ACO variability in performance, 
structure and even contingency exist. Further exploration of ACO programs and patient 
populations according to the local communities in which they subsist may provide greater insight 
into ACO performance. As ACO data capture progress in sophistication and volume of data 
available, geographical and regional trends may assist in better understanding ACO 
development and patient population trends. 
Finally, there is opportunity for more application of multiple contingency approaches to 
be used for ACO research. ACOs are prime for evaluating multiple contingencies because their 
scope expands across several care settings and environments. The platform in which ACOs 
operate also indicate internally, ACOs operate within several structures and that could be paired 
to multiple contingencies analyses. ACOs also operate in a uniquely multi-level environment 
that could be further explored under the lens of Structural Contingency Theory, specifically, 
vertical and horizontal integration.    
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Conclusion 
 Accountable care organization research has been diverse with opportunities for more 
granularity on organizational structures, contingency and performance. This exploratory study 
serves to reiterate ACO diversity and performance variation. Conceptually, multiple contingency 
fits have not been applied on ACO structure research, and this study attempts to apply 
Donaldson’s (2001) approach to multiple fit on ACO contingency-structure pairs. Although this 
study contains several limitations, most especially with its small sample size, results are 
indicative of how ACO performance is reliant on flexibility and innovation at the local level.  
 In the regression analysis results, this study exhibited statistically significant 
relationships between contingency-structure pairs and performance for strategic planning at the 
ACO level, retaining financial rewards with the ACO, rewards distribution across members and 
full data elements standardization. However, a co-led leadership structure, formal agreements 
or direct provision of health services, diverse access to behavioral health provider types and 
single EHR systems across the ACO did not indicate statistically significant relationships or 
showed inverse relationships to performance. Overall, administrators may find it useful to 
consider different means for health services access that does not need to be based on formal 
agreements or contracts. Additionally, health IT integration may require intensive change 
management or organizational readiness assessments before implementing a single EHR 
throughout the ACO’s member organizations.  
 Methodologically, this study applied Donaldson’s (2001) multiple contingency fit 
approach and extrapolated from Burton and Obel’s (1998) organizational design descriptions 
related to structural contingency. Considering the quantitative results from this study’s analyses, 
SCT is an exceptionally adequate theoretical framework applicable to ACO research. The high 
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variability of ACO performance indicates more localized solutions, increased flexibility and 
simpler rules would potentially support further ACO innovation and improvement.  
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Appendix 1 
Table 22 
Three Year Trend – Readmission Rates 
 
Readmission Ratea 
2015 
Readmission Ratea 
2016 
Readmission Ratea 
2017 
N 45 45 45 
Mean 162.02 161.20 169.42 
Median 162.00 161.00 172.00 
Std. Deviation 21.504 23.858 19.355 
Std. Error of Mean 3.206 3.557 2.885 
a. Readmission Rates per 1,000 discharges for ACO assigned beneficiaries within a performance year 
 
 
Table 23 
Three Year Trend – Inpatient Psychiatric Admission Rates 
 
IP Psych Admission 
Ratea 2015 
IP Psych Admission 
Ratea 2016 
IP Psych Admission 
Ratea 2017 
N 44 44 44 
Mean 9.91 9.11 8.18 
Median 9.50 9.00 7.50 
Std. Deviation 5.750 4.886 4.775 
Std. Error of Mean .867 .737 .720 
a: Inpatient psych facility discharges per 1,000 person years in ACO performance year 
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 Figure 17 
 Histogram –Total Earned Shared Savings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 
Q-Q Plot – Total Earned Shared Savings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 
Histogram – Relative Change in Readmissions 
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Figure 20 
Q-Q Plot – Relative Change in Readmissions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21 
Histogram – Relative Change in Inpatient Psychiatric Admissions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22 
 Q-Q Plot – Relative Change in Inpatient Psychiatric Admissions 
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Appendix 2 
Table 24 
Collinearity Statistics 
Independent Variable VIF 
Leadership 1.208 
Strategic Planning 1.134 
Retained 1.287 
Allocated 1.202 
Paid to Physicians 1.264 
Productivity 1.901 
Base Salary 1.890 
Clinical Quality 1.483 
Patient Satisfaction 1.664 
Cost Reduction 1.717 
Routine 1.904 
IP Rehab 2.230 
Mental Health 3.016 
Addiction 2.800 
SNF 1.554 
Palliative 3.370 
Home Health 2.734 
Hospital Diversion 1.859 
Psychiatrist 2.110 
NP_PA 1.508 
Psychologist 2.002 
Social Worker 1.639 
Mix EHRs 1.112 
Multiple EHRs 0.000a 
Single EHR 2.228 
Not Std Data 1.340 
Some Std Data 0.000a 
Most Std Data 1.455 
Fully Std Data 2.454 
a: excluded variables in regression
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Table 25 
Correlation Matrix: Independent Variables 
  Leadership 
Strategic 
Planning 
Retained Allocated 
Paid to 
Physicians 
Productivity 
Base 
Salary 
Leadership 1             
Strategic Planning -0.227 1           
Retained -0.089 -0.049 1         
Allocated 0.180 -0.091 0.069 1       
Paid to 
Physicians 
-0.008 0.086 0.193 0.143 1     
Productivity -0.049 0.086 -0.014 0.036 -0.071 1   
Base Salary -0.119 0.187 -0.142 0.024 0.078 .619** 1 
Clinical Quality -0.143 0.119 -0.026 0.267 0.200 0.200 0.090 
Patient 
Satisfaction 
0.105 0.129 0.010 0.273 .329* 0.143 0.071 
Cost Reduction 0.192 -0.055 -0.274 0.218 0.127 -0.236 -0.239 
Routine 0.159 -0.073 0.082 0.096 0.015 -.391** -.355* 
IP Rehab 0.165 -0.015 0.036 0.084 0.059 -0.277 -.519** 
Mental Health 0.034 0.000 -0.098 -0.018 0.027 -.373* -.426** 
Addiction 0.041 -0.197 -0.285 0.059 -0.198 -0.184 -0.256 
SNF 0.067 -0.069 0.112 -0.104 -0.249 0.010 -0.269 
Palliative 0.180 -0.046 0.007 0.038 -0.153 -.296* -.427** 
Home Health 0.124 0.127 -0.070 0.024 -0.132 -0.269 -.355* 
Hospital Diversion 0.008 -0.166 -0.068 0.000 -0.101 -0.226 -0.102 
Psychiatrist -0.086 0.070 0.160 -0.010 -0.017 0.223 .316* 
NP_PA 0.111 0.036 -0.194 0.068 -0.175 -0.111 0.111 
Psychologist -0.106 0.035 0.079 -0.084 -0.141 0.271 .332* 
Social Worker 0.022 0.178 -0.135 0.127 -0.162 0.083 0.280 
EHRs 0.150 0.246 -0.140 -0.237 0.007 0.166 .396** 
Data -0.140 0.074 0.282 -0.044 0.178 0.062 0.004 
Mix EHRs -0.200 -0.170 0.129 0.109 -0.148 -0.148 -.397** 
Multiple EHRs 0.217 0.024 -0.073 0.076 0.283 0.000 0.127 
Single EHR 0.012 0.207 -0.081 -0.262 -0.157 0.105 0.194 
Not Std Data 0.041 0.051 -0.233 -0.134 -.312* 0.134 0.247 
Some Std Data 0.173 -0.168 -0.037 0.265 0.094 -0.283 -.318* 
Most Std Data -0.217 0.120 0.073 0.038 0.189 0.189 0.064 
Fully Std Data -0.022 0.060 0.201 -0.151 -0.094 0.047 0.127 
ACO Size 0.135 -0.008 -0.136 -0.262 -0.172 0.197 0.130 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).     
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 25 
Correlation Matrix: Independent Variables Continued 
  
Clinical 
Quality 
Patient 
Satisfaction 
Cost 
Reduction 
Routine IP Rehab 
Mental 
Health 
Addiction 
Clinical Quality 1             
Patient 
Satisfaction 
.441** 1           
Cost Reduction .295* .417** 1         
Routine -0.169 0.021 0.230 1       
IP Rehab -0.282 0.003 0.248 .565** 1     
Mental Health 0.120 0.213 .366* .414** .392** 1   
Addiction 0.136 -0.084 0.159 0.245 0.093 .654** 1 
SNF -0.142 -0.079 -0.084 0.219 .424** 0.179 0.138 
Palliative -0.167 -0.027 0.175 .499** .372* .605** .522** 
Home Health -0.275 -0.244 0.122 .475** .523** .500** 0.294 
Hospital 
Diversion 
-0.188 -0.149 0.137 .382** 0.161 .505** .545** 
Psychiatrist -0.078 -0.111 -.342* -0.078 -.320* -.573** -.387* 
NP_PA -0.127 0.191 0.013 -0.003 -0.119 -0.095 0.108 
Psychologist -0.146 -0.111 -.408** -0.243 -.432** -.558** -.332* 
Social Worker 0.060 -0.078 -0.004 -0.211 -0.284 -.372* -0.176 
EHRs -0.241 -0.143 -0.015 -0.262 -0.183 -.510** -.540** 
Data -0.132 0.075 -0.176 -0.050 0.144 -.328* -.393** 
Mix EHRs 0.087 0.103 -0.024 0.164 .299* .391** 0.266 
Multiple EHRs 0.118 0.066 0.096 0.080 -0.222 0.020 0.127 
Single EHR -.294* -0.118 -0.053 -0.243 0.037 -.383* -.563** 
Not Std Data -0.028 -0.209 -0.068 -0.113 -0.293 0.144 0.213 
Some Std Data 0.118 0.230 .385** 0.159 0.266 0.159 0.071 
Most Std Data 0.236 0.033 -0.192 -0.032 -0.133 -0.096 0.057 
Fully Std Data -.354* -0.033 -0.144 -0.135 0.111 -.323* -.483** 
ACO Size -0.143 -0.108 -.350* -.525** -0.239 -0.196 0.013 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).     
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).    
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Table 25 
 
Correlation Matrix: Independent Variables Continued 
  SNF Palliative 
Home 
Health 
Hospital 
Diversion 
Psychiatrist NP_PA Psychologist 
Social 
Worker 
SNF 1               
Palliative .438** 1             
Home Health .350* .709** 1           
Hospital 
Diversion 
0.185 .480** .440** 1         
Psychiatrist -.299* -.462** -.341* -0.145 1       
NP_PA -0.230 -0.094 -0.245 0.039 .377* 1     
Psychologist -0.264 -.434** -.391** -0.110 .686** 0.273 1   
Social Worker -0.222 -0.193 -0.115 -0.216 .479** .512** .457** 1 
EHRs -0.278 -.303* -0.187 -.370* 0.179 -0.058 0.166 0.102 
Data -0.123 -0.163 -0.116 -0.192 .301* -0.006 0.248 0.081 
Mix EHRs 0.253 0.203 0.182 0.230 -0.087 0.090 -0.021 0.011 
Multiple EHRs -0.110 0.051 -0.016 0.044 -0.072 -0.080 -0.164 -0.141 
Single EHR -0.167 -0.266 -0.099 -.345* 0.196 0.006 0.247 0.179 
Not Std Data -0.052 0.048 0.160 0.084 -0.036 0.008 -0.079 0.055 
Some Std Data 0.274 0.101 -0.081 0.133 -0.279 0.113 -0.177 -0.119 
Most Std Data -0.220 -0.051 -0.081 -0.133 0.171 -0.126 0.164 0.041 
Fully Std Data -0.055 -0.177 -0.016 -0.133 .298* 0.106 0.199 0.137 
ACO Size -0.029 -0.127 -.319* -0.146 0.236 0.182 0.208 0.005 
 
  
EHRs Data 
Mix 
EHRs 
Multiple 
EHRs 
Single 
EHR 
Not Std 
Data 
Some 
Std Data 
Most Std 
Data 
Fully Std 
Data 
EHRs 1                 
Data .336* 1               
Mix EHRs -.800** 0.006 1             
Multiple EHRs 0.118 -.440** -.658** 1           
Single EHR .739** .556** -0.182 -.555** 1         
Not Std Data -0.059 -.742** -0.087 0.236 -0.196 1       
Some Std Data -0.283 -0.281 0.164 0.100 -0.277 -.354* 1     
Most Std Data 0.055 .491** -0.082 0.000 0.000 -.354* -.500** 1   
Fully Std Data .411** .629** 0.021 -.500** .693** -0.177 -0.250 -0.250 1 
ACO Size 0.219 0.113 -0.093 -0.087 0.253 0.143 -.303* 0.130 0.173 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 26 
Correlation Matrix: Dependent Variables 
 
Total Earned 
Shared Savingsa 
∆ Readmissionsb 
∆ Inpatient Psychiatric 
Admissionsc 
Total Earned Shared 
Savingsa 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 -.025 -.144 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .869 .345 
∆ Readmissionsb 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.025  -.138 
Sig. (2-tailed) .869  .368 
∆ Inpatient 
Psychiatric 
Admissionsc 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.144 -.138  
Sig. (2-tailed) .345 .368  
 
a. Calculated as the sum of ACO earned shared savings 2016 – 2017 
b. Calculated as the relative change in readmission rates per 1,000 discharges for all causes from 2015 start year and 2017  
c. Calculated as the relative change in rate of discharges from an inpatient psychiatric facility per 1,000 discharges from 2015 start 
year and 2017 
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